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ADMIRALTY PROCEDURE AND JURISDICTION 
AFTER THE 1966 UNIFICATION 
David W. Robertson* 
J. INTRODUCTION 
From the nation's beginning, the federal district courts have been 
vested with jurisdiction in cases "of admiralty or maritime jurisdic-
tion. "1 Like its predecessor statute, section 1333 of the present 
Judicial Code asserts that the jurisdiction is "exclusive of the courts of 
the states," but the infamous "saving clause"2 goes on to negate that 
exclusivity in the bulk of maritime cases by giving the plaintiff the 
option of maintaining his action in any other court having jurisdiction 
over it. In "saving clause" cases-that is, cases that could have been 
brought in federal court under the admiralty jurisdiction, but which 
were maintained, at plaintiff's option, in nonadmiralty tribunals-the 
substantive federal maritime law continues to obtain, 3 although pro-
cedural consequences vary. 
The operation of section 1333 would be typified in the case of a 
shipyard employee, injured while working aboard a vessel. Such a 
plaintiff could maintain a maritime tort action against the shipowner 
in federal court, basing jurisdiction on section 1333.4 If that choice 
were made, trial would be to the judge alone, in accordance with 
admiralty's well-entrenched nonjury tradition. 5 If the plaintiff wanted 
* Professor of Law, University of Texas. B.A. 1960, LL.B. 1961, Louisiana 
State University; LL.M. 1965, J.S.D. 1968, Yale University.-Ed. 
-r The systematic research for this article was completed in mid-1975. 
1. Judiciary Act of 1789, .ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76-77: "[l1he district courts shall 
have . . . exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction ... ; saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common Jaw remedy, 
where the common Jaw is competent to give it . . . ." The present version reads 
as follows: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the 
courts of the States, of . . . [a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, 
saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled . 
. . . " 28 u.s.c. § 1333 (1970). 
2. The wording of the saving clause was altered in 1948. Compare 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1333 (1970), with Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76-77. The meaning 
was not changed. See Madruga v. Superior Ct., 346 U.S. 556, 560 n.12, 565-66 
(1954). 
3. See notes 316-35 infra and accompanying text. 
4. The leading case on the extent of the admiralty jurisdiction over torts is Execu-
tive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972). Injury to a 
ship's repairman aboard ship would be within the section 1333 jurisdiction both be-
fore and after Executive Jet. 
5. See FED. R. Cxv. P. 38(e). 
1628 
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a jury trial, he would have to exercise his saving clause option to 
take the case either to state court or, if the diversity of citizenship and 
amotmt in controversy requirements could be met, 6 to federal court 
on that basis. 
Many maritime cases present plaintiff with this choice of avenues 
into federal court. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recite in 
clear terms how a plaintiff should manifest his choice. Rule 9(h) 
states: 
A pleading or count setting forth a claim for relief within the admir-
alty and maritime jurisdiction that is also within the jurisdiction of 
the district court on some other ground may contain a statement iden-
tifying the claim as an admiralty or maritime claim . . . . If the 
claim is cognizable only in admiralty, it is an admiralty or maritime 
claim . . . whether so identified or not . . . . 7 
Counsel for the plaintiff who can invoke federal court jurisdiction on 
both maritime and diversity grounds should make the designation 
permitted by rule 9(h) only if h~ is content with trial by a federal 
judge alone. If he wants a federal jury, he should refrain from 
making the rule 9(h) designation and should plead his case solely as 
a diversity action. 
All of this is almost insultingly simple and familiar ,to counsel 
experienced in maritime litigation. Yet to some other lawyers it is 
arcane. Illustrative is Romero v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 8 in 
which counsel for an injured shipyard employee filed a complaint that 
read: "Complainant alleges a cause of action based upon negligence 
in accord with general maritime law and a second cause of action on 
the grounds of unseaworthiness in accord with Rule 9(h) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."9 The complaint went on to al-
lege diversity and amount in controversy. Finally, the prayer 
read: "Wherefore, Complainant . . . demands judgment . . . gen-
eral and equitable relief, and for [sic] a trial by jury."1° Knowledge-
able counsel would have avoided the internal inconsistency-of making 
a 9(h) designation when a jury trial was desired. In such a case, 
diversity should have been the only basis used to establish jurisdic-
tion. Evidently unaware of the problem, plaintiff's counsel learned 
that the case was on the nonjury docket only when he appeared to 
select a jury. When the case was called, he requested a mistrial on 
the ground that his client was entitled to a jury. The trial judge 
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). 
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 9{h). 
8. 515 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1975). 
9. 515 F.2d at 1251. 
lO. 515 F.2d at 1251. 
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denied the motion and, ultimately, rendered judgment for the defend-
ant. 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit disposed of the plaintiff's argument 
that he was deprived of his seventh amendment rights: 
Whatever the subjective intention of appellant's counsel, it is clear 
that neither the district judge nor the defendants were given cause 
to believe that Romero had ever withdrawn the reference to Rule 9 
(h). . . . Romero could have obtained a jury trial on all claims 
simply by omitting or withdrawing the 9(h) designation of his com-
plaint and bringing his entire suit as ·a civil action. Yet, he persist-
ently refused to seek an amendment aimed at withdrawing the admir-
alty identification. We can find no logical purpose for this refusal 
in the face of his repeatedly professed desire for a jury .11 
Prior to 1966, the kind of difficulty encountered by plaintiff in 
Romero would have been less unexpected. In that year, however, the 
admiralty procedural rules were merged with the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The purpose of this highly controversial unification 
was to eliminate many of the mysteries of admiralty practice.12 Yet 
the rule 9(h) designation is only one of several unique and often 
confusing admiralty procedures that has survived. 
Before the 1966 unification, the district courts functioned under 
one set of procedural rules when exercising admiralty jurisdiction and 
under another when exercising federal question, diversity, or other 
jurisdiction. Thus, it was customary and correct to visualize a bifur-
cated federal district court, having both an "admiralty side" and a 
"civil" or "law side." The unification was designed to eradicate that 
conceptual separation18 and thereby yield significant simplification 
and increased accessibility. Prior to 1966, the admiralty courts had 
11. 515 F.2d at 1253-54 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
12. See Wiswall, Admiralty: Procedural Unification in Retrospect and Prospect, 
35 BROOKLYN L. REV. 36, 37 (1968). 
13. The weight of opinion was that the 1966 unification ,of the admiralty rules 
of procedure and civil rules destroyed the wall of separation. See, e.g., Bradley, Ad-
miralty Aspects of the Civil Rules, 41 F.R.D. 257 (1966); Colby, Admiralty Unifi• 
cation, 54 GEO. L.J. 1258 (1966); Crutcher, Imaginary Chair Removed from the 
United States Courthouse; Or, What Have They Done to Admiralty?, 5 WILLAMETrE 
L.J. 367, 374, 375 (1969); Currie, Unification of the Civil and Admiralty R11les: 
Why and How, 17 MAINE L. REv. 1 (1965); Fiddler, The Admiralty Practice in 
Montana and All That; A Critique of the Proposal To Abolish the General Admir-
alty Rules by Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and a Counter-
proposal, 11 MAINE L. REv. 15 (1965); Hecht & Davis, Unification of Admiralty 
and Civil Rules, 1967 ABA SECT. !NS. NEG. & COMP. L. 222; Maris, Recent Changes 
in the Federal Rules of Procedure, 42 F.R.D. 552 (1966); Wiswall, supra note 12. 
Others were better prophets. See Cohn, The Seamless Web: Civil-Admiralty 
Unification, 1967 ABA SECT. !Ns., NEG. & COMP. L. 228, 231; Tweedt, Will the Uni• 
fication of the Civil a11d Admiralty Rules Be a Happy, Productive Marriage?, Id. at 
233,237. 
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been "veiled in mystical words, phrases, rules, and forms of practice 
which no outsider could confidently penetrate. "14 After 1966, the 
"imaginary chair,"15 the "fiction of an independent admiralty juris-
diction,"16 would, presumably, vanish. 
At the same time, it was thought necessary to preserve certain 
specialized admiralty procedures that were deemed intrinsic to the 
subject matter. Accordingly, Supplemental Rules A through F of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make provision for what may be 
called the essential peculiarities of admiralty practice: actions in 
rem; maritime attachment and garnishment; possessory, petitory, and 
partition actions; and actions for limitation of liability. Additionally, 
the numbered rules preserve a peculiar form of third-party practice, 17 
the non jury tradition, 18 and admiralty's liberal venue doctrines.111 
Preservation of these special procedures reflects the current state 
of admiralty jurisdiction more accurately than does the superficial 
merger of admiralty and civil rules. The theory of the Rules drafts-
men was that unificiation would eliminate any further talk of the 
"admiralty side" and the "civil side" of the court. Furthermore, there 
would be no occasion for using the terms "libellant," "libel," "respon-
cJent," and "proctor."20 However, as this article will demonstrate, 
those terms and the separatist concept that underlies them persist. 
The outcome in the Romero case dramatically demonstrates the un-
wisdom of preserving as a specialist pra~tice a field that is formally 
fully accessible to the generalist lawyer. The premise of this article 
is that many special characteristics of the admiralty jurisdiction sub-
sist wholly without justification and fall into the category of the old-
fashioned "trap for the unwary." If, as has been claimed, "[t]he 
entire thrust of modem law reform . . . has been away from the 
mumbo-jumbo theory of law practice,"21 admiralty practice in many 
respects stands well outside the mainstream. This article will docu-
ment that claim and propose legislative correction. As a prologue 
to these efforts, the next section will examine several recent and un-
successful attempts at reform. 
14. Crutcher, supra note 13, at 375. 
15. Id. at 367. 
16. Id. at 374. 
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 14(c). 
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(e). 
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 82. 
20. A "libellant" is a plaintiff, a "libel" is a complaint, a "respondent" is a de-
fendant, and "proctors" are lawyers. 
21. Zobel, Admiralty Jurisdiction, Unification, and the American Law Institute, 
6 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 375, 398 (1969). 
1632 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:1627 
II. THE AMERICAN LAW lNSTITUTE'S .ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION 
PROPOSALS AND THE FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION ACTS 
On March 14, 1969, the American Law Institute (ALI) pub-
lished its Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and 
Federal Courts,22 which considered all aspects of federal jurisdiction. 
Included among the proposals offered by the Institute were certain 
modest suggestions for rationalizing admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion. The conservative character of these recommendations was the 
product of conscious deference to the mysteries of maritime practice.23 
The prevailing attitude was epitomized by the Chief Reporter. "[W]e 
[the Reporters] were not admiralty experts . . . . [P]artly because 
of our inexpertness . . . , and partly because we think it's sound any-
way, we thought that fooling around with language which had been 
thoroughly construed by the courts, was thoroughly understood by 
experts . . .-with which we do not classify ourselves-was a very 
much safer and wiser course .... "24 This deference had a sig-
nificant impact on the Institute's work. Critics brought a number 
of obvious and easily cured anomalies in the scope of admiralty 
jurisdiction to the Institute's attention. Some corrections were pro-
posed, 25 but in an alarming number of instances the anomaly was re-
22. AMERICAN I.Aw INSTITUTE, Snmy OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BE· 
TWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURT (1969) [hereinafter ALI STUDY]. 
23. The following comments are representative: "[W]ith respect to admiralty, 
our major desire, really, was not to rock the boat . . • . [W]hat we really wanted 
to do was to leave pretty much as it was the outlines of this jurisdiction." AMERI-
CAN L.\W INSTITUTE, PROCEEDINGS, 45m ANNUAL MEETING 45 (1968) [hereinafter 
PROCEEDINGS]. See id. at 45: "It was our objective . • • to make clearer as a matter 
of statute what is already clear to those experts in the mysteries of admiralty but 
not so clear to the run-of-the-mill, rank-and-file practitioner •••• " 
24. Id. at 60, 64. The Institute's philosophy was that admiralty is for the cog-
noscenti: ''The gloss that time has created on the traditional words [of the grant 
of admiralty jurisdiction] may be puzzling to the neophyte but it is well understood 
by the specialized bar and experienced judges who try admiralty cases." ALI STUDY 
230. 
25. The Institute proposed six significant clarifications or alterations in admiralty 
jurisdiction: 
(1) Adding language making clear that "the admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion does not include a claim merely because it arose on navigable waters." See 
proposed section 1316(a), ALI STUDY 34, 231-34. Since this proposal was writ-
ten, the Supreme Court has held that the mere fact of an injuzy or accident oc-
curring on navigable waters is not sufficient, absent "a significant relationship 
to traditional maritime activity," to invoke the admiralty jurisdiction. Execu-
tive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972). The case 
deals with aircraft crashes, but the "maritime relationship" requirement was 
probably intended by the Court to apply more generally, and the lower courts 
are generally construing it that way. See, e.g., Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520, 
524 (5th Cir. 1973) (deer hunters in small boat on Mississippi River); Crosson 
v. Vance, 484 F.2d 840, 842 (4th Cir. 1973) (water skier on tributazy of Chesa-
peake Bay). An exception is Richards 'V. Blake Builders Supply, Inc., 528 F.2d 
745, 748-49 (4th Cir. 1975). 
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tained.26 
Almost as influential as this exaggerated respect for admiralty's 
complexity was the ALI's optimistic assumption that the 1966 unifi-
cation of the admiralty rules with the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure27 had cured a number of erstwhile problems. Acknowledging 
that an admiralty court's lack of jurisdiction to grant equitable relief 
had always been "quite senseless,"28 the Institute hopefully supposed 
that "this unwise limitation was ended by the unification of civil and 
admiralty procedure in 1966."29 Similarly, the traditional distinction 
(2) Rewriting the saving clause to make explicit the-categories of exclusive ad-
miralty jurisdiction. See proposed section 1316(b), ALI SnJDY 34, 234-39. 
(3) Providing that actions under the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. 
§§ 761-768 (1970), may be maintained in nonadmiralty tribunals. See proposed 
section 1316(b), ALI STUDY 34, 236-37. 
( 4) Providing that an exclusively admiralty action originally brought in state 
court may be removed. See proposed section 1316(b), ALI STUDY 35, 244-45. 
(5) Attempting to codify the rules of venue and process for admiralty actions. 
See proposed section 1318, id. at 36, 245-49. 
( 6) Granting a right to either party to a maritime personal injury or death case 
to demand a jury trial in admiralty. See proposed section 1319, id. at 37, 250-
54. 
26. For example, while acknowledging the lack of sense of holding that ship-re-
pair contracts are maritime but ship-building contracts are not, the Institute declared 
it to be "an anomaly of little practical significance, save as a matter of symmetry, 
since so long as it is understood, as it is by those who build ships and those for whom 
they are built, they are able to safeguard their interests." Id. at 228. Actually, a 
wealth of anomalous doctrines respecting the admiralty's contract jurisdiction continue 
to generate litigation that is highly frustrating to the courts. See, e.g., McCorkle v. 
First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 459 F.2d 243, 244, 251 (4th Cir. 1972); Kane v. 
Motor Vessel Leda, 355 F. Supp. 796 (E.D. La. 1972); Hinkins S.S. Agency v. 
Freighters, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 373 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Similarly, while there are 
strong arguments that pleasure boating should be excluded from admiralty jurisdic-
tion, the Institute felt that 
it would be difficult to draft the jurisdictional statute in such a way as to exclude 
pleasure boating, and [that] problems would arise in deciding what is a pleasure 
boat and what the jurisdictional consequences are of a collision between a pleas-
ure boat and a commercial vessel. In addition it seems that the major problems 
here are not really jurisdictional but are matters of substantive law. Whether 
a pleasure boat should be regarded as a "vessel" for purposes of the Limitation 
of Liability Act, for example, is hardly the sort of question a jurisdictional study 
can appropriately resolve. 
ALI SnJoy 227-28. Further, while serious questions with respect to the boundaries 
of the category of actions in rem over which admiralty jurisdiction is exclusive re-
main, "the natural obscurity that has existed for many years without doing any great 
harm is being perpetuated. . . . [110 clear everything up . . . is not what was at-
tempted here." PROCEEDINGS 66. 
21. See notes 13-19 supra. 
28. ALI STUDY 226. 
29. Id. The argument that the 1966 merger cured the equitable remedies problem 
uses the following reasoning: 
A suit in admiralty is now, by force of Civil Rule 1, a "civil action." Rule 1.8 
expressly allows joinder of as many claims as the party has, whether "legal, 
equitable, or maritime." For certain purposes a suitor may continue to invoke 
special admiralty procedures, but Rule 65, dealing with injunctions, is not one 
of these exceptional rules, and is fully applicable in terms to all civil actions. 
The concept of pendent jurisdiction, if necessary, is surely broad enough to per-
mit a federal court . . • to give additional remedies for the same wrong, even 
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between building and repairing ships was seen to be completely 
anomalous, although it was no't considered overly important. In any 
event, predicted the Institute, "since the unification of admiralty and 
civil procedure, the doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction 
will permit joinder or impleader in any case in w~ich the transaction 
or occurrence involved gives rise to both maritime and non-maritime 
claims."30 
This article will demonstrate that the ALI erred in its appraisal 
of the admiralty jurisdiction. 31 The maritime specialists' claims 
that admiralty procedure works well and that it is too delicate 
and mysterious to be tampered with probably should have been 
received with a bit more of the skepticism that is normally required 
when a generalist approaches a specialist preserve. The thought has 
been expressed, fairly unkindly, in a narrower context: "[I]t seems 
likely that [the Reporters] have simply been bamboozled by the 
antiquarian crustaceans of the admiralty bar, who maintain a monop-
oly of aqueous litigation by promulgating the myth that their subject 
is arcane. "32 
The Institute's recommendations contemplated congressional im-
plementation, which has not eventuated. On May 14, 1971, Senator 
Burdick introduced the "Federal Court Jurisdiction Act of 1971;"83 
though there were no independent jurisdictional basis for the claim for the addi-
tional remedy . . . . Thus today there should be no difficulty in a federal court 
giving equitable relief in a case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction. 
Id. at 226-27. The assumption that the 1966 merger cured the equitable remedies 
problem was also made in much of the commentary dealing with the merger. See 
1 W. BARRON & A. HoLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 32 (Wright ed. 
Cum. Supp. 1960); Colby, supra note 13, at 1268-70. The post-1966 cases do not 
bear out the prediction. See text at notes 49-108 infra. The argument that the merger 
could hardly have been expected to cure the problem is well put by Zobel, supra note 
21, at 388-90. 
30. ALI STUDY 228. Here again, the post-1966 cases do not bear out the predic-
tion. Admiralty's ancillary and pendent jurisdiction may have been increased by the 
1966 merger, but the extent and nature of the increase is far too uncertain and ran-
dom to bear the weight the ALI study puts on it. See text at notes 108-230 infra. 
31. One of the two published studies on the ALI's admiralty recommendations 
is highly critical. See Zobel, supra note 21, at 398, 410-11. The other study, Currie, 
The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute-Part II, 36 U. Cm. L, Rnv. 
268, 286 (1969), is' mildly approving. A third treatment of the ALI recommenda-
tions does not deal with admiralty. See Comment, An Analysis of the ALi's Ap-
proach to the State-Federal Jurisdictional Dilemma, 21 .AM. U. L. REV. 287 (1972). 
Professor Maraist treats the ALI study tangentially, in the course of arguing for ex-
clusive state-court jurisdiction over what he calls "admiralty tort and compensation 
cases," in Proposed Discipline for a Procedural Problem Child: Reallocation of Ad-
miralty Tort and Compensation Jurisdiction Between Federal and State Courts, 24 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 26 (1969). 
32. Currie, supra note 31, at 303 (a remark directed specifically at the ALi's ad-
miralty venue proposal). 
33. S. 1876, 92d Cong., 1st ~ss. (1971). 
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whose admiralty features were a verbatim reproduction of the ALi's 
recommendations. 34 During hearings on the bill, 35 the maritime bar 
became officially involved with the proposals for ,the first time.36 The 
Maritime Law Association forcefully and unambiguously stated its 
opposition to any change37 and thus rejected as unnecessary and 
probably dangerous even the minimal clarifications recommended by 
the ALI.38 The major "proposal-provision of a jury trial at the 
behest of either party in admiralty personal injury and death 
cases89-was denounced as downright frightening.40 The "Federal 
34. Compare ALI SnJDy 34-37, with §§ 1316-1319 of S. 1876, supra note 33. 
35. See Hearings on S. 1876 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial 
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d sess., pt. 2, at 635-
703 (1972) [hereinafter 1972 Hearings]. 
36. "The Maritime Law Association of the United States is a 73 year old organ-
ization whose nearly 2,000 active members represent, for all intents and purposes, 
the entire admiralty bar in this country." Statement to the Senate Subcommittee by 
Herbert M. Lord, then Chairman of the Committee on Maritime Legislation of the 
Maritime Law Association (MLA) of the United States, 1972 Hearings 666. His 
statement may be a slight exaggeration-I am told that attorneys who frequently rep-
resent maritime plaintiffs do not inevitably join the Association. Evidently the Mari-
time Law Association had been invited to participate in the ALI Study but did not 
respond. See id. at 685, 686. 
37. But see remarks of David Owen, for the MLA: "One thing I would like to 
make plain, and that is the admiralty bar generally and the Association in particular 
are not against change as such." Id. at 686. 
38. See id. at 640, 662, 668-71, 672, 687-90. 
39. See proposed section 1319, ALI SruoY 37, 250-54. The proposal appeared 
in S. 1876, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1319 (1971). 
40. Section 1319 not only grants a jury trial in a personal injury and death 
case in admiralty, but by excluding only actions for limitation of liability and 
actions against the United States and its agencies, it might be construed as pro-
viding for a jury trial in all cases of diversity jurisdiction. Some of our members 
are fearful that as previously worded, it might even permit the trial by jury of 
collision cases. 
1972 Hearings 668. 
[T]he fears that some of the members of our association have, namely, you are 
going to have jury trials in collision cases, in charter parties, cargo damage . 
. . . [I]n some collisions you are going to have a jury trial and in some you 
are not. Right now you do not have jury trial in collision cases at all . . . • 
[Y]ou cannot get it now. You cannot go into Federal court on diversity juris-
- diction and get a jury trial in a collision case. Under the proposal you can. 
Id. at 690. But see Puget Sound Nav. Co. v. Nelson, 41 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1930) 
(jury trial in diversity collision case); Intagliata v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat 
Co., 26 Cal. 2d 365, 159 P.2d 1 (1945) (collision case tried to jury in state court). 
Admittedly, jury trials in collision cases are rare. The probable reason is that in 
1893 the Supreme Court in Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674 (1893), affirmed a state 
court's application of the doctrine of contributory negligence in a collision case. Pre-
sumably plaintiffs do not bring collision cases in diversity actions since the application 
of the contributory negligence doctrine could act as a bar to recovery. While the 
application of the contributory negligence theory is completely out of line with the 
modern judicial posture on choice of law in maritime cases, see D. ROBERTSON, AD-
MIRALTY AND FEDERALISM 194-202 (1970), the decision has never been explicitly re-
pudiated by the Court. Accordingly, experienced maritime counsel may avoid nonad-
miralty tribunals out of respect for that threat. 
For further objections offered by the MLA to the jury trial provision, see 1972 
Hearings 687-90. 
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Court Jurisdiction Act of 1973"41 reflected certain changes generated 
by the hearings, 42 but it remained closely modelled upon the ALI 
proposals. This bill died in the Senate Subcommittee on Improve-
ments in Judicial Machinery. Some of the ALI's recommendations 
may be reintroduced in 1976 as part of a broad-ranging court reform 
proposal, but the immediate prospects for a legislative response to the 
problems of admiralty jurisdiction are bleak. 43 
In any case, neither of the federal court jurisdiction acts spoke 
directly to the central issues of civil/ admiralty separatism. The re-
form proposed here will be considered drastic: Admiralty ought to be 
abolished as a separate grant of federal jurisdiction that is formally 
coequal with the diversity and federal question grants. It should 
instead be made a subcategory of federal question jurisdiction. Very 
early in the ALI's deliberations there was "some demand"44 for just 
such a change, but the idea was not acted upon. Nowhere in the 
published reports of the ALI's project is there any explanation of the 
source of the "demand" or of the reasons for not attempting to meet 
it.45 The ALI Study simply raises the possibility, points out that 
"much can be said for it,"46 demonstrates that it would be rather easy 
to accomplish, and then concludes that "it seems preferable" to leave 
matters as they are. 47 
Despite the ALI position, the idea should be pursued as a poten-
tial remedy for the vestiges of civil/admiralty separatism that have 
41. S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973 ). 
42. The basic grant of jurisdiction in section 1316(a) was substantially broadened 
by adding language extending admiralty jurisdiction to: claims for declaratory and 
equitable relief and interpleader; all claims arising out of the affairs of vessels of 
300-plus gross tons; broad ancillary and pendent jurisdiction; aircraft crashes beyond 
a marine league. See S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 1316(a) (1973). The at-
tempted reformulation of the line between exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction, the 
new saving clause, was insignificantly reworded. Id. § 1316(b). The venue proposal 
was broadened to include a district where a state court would have jurisdiction over 
the defendant. Id. § 1318(a)(3). Language was added seeking to make clear thal 
the broadening of process and venue is not meant to affect the remedy of maritime 
attachment. Id. § 1318(b)(1). A provision was added validating service or attach-
ment in a district adjoining the one where the action is brought, where such arrest 
or attachment is made on a body of water that forms or includes the boundary be-
tween the two districts. Id. § 1318(b)(2). 
43. For a recommendation that the Federal Court Jurisdiction Act of 1973 be 
resurrected and altered, see text at notes 379-405 infra. 
44. See testimony of Leavenworth Colby, the ALi's admiralty adviser, who pre-
sented the legislation to the Senate Subcommittee, 1972 Hearings 637. 
45. The matter is not mentioned in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PROCEEDINGS 
45m ANNUAL MEETING (1968). Nor is it explained in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 
TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 6 (1968). I am informed by Professor Charles Alan Wright, 
who served as Reporter, that the suggestion originated with Leavenworth Colby. Mr. 
Colby's purpose seems to have been full civil-admiralty unification. 
46, ALI STUDY 225. 
41. Id. at 225-26. 
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survived the 1966 unification of the admiralty rules with the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The remainder of this article is devoted to 
examining the tenacity of civil/ admiralty separatism in the federal 
courts (sectio~ Ill) and to detailing a proposal that attacks this 
separatism by integrating the admiralty jurisdiction into the federal 
question jurisdiction (section IV). 
ill. THE FAILURE OF THE 1966 UNIFICATION OF THE 
.ADMIRALTY AND CIVIL RULES 
This section will discuss many of the cases that have followed the 
1966 unification of civil and admiralty rules; these cases demonstrate 
the tenacity of the civil/ admiralty conception and the confusion it 
often causes. In this discussion, the terminology employed will re-
flect current thinking regarding the nature of maritime cases.48 Thus, 
"suit in admiralty" is sometimes preferred to the more cumbersome 
"claim identified as an admiralty or maritime claim pursuant to Rule 
9(h)," although the latter formulation has been the technically cor-
rect one since the merger. Similarly, "admiralty court," "admiralty 
side," or "court sitting in admiralty" have frequently been used, 
rather than the technically correct "United States District Court exer-
cising its admiralty or maritime jurisdiction." 
A. Admiralty's Equity Powers 
In its 1969 recommendations the American Law Institute made 
no provision for equitable relief in courts of admiralty; the Institute 
took the position that the 1966 unification had cured the problem of 
admiralty's lack of equitable powers. 49 Like many other assessments 
of the effects of the 1966 merger, this position has proved to be overly 
optimistic. Some commentators have noted the continuing diffi-
culty, 50 and a number of post-merger cases indicate that further action 
is needed to remove the lingering doubts about the availability of equi-
table relief in admiralty. 
The pre-1966 notion that admiralty lacked plenary equitable 
48. Since the 1966 unification it is technically incorrect to speak of "admiralty," 
the "admiralty side," or of "sitting in admiralty." See notes 13-20 supra and accom-
panying text. However, as pointed out in G. GILMORE & L. BLACK, THE LAw OF 
ADMIRALlY 19-20 (2d ed. 1975), it is efficient to employ the older terminology with 
the implicit understanding that ''no case is any longer 'in admiralty' in the older 
sense." 
49. See notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text. 
50. See Currie, supra note 31, at 286-87 & n.337; Zobel, supra note 21, at 381-
95; Comment, Admiralty Practice After Unification: Barnacles on the Procedural 
Hull, 81 YALE L.J. 1154, 1157-63 (1972). 
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power is totally lacking in sense. 51 The difficulty in correcting this 
defect is that the matter was generally cast in jurisdictional terms; 
hence, efforts to find a remedy in the unification can be met with the 
familiar but potent argument that rules of procedure could not con" 
ceivably have been proposed or interpreted as a cure for jurisdictional 
limitations. The enabling statute52 and the rules themselves63 make 
clear that no attempt was being made to alter jurisdictional bounda" 
ries. If admiralty lacked the equitable powers of its civil counterpart 
because of considerations rooted in the jurisdictional statute, or in the 
jurisdictional provisions of the Constitution, 54 then those limitations 
subsist. 55 The prevailing view prior to unification was plainly that 
the limitation was of jurisdictional stature. 56 
The most thoughtful recent analysis of this question asserts that 
the pre-1966 cases denying equitable power depended on a want of 
jurisdiction over the underlying claim, and not on a want of jurisdic" 
tion to grant relief. 57 That progressive view seems to have been 
refuted by the two leading Supreme Court decisions on the subject of 
equitable relief in admiralty. 58 Thus, the conventional wisdom is 
51. For fun discussion of the genesis of the American limitations on the equity 
powers of admiralty courts, see Morrison, The Remedial Powers of the Admiralty, 
43 YALE L.J. 1 (1933). See also D. ROBERTSON, supra note 40, at 28-64, 104-22. 
52. 28 u.s.c. § 2072 (1970). 
53. See FED. R. CIV. P. 82. 
54. It is not reany necessary to reach constitutional considerations in analyzing 
this matter: "Since . . . Rule 82 forbids interpretation of the rules which would alter 
the court's subject matter jurisdiction, one need not reach the constitutional question 
in order to invalidate a rule interpretation on jurisdictional grounds. Conversely an 
interpretation that is unobjectionable under Rule 82 is also necessarily permissible 
under Article Ill." Comment, supra note 50, at 1159. 
55. A very harsh critic of the American Law Institute's admiralty proposals has 
offered the funest range of arguments that the 1966 unification could hardly have 
been expected to cure the equitable remedies problem. See Zobel, supra note 21, at 
384-94. The countervailing arguments are wen analyzed in Comment, supra note 50, 
at 1157-63. 
56. See Zobel, supra note 21. 
57. See Comment, supra note 50, at 1159-61. 
58. In Rea v. Steamer Eclipse, 135 U.S. 599 (1890), a half owner and creditors 
libened the vessel to secure possession from the other half owner. A third party in-
tervened, seeking specific performance of an alleged contract of sale. Deeming the 
interests of both the co-libellants (creditors) and the intervenor "[merely] equitable," 
135 U.S. at 607, the Court stated: 
So far as the creditors and interveners were concerned, if the former desired to 
wind up the trust, or the latter to enforce an alleged contract of sale, which is 
indeed what is asked by this intervention, they should have resorted to a differ-
ent tribunal. While the court of admiralty exercises its jurisdiction upon equi• 
table principles, it has not the characteristic powers of a court of equity. It can-
not entertain a bill or libel for specific performance, or to correct a mistake; 
or declare or enforce a trust or an equitable title; or exercise jurisdiction in mat• 
ters of account merely; or decree the sale of a ship for an unpaid mortgage, 
or declare her to be the property of the mortgagees and direct possession of her 
to be given to them. The jurisdiction embraces an maritime contracts, torts, in-
juries or offenses, and it depends, in cases of contract, upon the nature of the 
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rather clearly supportive of those post-1966 decisions that refuse to 
find in unification a cure for the prior want of equity powers. The 
courts that have been willing to find such a cure have generally acted 
out of an abiding conviction that the limitation had always been 
senseless enough to be rejected out of hand. 
The Fifth Circuit is alone59 among the courts of appeals in having 
contract, and is limited to contracts, claims and services purely maritime, and 
touching rights and duties appertaining to commerce and navigation. There was 
nothing maritime about the claims of the interveners, and the intervention was 
properly dismissed for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter. 
135 U.S. at 608 (citations omitted). Comment, supra note 50, views the pre-1966 
jurisprudence as resting on the nonmaritime nature of the underlying subject matter, 
and focuses on the above disposition of the Supreme Court as though it dealt only 
with the intervenor's attempt to get specific enforcement of a contract of sale. The 
trouble with that analysis is that the Court in the Eclipse appears to have been par-
tially referring to the co-libellants, whose interests allegedly stemmed from an agree-
ment dealing in part with the operation of the vessel. The context of the quoted 
statement as well as its breadth and decisiveness seem to refute the suggested inter-
pretation. 
In Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684 
(1950), the lower court vacated a foreign attachment of a vessel on the theory that 
the defendant in the in personam action was not the owner, and that the admiralty 
court lacked jurisdiction to inquire whether the transfer of the vessel was fraudulent. 
The disposition in the Supreme Court was favorable to the exercise of equitable 
power in that instance, but Justice Frankfurter's opinion devastates the theory that 
the general limitations on admiralty's equitable powers are nonjurisdictional: 
Unquestionably a court of admiralty will not enforce an independent equitable 
claim merely because it pertains to maritime property. The reasoning of the 
District Court would be pertinent if the libellants, as creditors • • • , had gone 
into admiralty by way of a creditor's bill to set aside a pretended sale of the 
Caribe as a fraudulent transfer. But that is not the case before us. Libellants 
went into admiralty on a claim arising upon a contract of affreightment sup-
plemented by charges of negligence in the nondelivery of a sea cargo--matters 
obviously within admiralty jurisdiction. As an incident to that claim, in order 
to secure respondents' appearance and to insure the fruits of a decree in libel-
lants' favor, they made an attachment. • • • The issue of fraud arises in connec-
tion with the attachment as a means of effectuating a claim incontestably in ad-
miralty. To deny an admiralty court jurisdiction over this subsidiary or deriva-
tive issue in a litigation clearly maritime would require an absolute rule that ad-
miralty is rigorously excluded from all contact with nonmaritime transactions 
and from all equitable relief, even though such nonmaritime transactions come 
into play, and such equitable relief is sought, in the course of admiralty's exercise 
of its jurisdiction over a matter exclusively maritime. It would be strange indeed 
thus to hobble a legal system that has been so responsive to the practicalities 
of maritime commerce and so inventive in adapting its jurisdiction to the needs 
of that commerce. . . . We find no restriction upon admiralty by chancery so 
unrelenting as to bar the grant of any equitable relief even when that relief is 
subsidiary to issues wholly within admiralty jurisdiction. 
339 U.S. at 690-92 (citations omitted). Justice Frankfurter went on to adduce a 
number of examples, putting the holding in perspective, and making clear the hold-
ing's dependency on the ancillary or derivative nature of the equitable issue in Swift 
itself. Making it clear that the Court considered the want of affirmative equitable 
powers to be a jurisdictional limitation, the opinion states: "[A]dmiralty is not 
seized of jurisdiction to correct a fraud simply because it is a fraud; that's the busi-
ness of equity. The basis of admiralty's power is to protect its jurisdiction from being 
thwarted by a fraudulent transfer, and that applies equally whether it is concerned 
with executing its judgment or authorizing an attachment to secure an independent 
maritime claim." 339 U.S. at 694-95. 
59. While the matter of declaratory and injunctive relief in admiralty under the 
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made clear its view that unification removed any doubt about the 
reach of admiralty's equity powers. In several cases, Judge Brown°0 
has written: "The Chancellor is no longer fixed to the wool-
sack. He may stride the quarterdeck of maritime jurisprudence and, 
in the role of admiralty judge, dispense, as would his landlocked 
brother, that which equity and good conscience impels."61 Yet it is 
in dicta rather than in the results achieved that the post-unification 
decisions in the Fifth Circuit support -the argument that unification 
cured the equity problem. Three of the decisions sustain the power 
of a limitation court to enjoin proceedings collateral to the limitation 
proceeding. 62 Under the prevailing view limitation courts have long 
had this power. 63 Nevertheless, the leading case in this series04 
provisions of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-466(g) (1) 
(1970), was involved in Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 
(1967), the Court did not discuss the question of their general availability in ad-
miralty. 
60. Judge Brown was referred to as "our leading admiralty authority" by Justice 
Douglas in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 115 (1971) (dissenting opinion). 
Similar praise was bestowed on him in Zobel, supra note 21, at 399 ("the most au-
thoritative maritime analyst in all the federal judiciary"). 
61. Evidently Judge Brown coined this phrase in Compania Anonima Venezolana 
de Nav. v. Perez Export Co., 303 ·F.2d 692, 699 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 
942 (1962). The phrase is quoted or paraphrased in a number of his subsequent 
opinions for the Fifth Circuit, including Law v. Sea Drilling Corp., 510 F.2d 242, 
250 (5th Cir. 1975); Cates v. United States, 451 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1971); 
Florida Bahamas Lines, Ltd. v. Steel Barge "Star 800" of Nassau, 433 F.2d 1243, 
1249 (5th Cir. 1970). It is also echoed in other Fifth Circuit opinions, see, e.g., 
Merrill-Stevens Dry Dock Co. v. M/V "Laissez Faire," 421 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 
1970); Olympic Towing Corp. v. Nebel Towing Co., 419 F.2d 230, 235 (5th Cir. 
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970). 
The recent decision in Lewis v. S.S. Baune, 534 F.2d 115, 121 (5th Cir. 1976) 
is either very heavy dictum or a holding that admiralty courts have the power to 
issue injunctions. 
62. See In re Unterweser Reederei, GMBH, 428 F.2d 888, 892 (5th Cir. 1970), 
vacated on other grounds sub nom. M.S. Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co., 407 U.S. 
1 (1972); Olympic Towing Corp. v. Nebel Towing Co., 419 F.2d 230, 235 (5th Cir. 
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970) (dictum); Guillot v. Cenac Towing Co., 
366 F.2d 898, 904-05 (5th Cir. 1966). 
63. FED. R. Crv. P. F(3 ), dealing with limitation procedure, states: "Upon com-
pliance by the owner with the requirements of subdivision ( 1) of this rule all claims 
and proceedings against the owner or his property with respect to the matter in ques-
tion shall cease. On application of the plaintiff the court shall enjoin the further 
prosecution of any action or proceeding against the plaintiff or his property with re-
spect to any claim subject to limitation in the action." This provision reflects and 
continues powers of the pre-merger limitation court. 
64. In Guillot v. Cenac Towing Co., 366 F.2d 898, 904 (5th Cir. 1966), Judge 
Brown stated: 
The Court to whom virtually exclusive responsibility is committed for the oper-
ation of this [limitation] machinery has ample resources to assure, as appro.pri-
ate, that such Court retains exclusive control and power over competing claim-
ants. And in this day, which, to the dismay of some, and the disappointment 
of many others who see the esoteric trappings of their specialized calling foun-
dering from the forces of integrated rules, it would be odd indeed if the same 
person sitting as the same Judge were powerless tQ act because of the abbrevi-
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is cited by the ALI Study in support of the statement that "today 
there should be no difficulty in a federal court giving equitable relief 
in a case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction."65 
Other Fifth Circuit decisions that might be cited in support of the 
argument that unification cured the equity limitation are similarly 
narrow in their holdings. Under these cases, an admiralty court 
can distribute among nonlienholder claimants the post-lien-payoff 
proceeds of sale of a vessel, 66 exercise "equitable latitude" in de-
clining to enforce a seaman's release against one not mentioned in 
it, 67 render appropriate orders respecting the provision or acceptance 
of security pending litigation, 68 treat a multi-claim mortgage foreclo-
sure proceeding as a concursus and admit as a putative lienholder an 
advertising agency,69 set aside or modify the judicial sale of a vessel on 
grounds of fraud, 70 and arrange lien priorities according to equitable 
principles. 71 Each of these exercises of powers would probably have 
been sustained prior to unification as derivative or subsidiary to the 
main proceeding, 72 but there is some powerful and expansive lan-
guage in certain cases: "In many respects Israel's commencing a 
mortgage foreclosure invited a concursus in which at this day and 
time the disposition will be to let the Chancellor stride the quarter-
ated, and now nearly obsolete, prefix to a cause number. In the Admiralty the 
Chancellor now goes to sea and has adequate equitable reserves. 
This language is relied upon by Wiswall, supra note 12, at 37, in support of the claim 
that the 1966 merger was motivated partially by a desire for "liturgical reform." A 
similar statement by Judge Brown appears in Cates v. United States, 451 F.2d 411, 
412 (5th Cir. 1971): '11n an appeal which for the most part ignores the distinctive 
role of this Court as though the balmy pre-McAllister days of reconsideration of ad-
miralty cases de novo were still the birthright of proctors who have also lost their 
titles . . .. " That even language reform is difficult to come by is indicated by con-
tinued references to "libellants," "respondents," and "proctors." See, e.g., Jack Neil-
son, Inc. v. Tug Peggy, 428 F.2d 54, 56 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 
(1970); Flaska v. Little River Marine Constr. Co., 389 F.2d 885 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 392 U.S. 928 (1968). 
65. ALI STUDY 227. 
'66. Veverica v. Drill Barge Buccaneer No. 7, 488 F.2d 880, 885 (5th Cir. 1974). 
67. Cates v. United States, 451 F.2d 411,415 (5th Cir. 1971). 
68. Keystone Shipping Co. v. S.S. Monfiore, 409 F.2d 1345, 1346 (5th Cir. 
1969). 
69. Stem, Hays & Lang, Inc. v. M/V Nili, 407 F.2d 549, 551 (5th Cir. 1969). 
This case is cited in Landers, By Sleight of Rule: Admiralty Unification and Ancil-
lary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 51 TEXAS L. REv. 50, 75 (1972), as supporting the 
general proposition that, much to the author's surprise and apparently to his mild 
regret, unification appeared to have disposed of at least some of the prior jurisdic-
tional limits upon admiralty. 
70. Merrill-Stevens Dry Dock Co. v. M/V "Laissez Faire", 421 F.2d 430, 432 
(5th Cir. 1970). 
71. Florida Bahamas Lines, Ltd. v. Steel Barge "Star 800" of Nassau, 433 F.2d 
1243, 1249-52 (5th Cir. 1970). 
72. See Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684 
(1950), discussed in note 58 supra. 
1642 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:1627 
deck to transport into the Admiralty all of the Court's equity pow-
ers."78 
At least one district judge in the Fifth Circuit evidently remains 
unimpressed. In Nyon Technical Commercial, Inc. v. Equitable 
Equipment Co.74 defendant's counterclaim included a plea for in-
junctive relief75 against a tort concededly maritime. 76 In denying 
the request, the court reasoned as follows: ( 1) "The traditional 
rule in admiralty has been that there is no power to grant equi-
table relief in a direct proceeding for that purpose."77 (2) "The 
injunctive relief sought here by Equipment is not a subsidiary or 
derivative issue."78 (3) The claim for injunctive relief may not 
be heard as pendent to the main claim.70 (4) The 1966 merger 
of the civil and admiralty rules liberalized the use of counter-claims 
in admiralty, but it did not "create new substantive admiralty causes 
of action."80 The court concluded ,that despite any suggestions 
generated by ·the merger, the Supreme Court must speak author-
itatively before injunctive relief will become available in admiralty.81 
Outside the Fifth Circuit there appear to be only two post-1966 
admiralty decisions that are at all favorable to claims for equitable 
relief. In one of them, Seaboard Shipping Corp. v. Jocharanne Tug-
boat Corp., the Second Circuit concluded that it might be within 
admiralty's equitable power to order a portion of the costs of salvag-
73. Stern, Hays & Lang, Inc. v. M/V Nili, 407 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1969) (foot-
note omitted) (emphasis added). See Cates v. United States, 451 F.2d 411, 414 (5th 
Cir. 1971), quoting Compania Anonima Venezolana de Nav. v. Perez Export Co., 
303 F.2d 692, 699 (5th Cir. 1962); Keystone Shipping Co. v. S.S. Monfiore, 409 
F.2d 1345, 1346 (5th Cir. 1969). 
74. 341 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. La. 1972). 
75. Plaintiff's vessel burned at defendant's wharf. Plaintiff sought damages for 
the fire, and defendant counterclaimed, seeking damages for loss of wharf space and 
an injunction compelling plaintiff to remove the wreck. 
76. ''The cause of action which gives rise to the circumstances which are sought 
to be remedied by injunctive relief, that is, the claim that Nyon's vessel is trespassing 
on Equipment's wharf, is a maritime tort." 341 F. Supp. at 778. 
77. 341 F. Supp. at 779. 
78. 341 F. Supp. at 779. See Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana 
Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684 (1950), discussed in note 58 supra. 
79. 341 F. Supp. at 779-80. This aspect of Nyon is discussed in the text at notes 
129-40 infra, 
80. 341 F. Supp. at 781. 
81. 341 F. Supp, at 781. The court also stated that injunctive relief should be 
denied on the merits. Compare Amerind Shipping Corp. v. Jordan Intl. Co., 314 
F. Supp. 1324 (E.D. La. 1970), where the district court, relying on Judge Brown's 
"Woolsack" quotation, found that irrespective of whether a claim by a port agent for 
reimbursement of wharfage charges paid lay in subrogation, which may be equity, 
or in quasi-contract, which had been rendered doubtful in admiralty by the same 
kinds of considerations that had generated the equity doubt, there was power to hear 
it. 314 F. Supp. at 1325-26. See text at note 61 supra. See also Kane v. Motor 
Vessel Leda, 355 F. Supp. 796, 801 (E.D. La. 1972). 
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ing a stranded vessel to be paid by an insurer who benefited from 
the services, although the court did not refer to unification. 82 Much 
more positively, Judge Wyzanski in McKie Lighter Company v. City 
of Boston83 expressed the view that withholding from admiralty the 
power to enjoin a maritime tort never had made sense; he relied 
most heavily on unification to support his strong assertion that, in any 
event, admiralty now possesses this power. 84 But the McKie state-
ment was dictum in two senses: The injunctive relief sought85 was 
denied on the merits, and Judge Wyzanski chose to rely on federal 
question jurisdiction86 as well as on admiralty jurisdiction.87 
There are several decisions in the Second and Ninth Circuits that 
go against the argument that admiralty now has a full equity arsenal. 
In New York State Waterways Association v. Diamond,88 the Second 
Circuit assumed that admiralty lacks the power to grant an injunction 
but speculated that the plaintiff in that case might obtain one from a 
three-judge court under federal question jurisdiction. Without any 
mention of the 1966 merger, the court stated that while the proscrip-
tion against admiralty's granting equitable relief "has undergone in-
creasing erosion in recent years ... we still think it fair to say that the 
power of an admiralty court to grant injunctive relief remains severely 
circumscribed.,,89 In Beverly Hills National Bank and Trust Co. v. 
Compania de Navegacione Almirante S.A., Panama,90 the Ninth 
Circuit assumed that pre-unification91 Supreme Court decisions92 
fully controlled the availability of equitable relief in admiralty. It 
thus held that the trial court93 had erred in hearing a constructive 
82. 461 F.2d S00, SOS (2d Cir. 1972)' (relief denied on other grounds). 
83. 33S F. Supp. 663 (D. Mass. 1971). 
84. 33S F. Supp. at 666-67. 
8S. A tug owner wanted the City of Boston to open a swing bridge regularly so 
he could reach his berth. 
86. Federal question jurisdiction was present under statutes dealing explicitly with 
bridges over navigable water. See 33S F. Supp. at 666. 
87. 33S F. Supp. at 666. In another district court decision, the court expressed 
grave doubt about the merger's effects on the availability of injunctive relief in ad-
miralty, ultimately denying the relief sought on other grounds. See Thyssen Steel 
Corp. v. Federal Commerce & Nav. Co., 274 F. Supp. 18, 20 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
In Carroll v. Protection Maritime Ins. Co., 512 F.2d 4, 9 (1st Cir. 197S), the 
First Circuit recently stated: "[B]ecause of the historic unavailability of equitable 
relief in admiralty, the plaintiffs' prayer for injunctive relief cannot be granted . • . ." 
88. 469 F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1972). 
89. 469 F.2d at 421 n.2. 
90. 437 F.2d 301 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 996 (1971). 
91. The 1966 unification was not mentioned with regard to the availability of 
equitable relief. On the subject of pendent jurisdiction, there were OQlique references 
to unification. See 437 F.2d at 306 n.7. 
92. See Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684 
(19S0), discussed in note 58 supra. 
93. See Compania de Nav. Almirante S.A., Panama v. Certain Proceeds of Cargo, 
288 F. Supp. 77 (C.D. Cal. 1967). 
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trust94 claim in admiralty.95 The appellate court concluded that 
there was authority to hear the claim, not as a matter of equity in 
admiralty, but rather in the exercise of the court'~ pendent jurisdic-
tion. 96 
Thus, the post-unification case law does not lend significant sup-
port to the ALI view that unification cured the equity problem. 07 
The most significant decisions are those that deal with the power of 
94. The equitable nature of a constructive trust claim, correctly assumed through-
out the opinion in Beverly Hills Bank, was relied upon by the court in concluding 
that hearing the claim as a matter of pendent jurisdiction presented no jury trial prob-
lems. See text at notes 195-96 infra. 
95. The Ninth Circuit held that the constructive trust claim was not incidental 
or derivative in the sense of the Swift case. See 437 F.2d at 305. 
96. See notes 178-96 infra and accompanying text for discussion of this aspect 
of Beverly Hills Bank. 
97. Courts in holdings and dicta have enumerated the powers of the admiralty 
court to be the following: 
(1) to enjoin actions collateral to limitation proceedings that arise out of the 
same subject matter. In re Unterweser Reederei, GMBH, 428 F.2d 888, 892 
(5th Cir. 1970), vacated on other grounds sub nom. M.S. Bremen v. Zapata 
Offshore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Olympic Towing Corp. v. Nobel Towing Co., 
419 F.2d 230, 235 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); Guillot 
v. Cenac Towing Co., 366 F.2d 898, 904-05 (5th Cir. 1966). 
(2) to "reform" a seaman's release. Cates v. United States, 451 F.2d 411, 415 
(5th Cir. 1971). 
(3) to deem a mortgage foreclosure proceeding a concursus and admit a puta-
tive lienbolder. Stern, Hays & Lang, Inc. v. M/V Nili, 407 F.2d 549, 551 (5th 
Cir. 1969). 
( 4) to render appropriate orders respecting security pending litigation. Key-
stone Shipping Co. v. S.S. Monfiore, 409 F.2d 1345, 1346 (5th Cir. 1969). 
(5) to distribute the post-lienholder-payoff surplus of the sale of a vessel to 
nonlien claimants. Veverica v. Drill Barge Buccaneer No. 7, 488 F.2d 880, 885 
(5th Cir. 1974). 
(6) to apply quasi-contract or equitable subrogation principles to a port agent's 
claim for reimbursement of wbarfage expenses. Amerind Shipping Corp. v. Jor-
dan Intl. Co., 314 F. Supp. 1324, 1326 (E.D. La. 1970). 
(7) to arrange lien priorities according to equitable principles. Florida Ba-
hamas Lines, Ltd. v. Steel Barge "Star 800" of Nassau, 433 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 
1970). 
(8) to set aside or modify the judicial sale of a vessel on grounds of fraud, 
Merrill-Stevens Dry Dock Co. v. M/V "Laissez Faire", 421 F.2d 430, 432 (5th 
Cir. 1970). 
(9) to decree equitable contribution or restitution of salvage expenses among 
insurers. Seaboard Shipping Corp. v. Jocharanne Tugboat Corp., 461 F.2d 500, 
505 (2d Cir. 1972). 
(10) to enjoin a swing bridge from blocking plaintiff's tug from access to its 
berth. McKie Lighter Co. v. City of Boston, 335 F. Supp. 663, 666-67 (D. 
Mass. 1971). 
All but the last two of the enumerated decisions were in the Fifth Circuit. 
On the other band, there were holdings or statements that admiralty lacks power: 
(11) to enjoin the commission of a maritime tort. New York State Waterways 
Assn. v. Diamond, 469 F.2d 419, 421 (2d Cir. 1972); Nyon Technical Commer-
cial, Inc. v. Equitable Equip. Co., 341 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. La. 1972). But see 
Thyssen Steel Corp. v. Federal Commerce & Nav. Co., 274 F. Supp. 18, 20 n.3 
(S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
(12) to hear a constructive trust claim. Beverly Hills Natl. Bank & Trust Co. 
v. Compania de Nav. Almirante, 437 F.2d 301 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 
996 (1971). 
(13) to specifically enforce a charter party. See Commercial Metals Co. v. In-
ternational Union Maritime Corp., 294 F. Supp. 570, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
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admiralty to grant injunctive relief. With the exception of the Fifth 
Circuit limitation of liability cases98 and Judge Wyzanski's strong 
dictum in McKie Lighter Company v. City of Boston,99 ·the jurispru-
dence is unfavorable. One district judge expressed doubt about the 
effects of the merger on admiralty's injunctive powers;100 another 
district judge101 and the Second Circuit102 were certain that admiralty 
still lacks general equitable power.108 
As indicated in some of the commentary,1°4 it would be easy 
enough to cure this matter by statute, 105 and such legislation has 
indeed been proposed.106 Thus, there is hope that the problem will 
eventually disappear, whether or not the rest of the suggestions 
outlined below are followed.107 The major recommendation of this 
article, to remove admiralty's separate statutory basis and make it a 
subcategory of federal question jurisdiction, would cure the equita-
ble powers problem, along with several others. 
B. Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction in Admiralty108 
Nobody seems to be completely certain how to differentiate be-
98. See note 97 supra. But see note 61 supra. 
99. 335 F. Supp. 663, 666-67 (D. Mass. 1971). 
100. See Thyssen Steel Corp. v. Federal Commerce & Nav. Co., 274 F. Supp. 18, 
20 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
101. See Nyon Technical Commercial, Inc. v. Equitable Equip. Co., 341 F. Supp. 
777 (E.D. La. 1972). 
102. See New York State Waterways Assn. v. Diamond, 469 F.2d 419, 421 (2d 
Cir. 1972). 
103. In Insurance Co. of North America v. Langan Constr. Co., 327 F. Supp. 
567, 568 (S.D. Ala. 1971), the court, without comment on the law in the matter, 
said it "deems it unnecessary" to consider the injunction question raised in that mari-
time case. 
104. See Comment, supra note 50, at 1163-64. After making the argument that 
the pre-1966 limitations were not jurisdictional, and were certainly not based on con-
stitutional limitations, the author proposed that S. 1876, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 
1316-1319 (1971)-the then-pending legislation echoing the ALI's jurisdictional rec-
ommendations-be amended by adding the following language: ''The district courts 
of the United States, when hearing suits under the admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion, shall be empowered to order all appropriate remedies, whether formerly charac-
terized as legal, equitable or maritime." Id. at 1163-64 n.49. 
105. See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text. 
106. The issue of equitable remedies in admiralty was only cursorily treated in 
the Hearings on S. 1876. Leavenworth Colby testified that the ALI did not consider 
the matter "properly jurisdictional." 1972 Hearings 655. He also reiterated the ALI 
view that the 1966 merger cured the problem. After the Hearings, I raised the mat-
ter of equitable remedies with subcommittee counsel, and language was added provid-
ing: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount 
in controversy of all civil actions of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including 
those for interpleader, declaratory or equitable relief .... " S. 1876, 93d Cong., 
1st Sess., § 1316, May 23, 1973. There has been no further action. See notes 41-
43 supra and accompanying text. 
107. See notes 379-405 infra and accompanying text 
108. See Landers, supra note 69; Comment, Third-Party Practice in Admiralty, 
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tween the terms "ancillary" and "pendent" in the context of federal 
court jurisdiction.109 The conventional distinction was evidently that 
ancillary jurisdiction is the broader category-a nebulous class of 
cases where the federal courts will exercise jurisdiction over matters, 
including those involving new parties, which themselves lack an 
independent federal jurisdicitional basis. Pendent jurisdiction, in this 
view, is a definitely limited subcategory of ancillary jurisdiction, 
reaching only those cases where a plaintiff will be permitted to join to 
his main federal claim another claim, lacking an independent federal 
jurisdictional basis, against the defendant. 110 Yet recent develop-
ments have suggested that something called pendent ( or pendent 
party) jurisdiction might also validate the joinder of nonfederal par-
ties who are involved in claims arising out of the same nucleus of 
operative facts as the federal claim.111 This later development, 
though quite controversial, is apparently thriving in some quarters. 112 
Thus, in the instant context there is probably no reason for attempt-
ing to distinguish between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. The 
important issue is the degree to which either or both of these auxiliary 
jurisdictional bases are available to federal courts exercising admiralty 
jurisdiction. 
One major premise of the ALI study was that unification would 
greatly increase the availability of "ancillary and pendent jurisdic-
tion. "118 Prior to unification, the accepted view114 was that courts of 
admiralty could not exercise pendent or ancillary jurisdiction.116 With 
28 Sw. L.J. 1021 (1974); Comment, lmpleader of Nonmaritime Claims Under Rule 
14(c), 47 TExAs L. REV. 120 (1968); Note, Pendent Jurisdiction in Admiralty, 18 
WAYNE L. REv. 1211 (1972); Comment, Pendent Jurisdiction in Admiralty, 1973 
Wis. L. REv. 594; Comment, supra note 50, at 1164-80. 
109. See, e.g., Landers, supra note 69, at 57 n.31; Comment, 28 Sw. L.J. 1021, 
supra note 108, at 1026 n.49; Comment, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: To-
wards a Synthesis of Two Doctrines, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1263 (1975); Note, Rule 
14 Claims and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 51 VA. L. REV, 265 (1971); Note, 18 WAYNE 
L. REv. 1211, supra note 108; Comment, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 594, supra note 108, 
at 599 n.34. 
110. See 1 w. BARRON & A. HoLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 23, 
at 97 (Wright ed. 1960); C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CoURTS 65 (2d ed. 1970), 
111. See Leather's Best, Inc, v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 809-11 (2d Cir, 
1971); Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 441 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1971), 
See generally Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 710-15 (1973). 
112. The recent decision in Aldinger v. Howard, 44 U.S.L.W. 4988 (U.S. June 
24, 1976), disapproves "pendant party" jurisdiction over a county with respect to a 
claim brought under civil rights statutes (42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 
(3)). The Court expressly reserved the "subtle and complex" general question of 
the availability of "pendant party" jurisdiction. See generally Comment, 22 UCLA 
L REv. 1263, supra note 109, at 1277-87. 
113. See notes 27-30 supra and accompanying text. 
114. See Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 810 n.11 (2d 
Cir, 1971). 
115. What this article will call "Romero-pendent" jurisdiction is to be distin-
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the merger of the admiralty with the civil side of the federal court, 
there was reason to believe that the full array of incidental or deriva-
tive federal jurisdictional powers would extend to the court when it 
exercised its admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Indeed, the fram-
ers of the amended rules evidently assumed this. There was also 
plausible reason to think otherwise, however, for many of the pre-
1966 decisions denying to the admiralty various joinder, counter-
claim, impleader, cross-claim, and other ancillary procedural devices 
seemed to be based on jurisdictional grounds that reached deep into 
statutory,116 and perhaps constitutional, doctrine.117 
It would be interesting to analyze the relative merits of these two 
positions which, like so many other currently vexed issues of maritime 
law, wake "echoes in the deepest metaphysics of admiralty."118 But 
of more immediate relevance is exploration of what the case law since 
unification has made of the matter. If the results of this examination 
show that federal courts hearing admiralty cases have not exercised 
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, we will have discovered yet another 
indication that unification did not accomplish its major purpose-
the elimination of the idea of the admiralty as a separate court, 
behaving oddly because oddly labelled. 
In the ensuing treatment of post-merger decisions relating to 
ancillary and pendent jurisdiction, the categories of cases119 are 
guished. Well before unification, there was a device, sometimes called pendent juris-
diction, whereby a personal injury suit on the civil side of federal court, with jurisdic-
tion based on diversity or the Jones Act (Merchant Marine Act, 1920, ch. 250, § 
1, 41 Stat. 988 (codified in 46 U.S.C. § 688) ), could have appended to it claims 
based on the general decisional maritime law, with the entire case being tried 
to a jury. This, however, was not a device whereby other claims or parties were 
appended to the admiralty claim. It was the converse situation; a general maritime 
claim was appended to an arising under (or diversity) claim, on the civil side. The 
typical situation, exemplified by Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16 
(1963), and Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959), 
involved a seaman's Jones Act claim against his employer, wherein jurisdiction on 
the civil side of court was based on the Jones Act itself (i.e., "arising under" jurisdic-
tion) to which the seaman's unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure claims were 
added. Romero hinted, and Fitzgerald made clear, that all three admiralty claims 
could be tried to the jury to which plaintiff is entitled under the terms of the Jones 
Act. See notes 231-86 infra and accompanying text. 
116. Proponents of this view look all the way back to the First Judiciary Act, 
Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 76, which, according to one commentator, is "the sort 
of quasi-constitutional statutory law, change in which . . • one feels it almost impious 
to contemplate." Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 CouJM. 
L. REV. 259, 260 (1950). 
117. See generally Landers, supra note 69. 
118. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALlY 33 n.118 (1957), dis-
cussing whether admiralty cases are ipso facto also "arising under" cases. The Su· 
preme Court later answered that question negatively. See Romero v. International 
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959), discussed in notes 231-39 infra and 
accompanying text. 
119. For a "miscellaneous" pendent jurisdiction case, see Czarnikow-Rionda Co. 
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presented in what would be, according to traditional thinking, their 
approximate order of difficulty.120 Thus, under this view, it ought to 
be easier for defendant to assert a nonfederal counterclaim than for 
defendant to add a nonfederal party; easier for defendant to add a 
nonfederal party than for plaintiff to add a nonfederal claim; and 
easier for plaintiff to add a nonfederal claim than for plaintiff to add 
a nonfederal party. 
1. Counterclaim 
The generally accepted view is that ancillary jurisdiction permits 
federal courts to hear, and to bring in additional parties to respond to, 
compulsory counterclaims. Permissive counterclaims, on the other 
hand, require independent jurisdictional grounds.121 Despite the fact 
that post-unification maritime cases have followed this traditional 
pattern, 122 difficulties incident to civil/ admiralty separatism have 
arisen. In each of the four relevant decisions, the nonmaritime coun-
terclaim that the defendant asserted was permissive.123 In the two 
cases where diversity of citizenship was present, the courts ordered the 
nonmaritime permissive counterclaims severed from the main claims 
and retained for later trial to a jury.124 In the two cases where there 
v. Eddie S.S. Co. (Arb.), 1975 A.M.C. 1116, 1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (pendent juris-
diction gives court power to order cargo purchaser's claims consolidated with ship-
owner-charterer arbitration) (dictum). 
120. According to Professor Wright, the foJlowing categories aJI represent situa-
tions where "present consensus" concerning the interpretation of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure would permit a federal court to adjudicate, despite the absence 
of independent federal jurisdiction over the matter reached: compulsory counter-
claims under rule 13(a); adding parties to respond to a compulsory counterclaim 
under rule 13(h); impleader of a third-party defendant under rule 14; cross claims 
under rule 13(g); interpleader under rule 22; intervention as of right under rule 
24(a). Conversely, under the conventional view the foJiowing matters are not within 
the reach of ancillary federal judicial power: permissive counterclaims under rule 
13 (b); joinder of parties under rule 20; permissive intervention under rule 24(b); and 
"joinder of claims under rule 18, except where the federal and nonfederal claims are 
so closely related as to amount to separate grounds in support of a single cause of 
action." C. Wrumrr, supra note 110, at 21. 
121. Id. 
122. For cases assuming that courts exercising admiralty jurisdiction can hear 
compulsory counterclaims that lack independent jurisdictional basis, see Industrial 
Equip. & Marine Serv., Inc. v. M/V Mr. Gus, 333 F. Supp. 578, 580 (S.D. Tex. 
1971) (explicit assumption), and Camper & Nicholsons, Ltd. v. Yacht "Fontainebleau 
Il," 292 F. Supp. 734, 735 (S.D. Fla. 1968) (implicit assumption). 
123. See Industrial Equip. & Marine Serv., Inc. v. M/V Mr. Gus, 333 F. Supp. 
578 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Camper & Nicholsons, Ltd. v. Yacht "Fontainebleau II," 292 
F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Fla. 1968); Alaska Barite Co. v. Freighters, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 192 
(N.D. cat. 1972); Nyon Technical Commercial, Inc. v. Equitable Equip. Co., 341 
F. Supp. 777 (E.D. La. 1972). In Nyon the court did not determine whether the 
counterclaim was permissive or compulsory, but it appeared to be permissive. See 
text at notes 129-40 infra. 
124. In Alaska Barite Co. v. Freighters, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1972), 
a maritime shipper of goods sued on an affreightment contract, and the carrier filed 
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was no diversity jurisdiction the nonmaritime permissive counter-
claims were dismissed.125 
Retention for later trial to a jury over a closely related but 
permissive counterclaim that lacks a basis for independent admiralty 
jurisdiction is preferable to dismissal, but the procedure is cumber-
some. This awkwardness is the result of the continuation in the post-
1966 rules of the maritime plaintiff's power to command a nonjury 
proceeding.126 Whether that power ought to be preserved generally 
is a question that the ALI's 1969 recommendations answered in the 
a permissive counterclaim charging the shipper with antitrust violations. The carrier 
demanded a jury trial on the counterclaim. The court analyzed plaintiffs motion 
to dismiss the counterclaim as raising three major questions: (1) whether a permis-
sive counterclaim can be sustained at all in an admiralty proceeding; (2) whether 
federal rule 9(h) preserved intact the former admiralty practice which gives plaintiff 
establishing admiralty jurisdiction an unrestricted choice of a nonjury forum; and 
(3) whether the antitrust counterclaim necessitates a jury trial. The court answered 
in the affirmative to each of the three enumerated questions. A fourth question also 
resolved affirmatively was the appropriateness of antitrust counterclaims. See gen-
erally 54 F.R.D. at 195-96. 
With respect to the first, the court acknowledged that prior to unification, admir-
alty's use of the counterclaim device had been sparing, but pointed out that there is 
nothing in rules 13(a) or 13(b) that generates any doubt that the rule was intended 
to apply to admiralty cases. 54 F.R.D. at 195-96 n.1. The answer to the second 
question was easy; the rules make clear that a central purpose of rule 9(h) is to pre-
serve plaintiffs right to elect a nonjury proceeding. 54 F.R.D. at 194. The counter-
claim, on the other hand, was entitled to a jury trial. Thus, the only sensible resolu-
tion, somewhat cumbersome but necessary, was to try the main claim to the court 
and then to try the counterclaim to a jury. 
In Industrial Equip. & Marine Servs., Inc. v. M/V Mr. Gus, 333 F. Supp. 578 
(S.D. Tex. 1971), plaintiff brought an in rem action to enforce a preferred ship mort-
gage and defendant counterclaimed for breach of warranty in the sale of the vessel. 
Defendant demanded a jury trial. The court first determined, without any extended 
inquiry, that all of defendant's counterclaim, being based on a ship-sale transaction, 
was nonmaritime. Cf. Ohio Barge Lines, Inc. v. Dravo Corp., 326 F. Supp. 863 
(W.D. Pa. 1971) (analysis of the implied warranty problem). Then, finding di-
versity of citizenship to be present, the court retained the counterclaim and, together 
with plaintiffs cross-claim against the manufacturer of the engine of the vessel in 
question, see note 164 infra, severed it, presumably for later trial to a jury. The 
court ordered defendant's counterclaim and plaintiff's cross-claim redocketed, presum-
ably on the "civil side," and ordered plaintiff to move for default in the instant pro-
ceeding. What this probably amounts to is a transfer of the counterclaim and cross-
claim to the civil (i.e., jury) docket. 
125. Plaintiff in Camper v. Nicholsons, Ltd. v. Yacht "Fontainebleau II", 292 F. 
Supp. 734 (S.D. Fla. 1968), brought an in rem action to enforce a supply and repair 
lien on a vessel, and defendant counterclaimed alleging misrepresentations in the sale 
of the yacht. Under the anomalous but well-settled ship-sale doctrine, the counter-
claim was deemed nonmaritime. 292 F. Supp. at 735. Being permissive, it necessi-
tated an independent jurisdictional basis. Finding no diversity, the court dismissed 
the counterclaim. In Nyon Technical Commercial, Inc. v. Equitable Equip. Co., 341 
F. Supp. 777 (E.D. La. 1972), the permissive counterclaim was outside admiralty's 
jurisdiction because it demanded injunctive relief. See text at notes 74-81 supra. 
Finding no doctrine of ancillary or pendent jurisdiction strong enough to sustain the 
court's exercise of equity power, the counterclaim for an injunction was dismissed. 
See text at notes 129-40 infra. 
126. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h), 38(e). See text at notes 1-8 supra. 
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negative by providing for a jury trial at the option of any party in 
maritime personal injury and death cases.127 The philosophy of that 
proposal, congenial to the generalist, is that the nonjury tradition is 
not rooted in any jurisdictional limitation upon admiralty courts.128 
Adoption of this philosophy should make acceptable a procedure 
whereby the existence of a right to jury trial for any appropriately 
joined party in a maritime case would result in all related factual 
questions being sent to a jury according to the normal judge/jury 
allocation. 
The decisions dismissing permissive counterclaims that lack any 
independent basis for federal jurisdiction contain unexceptionable 
holdings, but they do present a conservative view of the effects of 
unification on admiralty jurisdiction that is dramatically uncongenial 
to the ALi's hopes. Exemplary is Nyon Technical Commercial, Inc. 
v. Equitable Equipment Co.,129 in which plaintiff had left his vessel at 
defendant's wharf for repairs. While there, the vessel burned. Plain-
tiff sought damages for the destruction of the vessel, and defendant 
counterclaimed for damages and an injunction compelling plaintiff to 
remove the hulk. The jurisdictional difficulty presented by the coun-
terclaim, otherwise founded on a maritime tort, was, of course, the 
equity limitation.130 Defendant urged "two bases for the court's 
jurisdiction over its claim for injunctive relief: (i) pendent jurisdic-
tion, and (ii) ancillary jurisdiction."131 
The "ancillary jurisdiction" argument was based on the view that 
the 1966 extension of rule 13 counterclaim procedures to admiralty 
127. See proposed section 1319, ALI STIJDY 37, 250-54. See also text at notes 
390-401 infra. 
128. During the Senate Subcommittee Hearings on the ALI's recommendations 
on admiralty jurisdiction, the Maritime Law Association objected both to the intro-
duction of the jury generalJy and to extending the right to defendant as well as to 
plaintiff. See 1972 Hearings 688-99. In response to this criticism, one version of 
the modified bill circulated after the hearings restricted the right to demand a jury 
in a maritime injury or death case to the plaintiff. However, S. 1876, as reintro-
duced by Senator Burdick in May 1973, S. 1976, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), con-
tinued to mirror the ALI proposal. 
129. 341.F. Supp. 777 (E.D. La. 1972). See notes 74-81, 125 supra and accom-
panying text. 
130. See text at notes 74-81 supra. 
131. 341 F. Supp. at 778. The idea (whether the court's or the defendant's is 
unclear) of the difference between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction portrayed here 
is intriguing: 
[Defendant] first argues that the Court's pendent jurisdiction should be invoked 
over the equitable injunctive demand because it arises out of the same operative 
facts as the maritime claims. Secondly, it is urged that the court has ancillary 
jurisdiction over the claim for equitable relief; as a result of the merger of admir-
alty and civil rules of procedure in 1966, because Rule 13 extended the right 
to counterclaim to admiralty cases. 
341 F. Supp. at 777-78. 
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removed the equitable jurisdiction difficulty. The court disagreed: 
Prior to the merger of the rules, there was very limited use of counter-
claims in admiralty. One of the purposes of the merger was to allow 
admiralty the same liberal practice of counterclaims as enjoyed by 
the civil practice. . . . The merger .. ·. did not, however, create 
new substantive admiralty causes of action, and this court does not 
have the power to entertain an equitable action to enjoin the commis-
sion of a maritime tort. . . . This is the law whether the equitable 
action is brought as a direct complaint or in a counterclaim.132 
Defendant's other argument-on a ,theory of "pendant juris~c-
tion"-was a clumsy effort to blend three decisions: Swift & Co. 
Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe,133 the leading Supreme 
Court "equitable powers" decision in admiralty, which had held that 
the admiralty court could employ powers deemed equitable in order 
to secure the defendant's appearance; Beverly Hills National Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Compania de Navigacione Almirante S.A., Panama,134 
wherein the Ninth Circuit had held that a constructive trust claim was 
not incidental in the Swift sense, 135 but that it could be entertained by 
the court as pendent;136 and Romero v. International Terminal Operat-
ing Co., 137 where the Supreme Court had held that, in an action 
under the Jones Act on the civil side of federal court, claims based on 
the general maritime law doctrines of maintenance and cure and 
unseaworthiness could be tried as pendent to the Jones Act claim. It 
ought to be fairly obvious that the Romero decision had no relation-
ship to the problem in Nyon. An admiralty court, seeking the power 
to ~ntertain an equitable counterclaim, will not derive much support 
from a decision permitting general maritime claims to pend to statu-
tory maritime claims in federal question proceedings.138 It is likewise 
evident that the Swift case is not directly related to the argument that 
the Nyon defendant advanced. Defendant's major reliance should 
have been on Beverly Hills Bank, which had employed a pendent 
approach. The Nyon court, however, simply lumped Beverly Hills 
Bank and Swift together, saying: "In Beverly Hills ... as was the 
case in [Swift], the court was faced with a situation where the plain-
132. 341 F. Supp. at 781 (citations omitted). 
133. 339 U.S. 684 (1950). See note 58 supra. 
134. 437 F.2d 301 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 996 (1971), discussed in 
text at notes 178-96 infra. 
135. Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684 
(1950). See note 58 supra. 
136. The court noted that diversity of citizenship provided a second, independent 
ground for the district court to exercise jurisdiction over the claim. 437 F.2d at 306. 
137. 358 U.S. 354 (1959). See note 115 supra; notes 231-39 infra and accom-
panying text. 
138. See note 115 supra. 
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tiff could not obtain a judgment if jurisdiction over the non-maritime 
claim was not retained."139 
There was no discussion in Nyon of the two major questions 
seemingly raised by the admiralty/ counterclaim cases: ( 1 ) Was the 
counterclaim permissive or compulsory? Although the court would 
likely have found it permissive, there was no discussion of the issue. 
Indeed, because the claims of each party arose from allegations that 
the same fire was the fault of the other party, a decision that the coun-
terclaim was compulsory would probably have been sustainable; (2) 
Was diversity or some other nonadmiralty ground of federal jurisdic-
tion present? Presumably not, but the decision gives no indication.140 
Instead, the court manifested little willingness to search for a way 
in which to bear the counterclaim, perhaps out of a disinclination to 
broaden further the jurisdictional base of the "admiralty side" of 
federal courts. 
2. Third-Party Practice 
Traditionally, ancillary jurisdiction, which reaches third-party 
claims, among others, has been subjected to much less rigorous 
jurisdictional scrutiny than has pendent jurisdiction, which principally 
affects additional claims asserted by a plaintiff.141 But there is an 
admiralty peculiarity that must be noted here. Former Admiralty 
rule 56 permitted both "indemnity" impleader-whereby a defendant 
asserts that a third-party defendant may be liable to the defendant 
by way of "remedy over, contribution or otherwise"142-and "sub-
stitute defendant" impleader-whereby a defendant asserts that third-
party defendant may be directly liable to the plaintiff.143 In the 
case of "substitute defendant" impleader, the third-party defendant 
139. 341 F. Supp. at 780. In Landers, supra note 69, at 74 n.96, this aspect of 
Nyon is criticized as being "of dubious authoritative value" because of its "failure 
to come to grips with the pertinent and relevant authorities." The author also took 
exception to the Nyon court's failure to mention the decision in Mccann v. Falgout 
Boat Co., 44 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Tex. 1968), discussed in text at notes 147-56 infra, 
which would have supported the result reached in Nyo11, and Leather's Best, Inc. v. 
S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1972), discussed in text at notes 206-25, 
which would have indicated an outcome contrary to Nyo11. 
140. Additionally, the court erected an alternative holding: "Even assuming that 
the Court did have the power to issue an injunction in an admiralty suit of this type, 
[on the merits] this Court would not exercise that power in this case." 341 F. Supp. 
at 781. 
141. See notes 109-13, 119-20 supra and accompanying text. 
142. Admiralty Rule 56, 368 U.S. 1015 (1961). 
143. The terms "indemnity impleader" and "substitute defendant" impleader were 
evidently coined in Comment, supra note 50, at 1172. These useful terms will be 
freely employed in this article. Despite the fact that under the federal rules "third-
party practice" is the usual term, "impleader" seems a useful synonym. 
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is, in effect, tendered to the plaintiff, and the action proceeds as 
though the plaintiff had originally joined that defendant.144 This 
feature of the pre-1966 admiralty practice is preserved in Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 14 ( c) .145 Because "substitute defendant" 
144. The difference between the two forms of third-party practice is well illus-
trated by Williams v. United States, 42 F.R.D. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), where plaintiff 
sued the United States for injuries allegedly sustained aboard a government vessel, 
and the Government sought to implead the state of New York. In the court's view, 
impleader was not offensive to sovereign immunity provided, as was true in the in-
stant case, that the theory was restricted to indemnity impleader: "Under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 14(a), unless the plaintiff amends his complaint, no demand is made by or 
on behalf of the plaintiff against the third-party defendant, and no judgment against 
the third-party defendant can run in favor of the original plaintiff." 42 F.R.D. at 
615. To attempt "substitute defendant" third-party practice under rule 14(c) would, 
on the other hand, have offended New York's unwaived immunity, because under that 
form of third-party practice "the third-party plaintiff may also demand judgment 
against the third-party defendant in favor of the plaintiff." 42 F.R.D. at 615. 
Also illustrative of the difference between "indemnity" third-party practice and 
"substitute defendant" third-party practice is Donaldson v. United States Steel Corp., 
53 F.R.D. 228 (W.D. Pa. 1971), although the opinion itself does not reveal an aware-
ness of the difference. Plaintiff, a seaman, brought a Jones Act suit (the opinion 
does not reveal whether it was brought on the law side, with a jury demand, or in 
admiralty) for injuries sustained aboard the vessel. Defendant filed a third-party 
claim against several defendants, alleging that "if the defendant is liable for the in-
juries sustained by the plaintiff, then it is entitled to recover such sum from the third-
party defendants whose alleged negligent and reckless operation of a motor vehicle 
caused the plaintiffs injuries." 53 F.R.D. at 229. The third-party claim was evi-
dently asserted under rule 14(a) alone, and the court dismissed it on the ground 
that no indemnity relationship existed between defendant and third-party defendants: 
fl1he requirement . . . that the relationship between the defendant, as a third-
party plaintiff and the third-party defendants be in reality one of plaintiff-de-
fendant must be met. Under the circumstances of this suit, there is no such 
relationship between the defendant as a third-party plaintiff and the purported 
third-party defendants, for no relationship exists between these two parties which 
would give rise independently to litigation between themselves. 
53 F.R.D. at 230. No mention was made in the decision of rule 14(c), which says 
in pertinent part: 
When a plaintiff asserts an admiralty or maritime claim . . . the defendant 
• . . , as a third party plaintiff, may bring in a third-party defendant who may be 
wholly or partly liable, either to the plaintiff or to the third-party plaintiff, by 
way of remedy over, contribution, or otherwise on account of the same transac-
tion, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. In such a case the 
third-party plaintiff may also demand judgment against the third-party defendant 
in favor of the plaintiff . . .. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 14(c). The quoted portion of rule 14(c) would seem to raise at 
least an argument that third-party jurisdiction should have been sustained in Donald-
son. fo essence, the defendant was arguing th?-t the injuries for which plaintiff sued 
the employer arose in fact, wholly or partially, from an automobile accident. Per-
haps even under rule 14(c), however, the suit against third-party defendants did not 
arise out of the "same . . . series of . . . occurrences." In the court's view, arguably, 
what was missing here was "some causal connection between the original action and 
the action brought in the third-party suit." 53 F.R.D. at 231. 
Another possible interpretation of Donaldson is that plaintiff had brought his 
Jones Act suit on the law side of federal court in order to get a jury trial. In that 
posture, rule 14(c) would presumably not be available since by its terms it is keyed 
to situations where "plaintiff asserts an admiralty or maritime claim within the mean-
ing of Rule 9(h)." FED. R. CIV. P. 14(c). But see Saus v. Delta Concrete Co., 
368 F. Supp. 297, 298 (W.D. Pa. 1973 ), discussed in text at notes 281-86 infra. 
145. The matter is well explained in Comment, supra note 50, at 1172-73. 
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third-party practice involves a functional tendering of the third-
party defendant to the original plaintiff, jurisdictional limits ought 
to be congruent with those applicable to joinder of parties. As 
will be seen, the decision in Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx146 
seems to have significantly expanded the availability of pendent 
jurisdiction in joining parties. Thus, "substitute defendant" prac-
tice may be broadened more successfully through pendent jurisdiction, 
although in this area the problem of the right to a jury trial has 
remained a troublesome factor. "Indemnity'' third-party practice, on 
the other hand, is probably best treated with the traditionally more 
expansive ancillary jurisdiction approach. 
a. "Substitute defendant" third-party practice under rule 14(c). 
The most celebrated case holding that the 1966 merger does not 
expand an admiralty court's powers over third-party defendants is 
McCann v. Falgout Boat Co., 141 a decision that contains all the major 
arguments against interpreting the 1966 merger as giving ancillary 
and pendent jurisdiction to the admiralty courts. 148 Plaintiff, a sea-
man, sued his employer in admiralty, asserting causes of action based 
on the Jones Act and on unseaworthiness. The employer brought a 
third-party complaint under rule 14(c) against a San Antonio physi-
cian, alleging that because of his incompetence the plaintiff's injury 
had culminated in disability. In dismissing the third-party com-
plaint, the court adopted the following line of reasoning: 
( 1) The claim against the doctor lacks independent admiralty 
jurisdictional basis; his negligence, if any, was committed on 
land, and it affected the plaintiff on land.140 Nor was there 
jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. 
(2) Rule 14(c), added in 1966, mirrors the former admiralty 
impleader practice of rule 56, under which the third-party de-
fendant was not only subject to indemnity, but was also treated 
as though he had been joined by plaintiff .150 
(3) The law under former rule 56 was quite clear in prohibit-
ing impleader of a third party over whom independent admiralty 
146. 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971), discussed in text at notes 206-25 infra, 
147. 44 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Tex. 1968). 
148. See Comment, 1973 Wrs. L. REv. 594, supra note 108, at 609-11. See also 
Landers, supra note 69, at 67-69; Comment, supra note 50, at 1176; Comment, 47 
TEXAS L. REv. 120, supra note 108, at passim. 
149. See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 266-
68 (1972) (discussion of the "locality" test for maritime tort jurisdiction, and of 
these two facets of the "occurrence" of a tort). 
150. "An impleaded party stands as one charged with fault by the original peti-
tion, although in fact it did not so charge and is not amended. The cause is treated 
as if the petitiqn had been filed against both the defendant and third-party defend-
ant." 44 F.R.D. at 37 n.2 (1968). 
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jurisdiction was lacking.151 The major reason for this restric-
tion was that bringing a nonmaritime party into an admiralty 
case would deprive him of his probable seventh amendment right 
to a jury trial. · 
( 4) The 1966 merger could hardly be taken to work so funda-
mental a change in the former admiralty impleader restriction 
because the Advisory Committee, in drafting rule 14(c), must 
have known Admiralty rule 56 and its construction. If the Com-
mittee had wanted to change that construction, it would have 
done so explicitly. The Supreme Court has often said that a prior 
construction of a statute is deemed to receive legislative approval 
if the provision is reenacted without material change; surely a 
procedural rule should be accorded similar treatment. Further-
more, rule 82 provides that the rules should not be construed to 
extend jurisdiction, yet reading rule 14(c) as permitting impleader 
of a nonmaritime party would certainly have that effect. 
The McCann decision has excited a good deal of commentary, 
most of it critical. One writer, though basically convinced that 
limitations on admiralty jurisdiction would reasonably have survived 
the merger, still found the decision unsatisfactory, partly because of 
the court's stress on the third-party's right to jury trial. He observed 
that the court evinced no awareness of a solution available since the 
merger of law and equity-bringing in the third party but trying the 
claim against him to a jury.152 The ALI jurisdictional study simply 
stated that McCann "takes too restrictive a view of the purpose of 
unification and of the rules adopted to implement unification."153 A 
student commentator pointed out that by leaving open the possibility 
that nonadmiralty grounds of federal jurisdiction, such as diversity, 
would permit impleader under 14(c), the court left the jury trial 
problem unsolved. He also noted the inconsistency in saying that the 
exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in an admiralty action is more viola-
tive of rule 82 than is the use of this device in a diversity action.154 
Another student's principal objection rested upon strong indications 
that the 1966 Advisory Committee did wish to alter drastically some 
151. The court cited seven cases in addition to 3 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
,r 14.20, at 669 (1966). 
152. Landers, supra note 69, at 67-69. Landers also complained that the court 
had not made clear whether jurisdiction would have been denied if the San Antonio 
physician had been pursued for indemnity alone under rule 14(a). Id. at 68. It 
appears that the opinion was fairly clear on this point; indeed, the opinion took 
pains to limit itself to third-party practice under rule 14(c). 
153. ALI Snmy 228. 
154. Comment, supra note SO, at 1176-80. 
1656 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:1627 
theretofore fundamental aspects of admiralty practice.11H1 Finally, an 
author dealing extensively with the case admitted the validity of the 
jury trial objection but thought that two solutions, short of dismissal, 
were available: By the first solution the court would give the doctor 
his jury trial, which, preferably, would include issues raised by plain-
tiff against the shipowner; the second possible solution was simply a 
split trial.156 
Despite these criticisms and the passage of five years, the same 
judge, in a similar situation, 157 declared that he "adheres to the 
McCann decision. Regardless of the desirability of appending non-
federal, non-admiralty claims to admiralty causes . . . through the 
devices of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, the use of these devices 
in admiralty cases were not intended by the 1966 unification and 
amendment of rules. Any change in this ancient restriction on the 
Court's jurisdiction should be by explicit alteration of the rules or 
statute."158 Each time the Fifth Circuit has confronted the issue 
presented by the Mccann case it has avoided a definitive ruling.1Go 
A much healthier attitude toward the civil/ admiralty dichotomy 
was displayed by another district court in Christman v. Maristella 
Compania Naviera.160 Plaintiff sued in admiralty for breach of a 
charter party, alleging that the defendant had never undertaken the 
155. Comment, 1973 Wrs. L. REv. 594, supra note 108, at 610. 
156. Comment, 47 TEXAS L. REV. 120, supra note 108, at 126. 
157. Stinson v. S.S. Kenneth McKay, 360 F. Supp. 674 (S.D. Tex. 1973). Judge 
James L. Noel, appointed March 17, 1962, acknowledged both commentary adverse 
to McCann and contrary decisions, notably Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 
451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1972), discussed in text at notes 206-25 infra, but was un-
moved. 360 F. Supp. at 675-76. Cf. Sanchez v. Lloyd Richardson Constr. Corp., 
56 F.R.D. 472 (S.D. Tex. 1972), sustaining admiralty jurisdiction and denying jury 
trial in an action by a maritime third-party defendant against an arguably nonmari-
time fourth-party defendant. Plaintiff was hurt on a vessel, and fourth-party defend-
ant was the alleged manufacturer of the device that hurt him. Close reading of a 
murky opinion suggests that the court found independent admiralty jurisdiction over 
the fourth-party defendant and thus did not have to reach the McCann point. See 
also In re McAninch, 392 F. Supp. 96, 97 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (plaintiff in limitation 
of liability proceedings under FED. R. Crv. P. F can employ rule 14(c) third-party 
practice); Petition of Klarman, 270 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Conn. 1967). 
158. 360 F. Supp. at 676. 
159. In Watz v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 431 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970), an injured 
shipyard worker sued the vessel owner. The owner impleaded the hoist assembler, 
who impleaded the manufacturer of an allegedly defective chain. As to jurisdiction, 
the court said: "Without expressing any view on the correctness of a decision such 
as McCann, we note that the third-party complaint there was distinctly not maritime. 
. . . In our case, on the other hand, the consequence of Campbell's conduct was 
injury on board the [vessel]. The same reasoning that led us to conclude that ad-
miralty jurisdiction existed over [plaintiffs] claim against [hoist assembler] sustains 
admiralty jurisdiction over [hoist assembler's] claim against [chain maker]." 431 
F.2d at 118. See also In re Motor Ship Pac. Carrier, 489 F.2d 152, 154 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 931 (1974). 
160. 293 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
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agreed voyage. Defendant conceded as much and sought to implead 
its agent, who had allegedly signed the charter party without author-
ity. The original third-party complaint was probably for indemnity 
alone, under rule 14(a),161 but it quickly became the functional 
equivalent of a rule 14(c) substitute defendant situation when plain-
tiff amended his complaint to assert a claim directly against the agent. 
The agent moved to dismiss both the third-party complaint and the 
plaintiffs complaint for want of jurisdiction. Acknowledging the want 
of admiralty jurisdiction over a third-party complaint based on a claim 
of breach of a nonmaritime agency agreement, 162 the court neverthe-
less found diversity and held dismissal improper. Further, the court 
reasoned that plaintiff's claim against the third-party defendant-un-
like defendant shipowner's claim-was not based on the agency agree-
ment, but rather flowed out of the underlying charter party contract;163 
as such, it was a claim within the court's admiralty jurisdiction. Thus, 
the court viewed the proceeding as consisting of an admiralty com-
plaint, an admiralty cross-complaint, and a diversity third-party com-
plaint, all involving a common issue. Accordingly, it seemed reason-
able to proceed with a single jury trial of the matter: "Third-party 
defendant's fear that a jury will be confused if the admiralty claim is 
tried with the alleged breach of agency agreement is unfounded. The 
jury, with the assistance of the court and counsel, will be able to focus 
on the single issue which it must determine, namely, whether third-
party defendant breached its agency agreement with defendant."164 
On their facts, the rule 14(c) third-party practice decisions are 
consistent with each other and with the permissive counterclaim 
decisions: If there is no independent ground for federal jurisdiction, 
the third-party complaint will be dismissed;165 if there is diversity but 
no independent admiralty jurisdiction over the third-party com-
plaint, 166 it will be retained, with the parties' right to a jury trial 
161. The opinion does not discuss the distinction between the two forms of third-
party practice. 
162. The notion that contracts with shore-side agents are not maritime was 
avoided and probably weakened in Hinkias S.S. Agency v. Freighters, Inc., 351 F. 
Supp. 373 (N.D. Cal. 1972). 
163. 293 F. Supp. at 444. 
164. 293 F. Supp. at 444. A similar but slightly more cumbersome approach 
was deemed necessary in Industrial Equip. & Marine Servs., Inc. v. M/V Mr. Gus, 
333 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Tex. 1971), where jurisdiction over a nonmaritime third-party 
complaint under rule 14(c) was retained because of the presence of diversity. How-
ever, the third-party complaint was severed from the maritime claim and retained for 
later trial, presumably to a jury. The counterclaim aspect of the case is discussed 
in note 124 supra. 
165. McCann v. Falgout Boat Co., 44 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Tex. 1968). 
166. In several cases independent admiralty jurisdiction was found to exist over 
third-party claims although the jurisdictional basis was not discussed in the opinions. 
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preserved as to that claim.167 As argued above in connection with 
nonmaritime counterclaims, 168 the cumbersomeness of some of the 
techniques employed to preserve that jury right are probably neces-
sary under the present state of doctrine. However, once it is realized 
that the plaintiff's "right" to a nonjury proceeding lacks constitutional, 
or even statutory, status, the difficulties become solvable. 
The Christman169 decision is appealing, largely because the ap-
proach adopted by that court could be extended to establish that the 
right to ,a jury trial of any party appropriately joined in a maritime 
case would take all related factual questions to the jury. Any factual 
matters solely involved with plaintiff's maritime claim could be tried 
to the judge alone, without unduly complicating or prolonging the 
trial. With this technique, the plaintiff's right to a nonjury trial can 
be treated as merely a matter of tradition that must yield in some 
cases to the combined pressure of the seventh amendment and the 
dictates of efficiency and economy.170 
Once the jury trial problem is solved, there is no legitimate reason 
for courts, in the exercise of their admiralty jurisdiction, to be any less 
free in recognizing pendent jurisdiction over substitute-defendant 
third-party claims than are federal courts generally in recognizing 
joinder of parties. In fact, under the approach approved in the 
Leather's Best171 decision, such recognition would be liberally given. 
Cases like McCann, 172 however, suggest a prevailing judicial attitude 
that is unsympathetic to the larger aims of the 1966 merger and 
unresponsive to the logic compelling the breakdown of the civil/ ad-
miralty distinction. Hence, despite rays of hope like Christman, 
legislative action remains desirable. 
b. "Indemnity" third-party practice under rule 14( a). In the 
third-party practice decisions involving rule 14(a) alone, the courts 
have uniformly sustained jurisdiction. In one case, occasionally cited 
in support of the application of pendent jurisdiction in admiralty, it 
appears that the third-party complaint was actually found to have an 
See In re MIT Alva Cape, 405 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1969); Raymond Intl. Inc. v. MIT 
Dalzelleagle, 336 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Petition of Klarman, 270 F. Supp. 
1001 (D. Conn. 1967). 
167. See Industrial Equip. & Marine Servs., Inc. v. M/V Mr. Gus, 333 F. Supp. 
578, 581 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Christman v. Maristella Compania Naviera, 293 F. Supp, 
442, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
168. See notes 125-28 supra. 
169. 293 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
170. Cf. Fitzgerald v. United States Line Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963) (the Supreme 
Court's approach in a related situation), discussed in text at notes 236-39 infra. 
171. 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971). 
172. 44 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Tex. 1968). 
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independent admiralty basis.173 In others, the 14(a) third-party 
action was retained as "diversity and/ or pendent."174 None of the 
opinions indicates that any jury trial problem was presented. Eviden-
tly, the prevailing view is that 14(a) third-party practice does not 
generate any problems with the seventh amendment. That viewpoint 
is certainly supportable on the basis of the simple but useful idea that 
a matter thus auxiliary to an admiralty proceeding is just not a "suit at 
common law."175 This implicit philosophy of the 14(a) third-party 
practice decisions could, of course, be extended without too much 
strain to the 14(c) situation, and perhaps it should be. However, as 
indicated above,176 there is an argument that 14(c) third-party prac-
tice is jurisdictionally indistinguishable from joinder of parties. And, 
as will be seen, 177 most of the joinder of parties decisions mirror the 
rule 14(c) third-party practice decisions in finding the preservation 
of the joined party's right to a jury trial to be a major problem. Thus, 
the simple solution of the 14(a) cases is not helpful in extending the 
ju:psdiction of federal courts in other admiralty contexts. 
3. Joinder of Claims 
There are just two decisions that address the issue of joining 
claims in admiralty. Each concludes that pendent jurisdiction can 
sustain the power of a court exercising admiralty jurisdiction to hear 
nonmaritime claims. While both cases support the aims of unifica-
tion, the difficulties presented in arriving at these results indicate that 
these aims have not yet been completely realized. 
The first admiralty case to use pendent jurisdiction in its original 
sense of joining state claims with a federal claim178 was Beverly Hills 
Bank170 where the jurisdictional difficulty arose from the long-debated 
notion that courts exercising admiralty jurisdiction lack equitable 
powers.180 Seeking to recover unpaid charter hire, a shipowner had 
asserted a maritime lien on funds in the hands of the defendant bank. 
Alternatively, the shipowner had sought recovery on a constructive 
trust theory. The maritime lien theory failed on the merits. Finding 
173. See Louis Furth, Inc. v. S.S. Srbija, 330 F. Supp. 305, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
174. Eutectic Corp. v. M/V Gudmundra, 367 F. Supp. 681, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); 
Royal Typewriter Co. v. M/V Kulmerland, 346 F. Supp. 1019, 1025 (S.D.N.Y. 
1972), affd., 483 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1973). See also Gambino v. United Fruit Co., 
48 F.R.D. 28, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
175. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
176. See notes 141-46 supra. 
111. See notes 205-30 infra. 
178. See Note, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1211, supra note 108, at 1214. 
179. 437 F.2d 301 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 996 (1971). 
180. See notes 90-96 supra and accompanying text. 
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no independent admiralty jurisdiction over the constructive trust 
claim due to its equitable nature,181 the trial court nevertheless heard 
the matter; it reasoned that ancillary jurisdiction over the constructive 
trust claim could be sustained on the basis of its derivative relation-
ship to the main (maritime lien) claim.182 
The court of appeals disagreed with the recognition of ancillary 
jurisdiction: "Compania's constructive trust claim constituted a sep-
arate basis for recovery, legally unrelated to Compania's maritime lien 
claim; and we are inclined to the view that it was therefore an 
independent equitable claim beyond the admiralty jurisdiction."183 
On traditional learning, the analysis of the appellate court was cor-
rect.184 Because the lien claim could be asserted without reference to 
the constructive trust matter, the issues were, in the relevant sense, 
separate. Still, to have held that such an important alternative argu-
ment must be dropped or pursued in a separate proceeding would 
have been separatism at its worst. The appellate court did mitigate 
this potentially harsh result by sustaining jurisdiction over the con-
structive trust claim on the basis of "pendent jurisdiction"185 and 
diversity.186 
With regard to pendent jurisdiction, the court of appeals in 
Beverly Hills Bank reasoned that the gist of United Mine Workers v. 
Gibbs187 was that a federal court has power188 to entertain a state 
claim if it relates to the federal claim in a way that would generate the 
expectation that plaintiff would try both in a single proceeding. The 
court concluded that, because both claims arose from "a common 
nucleus of operative fact" and would ordinarily be tried in one 
judicial proceeding, the district court had the power, on the basis of 
Gibbs, to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the equitable claim.180 
Yet, the Gibbs case had dealt with the jurisdiction of federal 
courts in federal question cases, and it has always been recognized 
181. See Compania de Nav. Almirante S.A., Panama v. Certain Proceeds of 
Cargo, 288 F. Supp. 77, 81 (C.D. Cal. 1967). 
182. The trial court read Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del 
Caribe, 339 U.S. 684 (1950), discussed in note 58 supra, as meaning that "an Admir-
alty Court can, as a means of effectuating a claim incontestably in Admiralty, deter-
mine subsidiary or derivative equitable issues." 288 F. Supp. at 81. 
183. 437 F.2d at 305. 
184. See note 58 supra. 
185. 437 F.2d at 305. 
186. 437 F.2d at 306. 
187. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
188. It is important to stress the word "power," because much of the traditional 
pendent-jurisdiction learning stresses that there are two inquiries: (1) whether 'the 
bare power to reach the asserted state claim exists; (2) the wisdom of reaching the 
claim. See 437 F.2d at 306. 
189. 437 F.2d at 306 (footnote omitted). 
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that admiralty has peculiarities of its own, which generally tend 
toward the restriction of jurisdiction. The Beverly Hills Bank court 
addressed this complication in an unilluminating footnote: "Gibbs 
involved federal question jurisdiction but there is no reason why the 
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction should not be equally applicable 
when jurisdiction over the federal claim is in admiralty. 7(a) 
Moore's Federal Practice 3146-47."190 
A traditionalist could readily conclude that the court in Beverly 
Hills Bank made more of a leap than it acknowledged.191 Fairly and 
conservatively read, the case stands for the proposition that an admir-
alty court has jurisdiction over a plaintiffs closely related equitable 
claim against a defendant where jurisdiction over the defendant is 
also supported by diversity192 and where there has been waiver or 
other disposition of the potentially thorny seventh amendment is-
sue.193 Even thus limited, it is an important case, and the relative 
want of attention it has received is surprising.194 
As noted above in the discussion of counterclaims and third-party 
practice, 105 the maritime courts that have employed auxiliary jurisdic-
tional techniques to establish jurisdiction over nonmaritime claims 
and parties have been sensitive to the jury trial rights involved. The 
Ninth Circuit in Beverly Hills Bank had a conspicuously easy time 
with that problem: "It is immaterial that the district court purported 
190. 437 F.2d at 306 n.7. Following that footnote, the Ninth Circuit also men-
tioned that the presence of diversity jurisdiction would sustain power to hear the con-
structive trust claim. 
In making its pendent jurisdiction argument, the court did not rely on unification, 
nor did it mention that rule 18(a) states: "A party asserting a claim to relief as 
an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as 
independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as 
he has against an opposing party." FED. R. Cxv. P. 18(a). 
191. The Moore treatise does support the use the court made of it. Professor 
Moore has frequently expressed impatience with jurisdictional niceties of any sort 
that he deems inimical to the just powers of a sensibly functioning federal court. 
The portion of the treatise referred to culminates with a nice statement of that philos-
ophy: "If the matter is one which, in the opinion of the court, would ordinarily be 
expected to be tried in one judicial proceeding there is power in the court-whether 
sitting within its maritime or nonmaritime capacity-to hear and determine the entire 
cause by invoking its pendent jurisdiction." 7A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ,r 270, 
at 3149 (2d ed. 1968). 
192. See notes 94, 190 supra and accompanying text. 
193. See notes 195-96 infra and accompanying text. 
194. The case is briefly described, without comment, in the 1973 supplement to 
Moore's treatise. See 7A J. MOORE, supra note 191, ,r 270, at 3149. It was cited 
in passing in two district court cases. See Ohio Barge Lines, Inc. v. Dravo Corp., 
326 F. Supp. 863, 867 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Nyon Technical Commercial, Inc. v. Equi-
table Equip. Co., 341 F. Supp. 777, 779-80 (E.D. La. 1972). For two useful evalua-
tions of the case, see Note, 18 WAYNE L REV. 1211, supra note 108, at 1215 and 
Landers, supra note 69, at 70 n.88. 
195. See notes 126-28, 167-69, 175-77 supra, 
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to exercise aQllliralty rather than pendent or diversity jurisdiction. 
. . . There was no right to a jury trial since the constructive trust 
claim was equitable . . . ; and even if such a right existed the bank 
could not complain for it did not demand a jury .... "100 
In the other major joinder of claims case, however, no such easy 
resolution of the jury problem was possible. In Ohio Barge Lines, 
Inc. v. Dravo Corp.,197 the plaintiff alleged that defects in a towboat 
built by the defendant caused the vessel to go out of control while 
being operated by plaintiff and to hit several barges and a landing, all 
owned by Delta Concrete. Ohio Barge settled with Delta and took an 
assignment of Delta's legal claims. It then brought suit in admiralty 
against the shipbuilder for the amount paid Delta plus the cost of re-
pairs; it urged eight separate theories in support of recovery.198 There 
was no diversity of citizenship. Defendant's exception to the jurisdic-
tion of the court was based on the foolish but well-settled doctrine 
that contracts for the sale or construction of ships are nonmari-
time.199 Examining each of plaintiff's eight theories separately, the 
court found independent admiralty jurisdiction over all except a count 
in express warranty and a count based on indemnification provisions 
in the construction contract. Those two counts were directly and 
closely tied to the ship-sale contract and were thus beyond the reach 
of admiralty jurisdiction. Nevertheless, on the authority of United 
Mine Workers v. Gibbs2°0 and the 1966 unification of the civil and 
admiralty rules, 201 the court found pendent jurisdiction. 
196. 437 F.2d at 306-07 (citations omitted). 
197. 326 F. Supp. 863 (W.D. Pa. 1971). 
198. Strict liability under REsTATEMENT (SECOND} OF TORTS § 402A (1965); as-
signment of Delta's claim for damage to its barge and landing; express warranty; im-
plied warranty; indemnity provisions in the construction contract between plaintiff 
and defendant; indemnification under general tort principles; unjust enrichment; un-
seaworthiness. 326 F. Supp. at 865. 
199. "Few admiralty doctrines have received more criticism and with so little ef• 
fect as that which holds that agreements for the construction of vessels are not mari-
time contracts and, hence, not within the purview of admiralty jurisdiction. This 
holding has been repeated many times by decisions of the Supreme Court and is now 
accepted as firmly established, albeit arguably inconsistent and illogical," 326 F. 
Supp. at 864 (footnotes omitted). 
200. "We cannot order that the non-admiralty counts be filed in a civil action 
because diversity is lacking. The situation therefore is not unlike that faced by the 
Supreme Court in United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), 
where it was held that pendent jurisdiction could be exercised in circumstances where 
diversity was lacking as to a state cause of action but where it and the federal claim 
were derived from a common nucleus of operative facts." 326 F. Supp. at 867. 
201. "In the American Law Institute, Study of Division of Jurisdiction Between 
State and Federal Courts (1969) we read: 'Moreover, since the unification of admir-
alty and civil procedure, the doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction will per• 
mit joinder or impleader in any case in which the transaction or occurrence involved 
gives rise to both maritime and nonmaritime claims.' " 326 F. Supp. at 867-68. 
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In two respects Ohio Barge Lines extends the holding in Beverly 
Hill Bank. It is true that in both cases, pendent jurisdiction sus-
tained an admiralty court's exercise of jurisdiction over a nonmaritime 
claim urged by plaintiff against the original defendant. Yet in 
Beverly Hills Bank, the holding was buttressed by the presence of 
diversity jurisdiction, while in Ohio Barge Lines diversity was lacking. 
Moreover, in Beverly Hills Bank, the court disposed of the issue of 
defendant's possible right to a jury trial of the appended claim by 
adverting to its equitable nature and to a waiver argument. 202 The 
Ohio Barge Lines court did not mention the jury trial issue, probably 
because nothing helpful could be said. The claims over which inde-
pendent admiralty jurisdiction was found wanting were claims at law, 
to which the seventh amendment right to jury trial would have 
extended, and there was less room to build a waiver argument than 
there had been in Beverly Hills Bank, for the Ohio Barge Lines de-
fendant had vigorously contested the jurisdiction. 
A student commentator saw the Ohio Barge Lines case as "an 
inevitable outgrowth of the merger of admiralty and civil 
procedure .... The instant [decision] was innovative and stands 
as a benchmark along the way toward a unified treatment of admiralty 
procedure and civil procedure in practice as well as in print."203 
Another commentator, however, in arguing that unification could 
not have removed prior jurisdictional limitations on admiralty, asserted 
that "the Ohio Barge court indicated ... that the maritime and 
nonmaritime issues were not separable. Therefore under .traditional 
learning admiralty could decide the whole matter."204 The court 
actually said nothing of the kind and in fact relied explicitly on the 
1966 merger rather than on "traditional [admiralty] learning." To-
gether, Beverly Hills Bank and Ohio Barge Lines do advance the 
purposes of the 1966 unification, but the leaps that hacl to be made 
by both courts demonstrate that problems of the separatist tradition 
continue to plague the courts. 
4. Joinder of Parties 
According to the ·traditional view, the plaintiff in a maritime 
proceeding could not join a nonmartime party.205 The strength of 
202. See notes 195-96 supra and accompanying text. 
203. Note, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1211, supra note 108, at 1219-20. 
204. Landers, supra note 69, at 72 n.91. 
205. The traditional learning on joinder of parties is fully explained in Howmet 
Corp. v. Tokyo Shipping Co., 320 F. Supp. 975 (D. Del. 1971), where shipper 
brought an action in admiralty against the carrier and against the City of Wilming-
ton, Delaware, for damage to the cargo occurring on the ship, on the pier, or both. 
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that prohibition highlights the dramatic nature of the Second Circuit's 
decision in Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx.200 Plaintiff, the 
disappointed shipper of a cargo of valuable leather, sued Moore-
McCormack Lines, which had conveyed the goods from Antwerp to 
New York, and Tidewater Terminal, with which the goods were 
stored in New York when they were stolen. The trial judge did not 
The court granted the city's motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. No inde-
pendent admiralty ground to support an action against the city could be found. 320 
F. Supp. at 977-78. Plaintiff's pendent jurisdiction argument was brushed aside: 
[A]Ithough this Court had admiralty jurisdiction over [shipper's] first alterna-
tive claim for cargo damaged in ocean transit . • . this claim would not confer 
pendant or incidental admiralty jurisdiction over [shipper's] alternative and sep-
arate claim against the City for damage allegedly sustained after the cargo had 
been discharged . . . . To confer pendant or incidental jurisdiction, the com-
plaint must state a "single cause of action" supported by federal and non-federal 
grounds, as distinguished from separate causes of action under federal and non-
federal law. Separate causes of action are presented • • • where the parties to 
the federal and non-I ederal claims are not idential. Here the separate and alter-
native federal and non-federal causes of action are not asserted against identical 
defendants. Thus, no incidental or pendant jurisdiction exists with respect to 
the claim against the City. 
320 F. Supp. at 979 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
The strength of the traditional prohibition against using the pendent jurisdiction 
device to permit plaintiff to join an additional party is highlighted by Consolidated 
Cork Corp. v. Jugoslavenska Linijska Plovidba, 318 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
In that case cargo was damaged, probably on the pier, and the shipper brought an 
action in admiralty against the carrier and the carrier's stevedore. On the th~ory 
that the cargo damage occurred on the pier, independent admiralty jurisdiction was 
lacking. The court was quite troubled by the stevedore's being present in the case 
at the behest of plaintiff but elected to focus on the fact that the carrier had brought 
a third-party complaint against the stevedore under rule 14(c). A third-party com-
plaint over the same defendant, in the court's view, would have sustained jurisdiction 
under ancillary notions: "Clearly, this procedure through which admiralty jurisdiction 
is retained over a matter involving the same transaction or occurrence could have 
and would have been invoked by [defendant] in this case but for plaintiff's libel. 
Therefore, the court will decide this case as if admiralty jurisdiction had been ac-
quired ... through the usual third-party procedure." 318 F. Supp. at 1211. The 
third-party complaint used by the Consolidated Cork court to sustain jurisdiction 
over the claims against the stevedore was obviously under rule 14(c). (In Landers, 
supra note 69, at 69 n.82, the Consolidated Cork case is briefed: "[N]o admiralty 
jurisdiction over plaintiff's direct claim against a third party, but admiralty proper 
if treated as third-party claim for indemnity." Actually, the third-party claim was 
both "indemnity" and "substitute defendant" third-party practice. For discussion of 
the jurisdictional affinity between "substitute defendant" third-party practice and join-
der of parties see notes 141-46, 175-77 supra and accompanying text). Yet the court, 
evidently perceiving no difficulty with the jury trial issue, did not mention it. The 
Consolidated Cork case is doubly anomalous because of this failure. Both the rule 
14(c) third-party practice decisions and the joinder of parties decisions generally 
have indicated at least a perception of the seventh amendment difficulty. 
Comparison of the results in Howmet and Consolidated Cork is warranted. In 
Howmet, plaintiff was not permitted to join a defendant allegedly responsible for 
shore damage to cargo, whereas in Consolidated the court ignored that facet of the 
case in favor of focusing on the fact that the maritime defendant, in addition to the 
plaintiff, wanted the shorebased party in the case. It should be noted that the claim 
in Howmet seemed to be based on two separate incidents of damage, one at sea and 
one ashore, whereas in Consolidated all the damage presumably occurred ashore. 
206. 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971). 
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question the existence of independent admiralty jurisdiction against 
either defendant, 207 but the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
disagreed with the trial judge's theory that Tidewater was a party 
to the maritime contract of carriage.208 The only other ·traditional 
basis for admiralty jurisdiction over Tidewater would have been tort. 
However, even if the plaintiff's complaint had been read with the 
liberality necessary to discern a claim based on tort, there would have 
been no jurisdiction under traditional admiralty principles, because 
both the alleged negligence and the damage occurred on land. 209 
Upon concluding that there was no independent admiralty 
jurisdiction over Tidewater under either a contract or a tort 
approach, an admiralty judge of traditional views would have ordered 
dismissal as to that defendant. Under the traditional view, not even 
diversity (which was lacking in any event210 ) would have cured the 
problem, for it was thought that independent admiralty jurisdiction 
was a requisite for the joinder of additional parties in a maritime case. 
Yet Judge Friendly, writing for the Second Circuit, ignored this 
constricting view and achieved a breakthrough of potentially major 
significance by using the device of pendent jurisdiction to sustain the 
trial court's power to hear the claim against the non.maritime defend-
ant. 211 
Judge Friendly's analysis in Leather's Best began with a consider-
ation of the Gibbs212 liberalization of pendent jurisdiction over addi-
tional claims;213 he concluded that the claim against Tidewater passed 
the "common nucleus of operative facts"214 test. The first major step 
207. "The district court was not asked, and evidently saw no need, to examine 
the jurisdictional underpinnings of this action. Neither has any question in this re-
gard been raised by the parties on this appeal." 451 F.2d at 807. 
208. 451 F.2d at 807-08. 
209. While the Supreme Court in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleve-
land, 409 U.S. 249 (1972), held that not all torts that occur on water are within the 
admiralty jurisdiction, under one view of the case, it also strongly implied that some 
torts not occurring on water may be. See 409 U.S. at 256-61. See also Robertson, 
Book Review, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 352, 363-65. However, it is questionable whether 
anything in Executive Jet would have validated traditional tort jurisdiction over Tide-
water. In any event, the Leather's Best decision antedates Executive Jet. 
210. See 451 F.2d at 809 n.10. 
211. Leather's Best is generally viewed as one of a trilogy of Second Circuit cases 
dramatically extending the pendent jurisdiction doctrine to include the joinder of addi-
tional parties by plaintiff. See Comment, Federal Pendent Subject Matter Jurisdic-
tion-The Doctrine of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs Extended to Persons Not Party 
to the Jurisdiction-Conferring Claim, 73 CoLUM. L. REv. 153 (1973). The other 
two cases of the series were Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 441 F.2d 
627 (2d Cir. 1971), decided before Leather's Best, and Almenares v. Wyman, 453 
F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 944 (1972), decided after Leather's 
Best. 
212. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
213. 451 F.2d at 809. 
214. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). 
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beyond Gibbs necessitated by the instant case--use of pendent juris-
diction to bring in a nonfederal party-had already been taken by the 
Second Circuit in a nonadmiralty case, Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset & 
Dunlap, Inc., 215 which had involved federal claims under the copy-
right laws and state claims of unfair trade practice and unfair compe-
tition_. There the court had held that a federal court had power to 
hear a state claim against a defendant not named in the federal claim, 
provided the Gibbs test was satisfied. The Astor-Honor court found 
support for this conclusion in prior decisions that had established 
ancillary jurisdiction to entertain compulsory counterclaims under 
rule 13(a) and third-party claims under rule 14(a).216 
The second necessary step-applying the liberal "pendent 
party"217 device in an admiralty case-was a large one, but Judge 
Friendly took it with ease: 
At an earlier date this [civil/admiralty] difference might have af-
fected our decision here. But the rules of procedure in the admiralty 
and civil jurisdiction were merged in 1966, and we are of the opin-
ion that at least since that merger, the constitutional rationale which 
underlies the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction in the context of Rule 
13(a) and Rule 14 may be applied to support the conclusion that 
a federal court has the power to hear a related state claim against 
a defendant not named in the federal claim regardless of whether the 
federal claim arises in the civil or admiralty jurisdiction.218 
As indicated above, 219 the traditional view of the availability of 
auxiliary jurisdictional devices in the federal courts generally would 
have listed the following categories, ranging from those where the 
extension of federal judicial power was deemed easiest to those where 
it was deemed most troublesome: 
( 1 ) compulsory counterclaims and cross claims [ added state claim 
by defendant]; 
(2) third-party practice220 [state party added by defendant]; 
(3) joinder of closely related state claim [state claim added by plain-
tiff]; 
( 4) joinder of closely related state party [state party added by plain-
tiff]. 
Prior to Astor-Honor,221 the extension of federal judicial power to the 
215. 441 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1971). 
216. See Judge Friendly's discussion of Astor-Honor in Leathers Best, 451 F.2d 
at 809-10. See also note 211 supra; Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 
(1973); Comment, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1263, supra note 109. 
217. Comment, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1263, supra note 109, at 1278. 
218. 451 F.2d at 810-11 (footnotes omitted), 
219. See notes 119-20 supra and accompanying text. 
. 220. This would refer, of course, to "indemnity" third-party practice under rule 
14(a), and not to the peculiarly admiralty "substitute defendant" third-party practice 
under rule 14(c). See notes 141-46, 175-77, 205 supra and accompanying text, 
221. See notes 119-20 supra and accompanying text. 
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first three situations was well established on the civil side, and Astor-
Honor set the fourth on its way. Before 1966, the prevailing view 
was that admiralty courts could not assume jurisdiction through the 
ancillary or pendent devices in any of these cases. 222 Leather's Best 
holds that the admiralty side of federal court may now extend its 
jurisdiction over cases in the fourth category, which traditionally has 
been seen as the least promising category for ancillary or pendent 
jurisdiction. The structure of Judge Friendly's argument and ·the 
prior practice on the civil side together suggest that all four of these 
categories of cases are as fully cognizable on the admiralty side as they 
are on the civil side. 223 
222. As to the various categories of ancillary jurisdiction-parties other than 
plaintiff adding nonfederal claims or parties-Judge Friendly pointed out in Leather's 
Best that, prior to 1966, there were no such doctrines in admiralty. 415 F.2d at 810 
n.11. As to pendent jurisdiction, the prevailing view is correctly mirrored by the fol-
lowing footnote remark: "Prior to [Beverly Hills Bank], Professor Currie's appraisal 
of pendent jurisdiction in admiralty held true [from Currie, The Silver Oar and All 
That: A Study of the Romero Case, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 59 (1959)]: 'No one 
has ever suggested . • . that the doctrine of "pendent" juriscliction applies to maritime 
claims, except in the context of the problem of procedure in seamen's injury cases' 
[where the "pending" was not at all of a state claim to a maritime claim in admiralty 
court, but rather of a general maritime claim to a statutory maritime claim on the 
civil side of federal court]." Note, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1211, supra note 108, at 1215 
n.27. At the time of Leather's Best, there had been two other post-merger decisions 
arguably exploiting the third category of juiisdictional extension. See Beverly Hills 
Natl. Bank & Trust Co. v. Compania de Nav. Almirante S.A., Panama, 437 F.2d 301 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 996 (1971), discussed in notes 90-96, 178-94 supra; 
Ohio Barge Lines, Inc. v. Dravo Corp., 326 F. Supp. 863 (W.D. Pa. 1971), discussed 
in notes 197-204 supra. While neither case was mentioned in Leather's Best the pre-
vailing view clearly was that a maritime plaintiff could not utilize the pendent juris-
diction device to add nonmaritime parties. See Howmet Corp. v. Tokyo Shipping 
Co., 320 F. Supp. 975 (D. Del. 1971); Consolidated Cork Corp. v. Jugoslavenska 
Linijska Plovidba, 318 F. Supp. 1203 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), discussed in note 205 supra. 
223. In two long footnotes in Leather's Best, Judge Friendly touched on these 
matters as follows: 
Prior to the 1966 merger, there was no rule of compulsory counterclaim, much 
less a doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, in the maritime jurisdiction, and permis-
sive cross-libels were limited to claims in admiralty arising out of the same con-
tract or cause of action as the original claim. With merger, however, Rule 13 
became applicable to proceedings brought in the admiralty jurisdiction. There 
is no evident reason why the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction should not now 
be applicable as well to compulsory counterclaims which arise in the context of 
suits in admiralty. 
With respect to third-party practice, too, admiralty practice differed from 
practice on the civil "side" prior to the 1966 merger. Under former Admiralty 
Rule 56, at least some independent basis of federal jurisdiction was always neces-
sary to implead a third party. Indeed, there was substantial authority to the ef-
fect that the third-party claim had to come within the admiralty jurisdiction. 
With merger, a subsection (c) was added to Rule 14 with the intent of preserv-
ing certain features of admiralty impleader which were more liberal than civil 
impleader. The effect of merger upon the former admiralty requirement of inde-
p.:ndent jurisdiction for impleader has not as yet been conclusively resolved. But 
if we were presented with the question, it would be only with the greatest reluc-
tance that we would conclude that under the merged rules the doctrine of ancil-
lary jurisdiction did not extend to admiralty as well as to civil impleader. Cer-
tainly the practical considerations which support the doctrine of ancillary juris-
diction in the context of civil impleader are equally persuasive on the admiralty 
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But what of the seventh amendment right to jury trial, the issue 
that had created much of the difficulty in the admiralty counterclaim, 
third-party, and joinder of claims decisions?224 Leather's Best dis-
poses of the problem with a footnote: "[I]n this case, we are not 
faced with any problem of denial of the right to jury trial since 
Tidewater made no such demand below."225 Judge Friendly's failure 
to treat the jury trial problem is puzzling. Leather's Best has the look 
of a case chosen by the court of appeals as a vehicle to write some 
law. The trial court's inclusion of the terminal operator on the theory 
that the claim against it was incident to a maritime contract was 
perhaps erroneous, but the Second Circuit was under no compulsion 
to notice that problem sua sponte. In the context of an exposition 
upon the post-1966 reach of admiralty's pendent and ancillary pow-
ers, the relegation of the jury trial problem to a footnote about "this 
case" is disappointing. 
The Leather's Best decision has been used to support the exercise 
of pendent jurisdiction over rule 14(c) third-party defendants,226 and 
in one case to support pendent jurisdiction over an additional party 
joined by plaintiff, 227 but it has not exercised an influence even 
remotely commensurate with its potential importance. One reason 
for the relative paucity of discussion of this aspect of the case228 might 
be its failure to confront the seventh amendment problem, but a more 
likely explanation is the tendency of courts and commentators dealing 
with matters of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction to perceive the 
subject as divided into fairly rigid compartments. Thus, for example, 
if a given decision dealt with third-party practice, it is not likely to be 
mentioned in the context of counterclaims. As the Leather's Best 
opinion indicated, the underlying problems are the same whether the 
additional claim or defendant is added to the maritime case at the 
behest of the plaintiff or the defendant, but, by and large, the cases 
side. In any event, we do not perceive the requirement of independent jurisdic-
tion in pre-merger admiralty impleader to have had constitutional underpinnings. 
Rather it reflected a judicial conception of the limited nature of Admiralty Rule 
56 and the appropriate reach of the then distinct admiralty jurisdiction. 
451 F.2d 810-11 nn.11 & 12 (citations omitted) (emphasis original). 
224. See notes 126-28, 167-69, 175-77 supra and accompanying text. 
225. 451 F.2d at 811 n.12. 
226. See Royal Typewriter Co. v. M/V Kulmerland, 346 F. Supp. 1019, 1025 
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), atfd., 483 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1973). 
227. See Princess Cruises Corp. v. Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 762, 
765 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (the jury trial problem was not mentioned). 
228. The case is widely known for its substantive treatment of the $500 per pack-
age limitation of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1970). 
Sae, e.g., Note, 4 J. MAR.~- & COMMERCE 159 (1972). 
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and the commentary do not treat these questions from this perspec-
tive.220 ~ 
If Leather's Best had been decided by the Supreme Court, and if 
it were understood and followed by the lower courts in the sense 
indicated here, the 1966 merger would have gone far toward accom-
plishing what many of its proponents saw as its major purpose-the 
abolition of civil/ admiralty separatism. Such a Supreme Court deci-
sion would validate the hope, expressed in the 1969 ALI study, that 
such jurisdictional anomalies as admiralty's want of equitable powers 
and the rule that ship-sale contracts are not maritime could be cured 
or mitigated by the doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction.230 
As it stands, however, the case has not been that influential. 
5. "Romero-Pendenf'231 Problems 
This subsection discusses situations in which a party seeks to add 
maritime parties or claims to cases brought on the civil side232 of 
federal court under federal question or diversity jurisdiction. In these 
decisions the problems of separatism are not the direct result of the 
conception of "admiralty" as a separate court. Rather, the difficul-
ties confronted by the federal courts stem in part from the rigidity of 
the concomitant conception that maritime substantive law differs 
radically from other federal law, and in part from uncertainties as to 
the appropriate role of the seventh amendment in maritime cases. 
The largest single category of such cases consists of actions 
brought by injured seamen, who typically will assert in a single 
proceeding three distinct claims against the employer: (1) Negli-
gence, under the Jones Act;233 (2) unseaworthiness, under the general 
229. Landers, supra note 69, at 73, appears to view the Leather's Best case in 
a light similar to that indicated in the text. Landers disapproved of the decision, 
using the familiar argument that the 1966 rules could hardly have worked the neces-
sary change. 
230. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STuDY OF THE DMSION OF JURISDICTION BE-
TIVEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 226-29 (1969). 
231. For the explanation of this term, see note 115 supra. 
232. See note 48 supra and accompanying text. 
233. 46 u.s.c. § 688 (1970): 
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment 
may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of 
trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or 
extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway 
employees shall apply; and in case of the death of any seaman as a result of 
any such personal injury the personal representative of such seaman may main-
tain an action for damages at law with the right of trial by jury, and in such 
action all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right of ac-
tion for death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable. Jurisdiction 
in such actions shall be under the court of the district in which the defendant 
employer resides or in which his principal office is located. 
As interpreted in Panama. R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924), the Jones Act per-
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maritime law; and (3) maintenance and cure, under the general 
:p1aritime law. The Jones Act expressly gives an injured seaman the 
option of proceeding "at law, with the right of trial by jury." The 
problem that gave rise to the important case of Romero v. Interna-
tional Terminal Operating Co.234 was the natural desire of the sea-
man-plaintiff for a jury trial of the other two claims as well. The 
court of appeals had split on whether the unseaworthiness and main-
tenance and cure claims, premised as they are on federal case law, 
"arise under" federal laws in the sense necessary for federal question 
jurisdiction. In Romero, the Supreme Court decided that they did 
not, but went on to hold that when a seaman brings a Jones Act suit 
at law, the intimately related unseaworthiness and maintenance and 
cure claims can be heard simultaneously as a matter of pendent juris-
diction. One would have thought that this disposition necessarily 
afforded the seaman a jury trial on all three of his closely connected 
injury claims, but, because of the technical posture of the case, the 
Romero court expressly left this issue open.285 
Several years later, in Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co.,286 the 
Court resolved the matter in favor of the right to a jury trial. In 
Fitzgerald a seaman had brought a Jones Act suit on the civil side of 
federal court; he added counts based on the general maritime law of 
unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure, and demanded a jury 
trial of all the issues. The Supreme Court held in his favor: 
Although remedies for negligence, unseaworthiness, and maintenance 
and cure have different origins and may on occasion call for applica-
tion of slightly different principles and procedures, they nevertheless, 
when based on one unitary set of circumstances, serve the same pur-
pose of indemnifying a seaman for damage caused by injury, depend 
in large part upon the same evidence, and involve some identical ele-
ments of recovery. Requiring a seaman to split up his lawsuit, sub-
mitting part of it to a jury and part to a judge, unduly complicates 
and confuses a trial, creates difficulties in applying doctrines of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel, and can easily result in too much or 
too little recovery. 2a1 
Thus, common sense dictated a single trial to a jury "[i]n the absence 
of some statutory or constitutional obstacle."288 While admiralty's 
mits an injured seaman, at his option, to proceed in admiralty, without a jury, or in 
state court or federal court, with a jury. 
234. 358 U.S. 354 (1959). 
235. 358 U.S. at 381. For a thorough analysis of the Romero case, see Currie, 
The Silver Oar and All That: A Study of the Romero Case, 27 U, Cm. L. REV, 1 
(1959), and Kurland, The Romero Case and Some Problems of Federal Jurisdiction, 
73 HARV, L. REV. 817 (1960), 
236. 374 U.S. 16 (1963). 
237. 374 U.S. at 18-19 (footnote omitted). 
238. 374 U.S. at 20. 
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nonjury tradition was firm and venerable, it did not, in the Court's 
view, amount to such an obstacle: "While this court has held that 
the Seventh Amendment does not require jury trial in admiralty cases, 
neither that amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution 
forbids them. Nor does any statute of Congress or Rule of Proce-
dure, Civil or Admiralty, forbid jury trials in maritime cases."239 
The traditional interpretation of Romero and Fitzgerald has been 
that pendent jurisdiction on the civil side of the federal court was 
the seaman's only route240 to jury trial of his unseaworthiness and 
maintenance and cure claims; on the admiralty side juries remained 
unknown. 241 But several recent decisions, noµng that the language 
of Fitzgerald242 is consistent with limited provision of jury trials in 
courts of admiralty, have concluded that in appropriate cases admiral-
ty's nonjury tradition should yield to the dictates of the seventh 
amendment. 243 The two leading cases are from the Third Circuit. In 
Haskins v. Point Towing Co.,244 a pleading that the court termed 
"confused"245 was interpreted as asserting a Jones Act claim at law, 
and unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure claims in admiralty. 
Plaintiff sought consolidation of the civil and admiralty actions and a 
jury trial of all three claims. 246 The court granted his request be-
cause of the policy it found to be implicit in Fitzgerald:247 
239. 374 U.S. at -20. 
240. A plaintiff with a maritime case as to which admiralty jurisdiction is not 
exclusive can proceed on the basis of diversity and get a federal jury, provided he 
can meet the requirements for diversity jurisdiction. See text at notes 4-7 supra. 
241. See, e.g., Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Philadelphia Ship Maintenance Co., 342 
F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Sanderlin v. Old Dominion Stevedoring Corp., 281 
F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Va. 1968). 
242. See text at notes 237, 239 supra. 
243. See Blake v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 417 F.2d 264, 266 (3d Cir. 1969); Haskins 
v. Point Towing Co., 395 F.2d 737 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 834 
(1970); Saus v. Delta Concrete Co., 368 F. Supp. 297 (W.D. Pa. 1973). See gener-
ally In re Dearborn Marine Service, Inc., 499 F.2d 263, 271 (5th Cir. 1974); Terrac-
ciano v. McAlinden Constr. Co., 485 F.2d 304, 308-09 (2d Cir. 1973), 
244. 395 F.2d 737 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 834 (1970). The de-
nial of certiorari occurred after the Third Circuit had affirmed a decision by the 
trial court on remand that plaintiff was not entitled to Jones Act benefits because 
he had failed to establish an employment relationship with the defendant. See Has-
kins v. Point Towing Co., 421 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1970). 
245. 395 F.2d at 738. 
246. Broad discretion respecting consolidation and separate trial orders is pro-
vided in rule 42, which requires "preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as 
declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of 
the United States." See FED. R. CIV. P. 42. 
247. In Fitzgerald the Supreme Court "made no attempt to define precisely how 
plaintiff had labeled his claims, whether in admiralty or at law, . . . [but rather] 
based its decision on the fundamental factors of simplicity, utility to litigants and 
the interest of justice in having one tribunal decide the three claims which in general 
arise from a unitary set of circumstances." 395 F.2d at 740. 
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We see no reason why a plaintiff who sues at law under the Jones 
Act for negligence must make his claims for unseaworthiness and 
maintenance and cure pendent to it on the law side in order to main-
tain his right to trial by jury on all three claims. To require this could 
compel him to lose the advantages which inhere in the characteristic 
admiralty claims, such as in rem process, interlocutory appeals, [and] 
admiralty attachment . . . . There is no reason to make relinquish-
ment of the procedural advantages of the inherent admiralty claims 
for unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure the price for a jury 
trial.248 
Thus, out of regard for "simplicity, utility to litigants, and the interest 
of justice,"249 Haskins took the Fitzgerald decision a major step 
forward. Fitzgerald had mandated jury trial of maritime claims 
brought on the civil side as pendent to "arising under'' claims; Haskins 
extended the mandate to maritime claims brought on the admiralty 
side and consolidated with "arising under'' claims. Still, the de-
cision might have been interpreted as limited to the assertion of 
a seaman's rights under a statute affirmatively endowing seamen with 
the right to jury trial; the availability of jury trial for other kinds of 
maritime claims that lack an independent diversity or federal question 
basis was not implicated in the Haskins rationale. 
It remained for the same court of appeals to complete the picture 
the following year. Blake v. Farrell Lines, Inc.250 consolidated several 
like cases in which a longshoreman's personal injury action against 
a shipowner was based on diversity and in which a separate admiralty 
suit for indemnity had been brought by the shipowner against the 
plaintiff's employer. Each shipowner moved for consolidation of the 
original diversity suit with the admiralty indemnity suit and requested 
a separate bench trial of the indemnity suit; each employer argued 
that consolidation should result in a jury trial of all issues in the case. 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the trial judges had 
properly ordered jury trial of the entire case. At the core of its 
decision was the court's perception that, while jury trial is clearly a 
matter of right under the Constitution, nonjury trial in admiralty 
is merely a matter of tradition.251 The court noted that while the 
federal rules provide for "the assertion and preservation of the right to 
248. 395 F.2d at 741 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). Accord, Saus v. 
Delta Concrete Co., 368 F. Supp. 297 (W.D. Pa. 1973). 
249. 395 F.2d at 740. 
250. 417 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1969). 
251. "[J]ury trial is a matter of right in the action for damages while only his-
toric practice and the failure of the Rules to make affirmative provision for this sit-
uation inhibit the ordering of a jury trial of the admiralty suit." 417 F.2d at 266-
ol. 
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jury trial,"252 they "neither create nor preserve any right to a non-jury 
trial."253 It concluded that in special situations of trial consolidation 
of closely related actions or claims, one of which is attended by a right 
to jury trial and the other not, a court may, in the interest of efficient 
and expeditious administration of justice, submit both to a jury for a 
decision concerning disputed factual issues. 254 
The Blake court did caution against reading the decision to mean 
"that in the ordinary situation in which there is no right to a jury trial, 
the trial judge may, within his discretion, reject the traditional mode 
of fact finding and order a jury trial."255 Yet the reasoning in the 
case is potent, 256 and might be used with equal efficacy to resolve the 
jury problems created by the use of ancillary and pendent techniques 
in cases originally based on admiralty jurisdiction. As previously 
mentioned, the jury trial problem in those cases has been handled in 
various ways. In some instances the problem was ignored, 257 in 
others a jury trial of the nonmaritime claim was ordered. 258 Occa-
252. 417 F.2d at 266. 
253. 417 F.2d at 266. 
254. 417 F.2d at 266. 
255. 417 F.2d at 266. 
256. See, e.g., Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Philadelphia Ship Maintenance Co., 312 
F. Supp. 380, 381-82 (E.D. Pa. 1970), revd. and remanded, 444 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 
1971), on remand, 342 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Pa. 1972). In Bergeria v. Marine Car-
riers, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 1153 (E.D. Pa. 1972), a district court suggested the one 
obvious extension. In that case, a seaman brought a civil-side action premised on 
the Jones Act and the doctrine of unseaworthiness, demanding a jury trial. Ship-
owner counterclaimed for fraudulently procured maintenance and cure. Plaintiff 
urged that the counterclaim should be dismissed as not within federal jurisdiction. 
The court, however, found independent admiralty jurisdiction over the counterclaim. 
The major question remained the mode of trial of the issues presented by the counter-
claim. Relying on Fitzgerald, Blake, and the fact that the issues on the main claim 
and the counterclaim were almost entirely overlapping, the court ordered the counter-
claim tried to the jury. The court's discussion of the jury trial problem is aptly ex-
pressive of the Blake philosophy: 
In the present case, the jury will have to determine whether the injuries giving 
rise to plaintiff's Jones Act claim were the result of an accident aboard ship . • • 
or whether they resulted from the preexisting condition alone. Much the same 
factual determination is involved in the claim for recovery by the shipowner of 
the maintenance and cure which it claims was fraudulently procured. . . . It 
would appear that this case presents the obverse of the Fitzgerald situation, since 
what is involved here is a claim to recover maintenance and cure allegedly 
wrongfully paid instead of a claim by the seaman to recover maintenance and 
cure in the first instance. However, since the same policies of judicial efficiency 
and consistency apply, we hold that Fitzgerald, as amplified by Blake, required 
submission of the counterclaim to the jury. 
341 F. Supp. at 1157-58 (emphasis added). 
257. See Ohio Barge Lines, Inc. v. Dravo Corp., 326 F. Supp. 863 (W.D. Pa. 
1971), discussed in notes 197-204 supra and accompanying text; Eutectic Corp. v. 
M/V Gudmundra, 367 F. Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Royal Typewriter Co. v. 
M/V Kulmerland, 346 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd., 483 F.2d 645 (2d 
Cir. 1973). 
258. See Alaska Barite Co. v. Freighters, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1972), 
discussed in note 124 supra; Industrial Equip. & Marine Serv., Inc. v. M/V Mr. 
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sionally courts have found that a befuddled nonmaritime party made a 
highly fictional waiver of his seventh amendment rights.250 One 
possible nonseparatist resolution of the problem would be that the 
assertion of jurisdiction by an admiralty court over any closely related 
claim or party makes that claim or party maritime, 260 thus removing 
it from the seventh amendment's "suits at common law" category. A 
more appealing solution, suggested by Blake v. Farrell Lines, Inc., is 
to recognize that the want of juries in admiralty is merely a matter of 
tradition261 that is clearly outweighed by the seventh amendment on 
the "admiralty side" just as Fitzgerald struck this balance on the "law 
side." Such recognition would lead to a requirement that, regardless 
of the original basis for jurisdiction, federal courts provide a jury trial 
for all issues upon the demand of any party who could have sum-
moned a federal jury to decide any one of the claims. This practice 
would comport with the conclusion of one district court that, 
"[g]iven the policy of the seventh amendment . . . , federal courts 
are less apt to err by granting jury trials, where not prohibited, than 
by denying jury trials. "262 
As indicated above, very few cases where admiralty was the 
original basis for federal jurisdiction have adopted the philosophy of 
providing jury trials for all issues of fact. 263 Indeed, this approach 
has gained only partial acceptance in the maritime cases brought on 
Gus, 333 F. Supp. 578, 582 (S.D. Tex. 1971), discussed in note 124 supra; Christman 
v. Maristella Compania Naviera, 293 F. Supp. 442, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), discussed 
in notes 160-64 supra and accompanying text. 
259. See Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 811 n.12 (2d Cir. 
1971), discussed in notes 206-25 supra and accompanying text; Beverly Hills Natl. 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Compania de Nav. Almirante S.A., Panama, 437 F.2d 301, 307 
(9th Cir. 1971), discussed in notes 178-94 supra and accompanying text. 
260. See text at note 175 supra. 
261. Rule 38(e) does not detract from this argument. It states: "These rules 
shall not be construed to create a right to trial by jury of the issues in an admiralty 
or maritime claim within the meaning of Rule 9(h)." FED. R. C1v. P. 38(e). This 
is no more than a statement that the rules draftsmen did not see fit to examine the 
tradition. See Nice v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 305 F. Supp. 1167 (W.D. Mich. 
1969), in which the court stated: 
The Explanatory Notes to then proposed Rule 38(e) indicate that the drafters 
were cognizant of a very limited right to a jury trial [in admiralty]. "There 
is no constitutional right to a jury trial in admiralty, and statutes conferring it 
are rare. The purpose of the new subdivision is to preserve the status quo as 
to a jury trial." Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Memo to the Ad-
visory Comm. on Admiralty Rules, the Status of Unification of the Civil and 
Admiralty Rules 33 (Nov. 15, 1962). 
305 F. Supp. at 1185 & n.4. 
262. Ballard v. Moore-~cCormack Lines, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 290, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 
1968). Accord, In re Dearborn Marine Serv., Inc., 499 F.2d 263, 271 (5th Cir. 
1974); Terraccian~ v. McAlinden Constr. Co., 484 F.2d 304, 316 (2d Cir. 1973); 
Gyorf1 v. Partredenet Atomena, 58 F.R.D. 112, 114-16 (N.D. Ohio 1973) · Gvirtsman 
v. Western King Co., 263 F. Supp. 633 (C.D. Cal. 1967). ' 
263. See text at notes 126-28, 154-56, 160-64, 176-77 supra, 
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the civil side, as reflected in three sets of cases. In one group of 
decisions, a shipowner's rights under the Limitation of Liability 
Act264 were asserted as a defense to a maritime action on the civil side 
of the federal court. In each case the court provided a bifurcated 
trial, and only the limitation issues were tried to the judge sitting 
alone. 265 In these decisions, the plaintiff had asserted his saving 
clause option in order to get a jury trial, and it was the defendant who 
sought to convert all or part of the case into an exclusively admiralty 
proceeding. The bifurcated trial resolution was deemed essential to 
preserve both the plaintiff's seventh amendment rights and the de-
fendant-shipowner's right to an exclusively admiralty defense. 266 
No consistent resolution has emerged for the second category of 
cases, in which the plaintiff seeks both unique admiralty procedures 
or remedies and a jury trial. Where plaintiffs sought to combine 
causes of action under the exclusively admiralty267 Death on the High 
Seas Act268 with a Jones Act civil action, jury trial of all the issues has 
been held proper.269 This outcome is in full accord with the spirit of 
Haskins270 and Blake271 that "there is no reason to make relinquish-
ment of the procedural advantages of the inherent admiralty claims 
. . . the price for a jury trial. "272 On the other hand, in two cases 
where plaintiffs sought to combine in personam jury trials with in rem 
procedures, district courts held that the in rem features would have to 
264. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-189 (1970); See also FED. R. CIV. P. F. 
265. See Terracciano v. McAlinden Constr. Co., 485 F.2d 304, 308-09 (2d Cir. 
1973) (appropriate procedure is to try liability issues to the jury and limitation issues 
to the judge alone; but where no objections made at the trial level, no error in trying 
the entire matter to the jury); Famiano v. Enyeart, 398 F.2d 661, 664 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1020 (1968); Doughty v. Nebel Towing Co., 270 F. Supp. 957, 
959 (E.D. La. 1967). 
266. Where limitation of liability is affirmatively invoked by a limitation com-
plaint filed under the admiralty jurisdiction, see FED. R. CIV. P. F, there is no right 
to a jury trial on behalf of any of the claimants. Complaint of Great Lakes Towing 
Co., 395 F. Supp. 810, 812-13 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (if there are multiple claimants 
in the limitation proceeding, admiralty's nonjury tradition takes precedence over 
Great Lakes jury trial statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1873 (1966) ). 
267. The weight of authority is that actions under the Death on the High Seas 
Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1970), must be brought on the admiralty side, and may 
not be brought at law under the saving clause. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra 
note 48, at 40 n.133. But there has always been doubt about the validity of that 
view. See Comment, Death on the High Seas Act, 55 CoLUM. L. REv. 907 (1955). 
268. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of March 30, 1920, ch. 
111, § 1, 41 Stat. 537). 
269. Peace v. Fidalgo Island Packing Co., 419 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1969); Gvirst-
man v. Western King Co., 263 F. Supp. 633 (C.D. Cal. 1967). 
270. Haskins v. Point Towing Co., 395 F.2d 737 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 
400 U.S. 834 (1970), discussed in notes 244-49 supra and accompanying text. 
271. Blake v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 417 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1969), discussed in notes 
250-54 supra and accompanying text. 
272. Haskins v. Point Towing Co., 395 F.2d 737, 741 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. de-
nied, 400 U.S. 834 (1970). 
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be dropped from the case as the price for jury trial. 273 From the 
traditional viewpoint, the reasoning of these cases was 
unexceptionable: (1) The law side of a federal court has no juris-
diction to entertain a libel in rem, which is the major category of 
exclusive admiralty jurisdiction; (2) There are no jury trials in admi-
ralty; (3) Therefore, the plaintiff must choose between the admiralty 
side, where a libel in rem is available, or the civil side, where there is 
a right to a jury trial. Far preferable to this reasoning would have 
been an acknowledgment, on the authority of cases like Haskins and 
Blake, of the feasibility of jury trials in admiralty. 
In a third category of Romero-pendent cases, the plaintiff pursues 
a maritime cause on the civil side of federal court and the original 
defendant seeks to implead a third-party defendant as a matter of 
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction under rule 9(h). 274 If Blake is 
correct then it ought to follow that when a plaintiff asserts a maritime 
claim for jury trial on the law side, and the first defendant seeks to 
implicate the second according to third-party practice, the entire case 
may be tried to the jury.275 This was, in fact, the holding in Gyorfi v. 
Partrederiet Atomena,276 where the plaintiff had brought a diversity 
action277 against a shipowner, and the shipowner brought a third-party 
action, which he designated an admiralty claim under 9(h), against 
the stevedore. The question in the case was whether the stevedore was 
entitled to a jury trial of the third-party claim. The court held that 
the entire case should be tried to the same jury. Relying extensively 
on Blake, 278 the court made an important distinction: 
[T]he fact that there is no jury trial in admiralty does not mean that 
it is impermissible for a jury to hear and determine issues denomi-
nated as arising under the court's admiralty jurisdiction. . . . 
273. Johnson v. Venezuelan Line S.S. Co., 314 F. Supp. 1403, 1406-07 (E.D. La. 
1970); Fernandes v. United Fruit Co., 303 F. Supp. 681 (D. Md. 1969). 
274. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h). 
275. Indeed, in Close v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 44 F.R.D. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1968), the 
district court advanced from the assertion that if the more usual third-party practice 
had been employed there would clearly be a jury right, to the conclusion that there 
was similarly a jury trial in the consolidation situation. 
276. 58 F.R.D. 112 (N.D. Ohio 1973). 
277. ''The complaint is lacking a formal jurisdictional allegation. However, the 
plaintiff does plead facts which would be sufficient to support both general civil juris-
diction under diversity of citizenship and admiralty jurisdiction. Trial by jury was 
requested." 58 F.R.D. at 113. The court elected to treat plaintiffs complaint, in 
accordance with its obvious intention, as though it were in diversity. This is to be 
contrasted with the highly technical, almost punitive, approach taken in Americana 
of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Transocean Tankers Corp., 317 F. Supp. 798 (D.P.R. 1969), 
holding that where plaintiff pleads both rule 9(h) and diversity, he is precluded from 
making a later jury demand. See note 314 infra and accompanying text. 
278. The Gyorfi court was also much impressed by the reasoning of the court 
in Close v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 44 F.R.D. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1968). See 58 F.R.D. at 
115-16. Close was one of the cases consolidated on appeal in Blake. 
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[W]hile it is often said that there may not be a jury trial in admiralty, 
the accurate statement of law is that there is no constitutional right 
to a jury trial in admiralty and that customarily admiralty actions 
are tried to the court. 279 
Custom can yield, said the court, when factors such as those discussed 
in Blake280 are present. 
A similar philosophy obtained in Saus v. Delta Concrete Co.,281 
where the plaintiff sued his employer at law under the Jones Act, and 
the employer brought in as a third-party defendant the owner of the 
barge on which the plaintiff had been hurt. The third-party defend-
ant contended that because the plaintiff's Jones Act claim could not 
be considered a rule 9(h) claim, substitute-defendant third-party 
practice under rule 14(c)282 was unavailable. The district court 
answered that despite the plaintiff's request for a jury trial of his 
Jones Act claim, the case was still, in a conceptual sense, an admiralty 
or maritime claim, for which the procedure of rule 14(c) was 
available. In response to the third-party defendant's contention that 
a Jones Act jury proceeding and a rule 9(h) maritime case are 
mutually exclusive concepts, the court noted that Fitzgerald283 and 
Haskins284 were "unequivocally against [third-party defendant's] ar-
gument."285 The Saus court also indicated that the entire matter 
should be tried to the jury.286 
6. Summary 
Much of the recent case law concerned with the conflict between 
one party's asserted right to jury trial and another's asserted right to 
an admiralty bench trial has revealed a judicial tendency to disregard 
the civil/ admiralty barrier in order to accommodate the overriding 
seventh amendment right. Yet the cases continue to exhibit uncer-
tainty over the proper force of admiralty's nonjury tradition, especially 
where admiralty was the basis for the original invocation of federal 
jurisdiction. Particularly in the Romero-pendent cases, there is evi-
dence that the 1966 merger is gradually coming to have the intended 
effect of dissolving the artificial separateness of admiralty jurisdiction. 
However, there is more than enough evidence of a continuing paten-
279. 58 F.R.D. at 114 (emphasis original). 
280. See 58 F.R:D. at 115-16. 
281. 368 F. Supp. 297 (W.D. Pa. 1973). 
282. See text at notes 141-46 supra. 
283. Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963). 
284. Haskins v. Point Towing Co., 395 F.2d 737 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 
400 U.S. 834 (1970). 
285. 368 F. Supp. at 298. 
286. 368 F. Supp. at 298. 
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tial for confusion and arguable injustice in the courts' view of the 
nature of unification to warrant legislative action to complete what 
the unification intended to achieve. 
C. Other Separatism Problems 
In a variety of otherwise unrelated ways, the separatist view of 
admiralty that has survived the 1966 unification continues to create 
problems for the courts. In this subsection, a number of such 
discrete problem areas will be briefly considered. 
1. Amendment of Pleadings To Add or Withdraw the Rule 9(h) 
Designation 
As indicated above, 281 in cases where federal jurisdiction is 
present on diversity or federal question as well as admiralty grounds, 
the plaintiff must decide whether to include in his complaint "a 
statement identifying the claim as an admiralty or maritime claim"288 
under rule 9(h). If the 9(h) designation is made, admiralty's 
nonjury tradition obtains;289 if it is not, trial will ordinarily be to a 
jury. 
Rule 9(h) evidently contemplates a liberal policy of allowing 
amending pleadings to add or withdraw the identifying statement, for 
it specifies that such amendment "is governed by the principles of 
Rule 15."290 Rule 15 in tum states that "[a] party may amend his 
pleading once-as a matter of course at any time before a responsive 
pleading is served . . . . Otherwise a party may amend his pleading 
only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and 
leave shall be freely given when justice so requires."291 On the basis 
of these provisions, the proper practice would appear to be clear. 
Indeed, a leading treatise on federal practice has so concluded: 
The pleader's identification of his claim as an admiralty or maritime 
claim or his failure to do so is not an irrevocable election. The 
general liberal principles found in Rule 15 as to amendment of 
pleadings are expressly made applicable to the identifying statement 
by the penultimate sentence of Rule 9(h). Hence the identification 
287. See text at notes 1-12 supra. 
288. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h). 
289. Rule 9(h) provides for an optional statement identifying the claim "as an 
admiralty or maritime claim for the purposes of Rule[s] ••• 38(e) ••.• " FED. 
R. CIV. P. 9(h). Rule 38(e) provides: ''These rules shall not be construed to cre-
ate a right to trial by jury of the issues in an admiralty or maritime claim within 
the meaning of Rule 9(h)." FED. R. CIV. P. 38(e). 
290. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h). 
291. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a) (emphasis added). 
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can be deleted or belatedly inserted as permitted by the rules govern-
ing amendment of pleadings.292 
Unfortunately, the case law on the matter is less clear. In several 
cases wherein plaintiffs sought to add the 9 (h) designation, the indi-
cated liberality has properly prevailed. 293 But courts have been 
sharply divided in cases where the plaintiff's option to add the 9(h) 
designation clashes with another party's asserted right to jury trial. 
The conflict among the circuits has been produced in part by a lack 
of clarity in the rules themselves. While rules 9(h) and 15 express a 
liberal amendment policy, rules 38 and 39 provide that once any 
party has demanded a jury trial of an issue triable of right by a jury, a 
nonjury trial may be conducted only with the consent of the par-
ties.204 Thus, the rules seem to speak with two voices to the situation 
where plaintiff has filed his maritime action on the basis of diversity or 
federal question jurisdiction, either party has demanded a jury trial, 
and plaintiff then seeks to amend in order to add the rule 9(h) 
designation. 295 
In the Fifth Circuit, Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co.206 takes the 
position that in the situation suggested here the jury right prevails.297 
In each of the two cases disposed of in Johnson, a seaman suing his 
employer under the Jones Act (and alleging diversity of citizenship as 
well) demanded a jury trial. Then, over two years Iater,298 each 
plaintiff sought to add a 9(h) designation; neither amended com-
plaint referred to the matter of a jury trial. Despite defendants' 
motions for jury trials, each case was tried to the judge alone. That, 
said the Fifth Circuit, was reversible error, which deprived defendants 
of their seventh amendment right to trial by jury.299 The court's 
reasoning was as follows: 
The procedure set forth in Rule 39(a) for transferring an action from 
a district court's jury docket to its non-jury docket gives explicit rec-
ognition to the quasi-constitutional privilege of the party who did not 
292. 5 C, WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FFDE.RAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1314, at 
455 (1969). 
293. See McCrary v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 469 F.2d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 1972); 
Doucet v. Wheless Drilling Co., 467 F.2d 336, 341 (5th Cir. 1972); Elverfield v. 
Central Gulf S.S. Co., 1974 A.M.C. 409,410 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Di Paola v. Interna-
tional Terminal Operating Co., 294 F. Supp. 736, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
294. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b), 38(d), 39(a). 
295. See Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 469 F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir. 1972), 
affd. en bane, 510 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975): "Our resolution of the jury trial issue 
presented by these appeals requires that we attempt a reconciliation of apparently 
conflicting provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 
296. 469 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1972), afjd. en bane, 510 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975). 
297. Accord, Banks v. Hanover S.S. Corp., 43 F.R.D. 374, 380 (D. Md. 1967). 
298. 469 F.2d at 899, 900. 
299. 469 F.2d at 899. 
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originally demand trial by jury to rely upon the jury trial demand 
made by the adverse party. We therefore hold that the district court 
erred when it transferred these two actions from its jury docket to 
its non-jury docket without first obtaining Rule 39(a) consent to the 
transfers. . . . 300 
To precisely the opposite effect is McCrary v. Seatrain Lines, 
/nc.,801 decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals just twenty 
days before Johnson. In Mccrary, a longshoreman had sued a 
shipowner in diversity, apparently without any explicit jury demand. 
The shipowner filed a third-party complaint against the stevedoring 
company, and in its answer the stevedoring company demanded a 
jury trial. The plaintiff settled with the shipowner during pretrial, 
and the trial judge decided to try the shipowner's action against the 
stevedore without a jury, despite the stevedore's objections. The 
Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the trial judge had reached 
the right result for the wrong reasons. In the view of the trial judge, 
the indemnity claim of the shipowner against the stevedore lay only in 
admiralty; as such, it was triable to the court alone, without the 
necessity of a 9(h) designation.302 That determination was erron-
eous, said the appellate court, because the shipowners' third-party 
claim "did not lie solely in admiralty. It was ancillary to the injured 
workman's diversity action."303 Therefore, it would have been incor-
rect to deny the stevedore's motion for jury trial on these facts alone. 
However, the shipowner should have been allowed, as it had de-
manded, to amend its third-party complaint to add the 9(h) designa-
tion under the terms of rule 15. Here, the shipowner had made a 
timely effort to amend its third-party complaint, and there was no 
showing that the stevedore would suffer any prejudice if the amend-
ment were allowed. 304 
The Fifth Circuit offers the better argument. Under the present 
form of the Rules, admiralty's nonjury tradition is bound to conflict 
300. 469 F.2d at 903. It should be noted that despite the fact that plaintiffs in 
Johnson were not explicit in withdrawing their jury demand when they sought to add 
the rule 9(h) designation, the Fifth Circuit properly read the amendments as de-
signed for that purpose; indeed, that could have been the only purpose. This is to 
be contrasted with the kind of concern for technicalities manifested in some of the 
other decisions involving similar points. See text at notes 8-21 supra, 308-15 infra. 
301. 469 F.2d 666 (9th Cir. 1972). Accord, Elverfield v. Central Gulf S.S. Co., 
1974 A.M.C. 409, 410 (N.D. Cal. 1973). 
302. Rule 9(h) says in pertinent part: "If the claim is cognizable only in admir-
alty, it is an admiralty or maritime claim for those purposes [Rules 14(c), 38(e), 
82, and the Supplemental Rules] whether so identified or not." FED. R. C1v. P. 
9(h). 
303. 469 F.2d at 668. 
304. McCrary thus is like Johnson in taking a nontechnical approach to constru-
ing pleadings, in sharp contrast to several other relate • decisions. See text at notes 
8-21 supra, 308-15 infra, 
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on occasion with seventh amendment rights. As indicated above, 305 
a sensible interim policy would be a simple resolution in favor of the 
jury right in all such cases. A more stable long-term resolution 
would be achieved by legislation designed to bring the jury into 
admiralty proceedings.306 Better yet, legislative adoption of the-pro-
posal advocated in the concluding section of this paper3°7 would 
resolve this matter, and other problems as well. 
In the converse situation, where a plaintiff seeks to withdraw his 
9(h) designation in order to obtain a jury trial, there is no confusion 
in the rules, no conflict between the jury right and the liberal amend-
ment policy of rules 9(h) and 15, and therefore no reason for judicial 
reluctance to permit amendment. It ought to be far easier for a 
plaintiff to withdraw a 9 (h) designation and get a jury trial than it is 
to add the designation in the face of some other party's asserted right 
to jury trial. Yet the case law demonstrates precisely the reverse 
emphasis. In Romero v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation,3°8 the Fifth 
Circuit refused to permit plaintiff to amend his complaint in this 
fashion, on the theory that while such amendment might be permis-
sible, plaintiffs counsel plainly did not know how to obtain it.309 In 
achieving that draconian result, the court strongly suggested that it 
ought to be much more difficult for plaintiff to "shift . . . from admi-
ralty to law" than vice versa. 310 Other decisions agree with Romero 
that while the 9(h) designation may not be irrevocable, an amendment 
to withdraw it will not be allowed when it is attempted late311 or in 
improper form. 312 Worse yet, other decisions flatly defy the plain 
wording of rule 9(h) that "the amendment of pleading to add or 
withdraw an identifying statement is governed by the principles of 
Rule 15,"313 and hold that the 9(h) designation is irrevocable.814 
305. See notes 126-28, 167-69, 175-77 supra and accompanying text. 
306. See notes 33-43 supra and accompanying text. 
307. See notes 379-405 infra and accompanying text. 
308. 515 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1975). See notes 1-12 supra and accompanying 
text. 
309. 515 F.2d at 1249. 
310. The Court quoted and relied on the earlier Fifth Circuit decision of Doucet 
v. Wheless Drilling Co., 467 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1972), where the plaintiff had been 
accorded great latitude respecting a shift from "law to admiralty" in order to obtain 
pre-judgment interest under the Jones Act. 515 F.2d at 1252-53 n.1. See text at 
notes 345-52 infra. 
311. Anderson v. American Oil Co., 60 F.R.D. 676 (S.D. Ga. 1973). 
312. Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, Ltd., 354 F. Supp. 626 (S.D. Ga. 
1973). 
313. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h). 
. 314. See Transamerican Trailer Transp., Inc. v. Transocean Gateway Terminal, 
foe., 1974 A.M.C. 1860 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Americana of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Trans-
ocean Tankers Corp., 317 F. Supp. 798 (D.P.R. 1969); See also Alaska Barite Co. 
v. Freighters, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 192, 194 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (dictum). Compare Maz-
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This view of the rule 9(h) choice is clearly contrary to the spirit of 
unification, and seems yet another instance of the undesirable tenacity 
of old formalisms. 815 
2. Choice of Law Mistakes 
No convincing argument has ever been advanced for allowing the 
choice of forum in our federal system to affect applicable substantive 
law. It is now well-established that in a case based upon diversity of 
citizenship, a federal district court sitting in a particular state must 
apply the same substantive principles that the state's own courts would 
apply.816 Similarly, if a plaintiff exercises his saving clause option to 
bring an admiralty and maritime case in a nonadmiralty forum, the 
applicable substantive principles will be those that an admiralty court 
would apply in that case.817 Since 1917,318 the Supreme Court has 
consistently held that the substantive aspects of cases of admiralty 
and maritime jurisdiction are presumptively controlled by the general 
maritime law of the United States, which consists of federal statutes 
and case law. 319 Choice of law in the maritime sphere is, in other 
words, governed by a reverse-Erie principle. 320 In both diversity and 
admiralty cases consistency of the applied substantive law is the goal. 
With some frequency, maritime matters arise for which there is no 
settled disposition in the federal maritime law, or which have some 
significant feature that is local in nature. In such instances, a "mari-
zella v. Pan Oceanica A/S Panama, 232 F. Supp. 29, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), a pre• 
unification decision wherein plaintiff originally pleaded admiralty and faulty diver-
sity, and was allowed to amend his complaint to cure the diversity flaw on the sens-
ible view that "plaintiff could now bring a new civil jury action based on diversity 
jurisdiction, and if plaintiff did so there would appear to be no reason to bar this 
new action for !aches." 
315. See Mazzella v. Pan Oceanica A/S Panama, 232 F. Supp. 29, 32 (referring 
to defendant's argument as "shades of a formalism which we had long thought dead 
and interred"). 
316. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
317. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). 
318. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917); Chelentis v. Luck-
enbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918). 
319. See generally, D. Robertson, supra note 40, at 136-47, 185-201. Very re-
cently, in Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973), the 
Supreme Court made an important contribution on the question of when state law 
features can be applied in a case within the admiralty jurisdiction. In holding that 
Florida's statute dealing with oil pollution of territorial waters was constitutional, 
Justice Douglas said that the Jensen doctrine-federal supremacy in the maritime 
sphere-had given way under the weight of a number of considerations supporting 
state law competence. Further, he cast that portion of his opinion in terms of 
whether "admiralty jurisdiction" was "exclusive" in these matters. See 411 U.S. at 
337-44. But he did not say or imply that the answer to this question, when can state 
law apply in a maritime matter, varies according to the court where the question is 
asked. 
320. See D. ROBERTSON, supra note 40, at 136-283. 
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time but local"321 rubric attaches, and these cases, while within the 
admiralty, can be determined according to state law principles.322 
However, in no case is choice of forum allowed to influence the 
matter. 323 If the case is totally maritime, it is to be governed by the 
substantive federal maritime law, whether it has been brought in 
admiralty, in state court, or in federal court on diversity grounds. If 
the case is maritime but local in its nature, it may be governed by 
settled features of the maritime law and borrowed features of state 
law, but the federal-state blend is to remain the same regardless of 
whether the matter is litigated in admiralty, in state court, or in 
federal court on grounds of diversity.a24 
This reverse-Erie posture of maritime choice of law principles is 
as well settled as any legal doctrine can be. Yet the competing notion 
that in some instances the applicable substantive principles vary ac-
cording to the forum selected continues to have a powerful and per-
nicious appeal. It is easy enough to understand why the error persists, 
for in a number of contexts courts have occasion to assert tl1at, if a 
matter is maritime, one set of principles governs, whereas, if it is not, 
another set governs. Any such statement can conveniently and 
simplistically be cast in the form: "In admiralty, result A; at law, 
result B." A statement in this form is susceptible to the erroneous, 
mechanical interpretation that one result is called for in an ad-
miralty court and another in a nonadmiralty court. 
321. The genesis of this phrase was apparently Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 
U.S. 233, 242 (1921) (state's wrongful death statute applicable in an admiralty case). 
322. See, e.g., Wilburn Boat Co. v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955) 
(state law principles govern breach of printed warranties in policy of insurance on 
houseboat operating on Lake Texoma, landlocked but touching two states). 
323. With a single exception, the Supreme Court has been consistent in insisting 
on the correctness of the generalization in the text. In Caldarola v. Eckert, 332 U.S. 
155 (1947), Justice Frankfurter rather plainly said that defendant's responsibility for 
personal injuries caused by a vessel it was operating under a wartime general agency 
agreement depended upon New York law's characterization of the contract because 
New York's own "determination is decisive that there is no remedy in its courts for 
such a business invitee. . . ." 332 U.S. at 158. There have been a number of at-
tempts to rationalize Caldarola with the doctrine that choice of forum cannot affect 
choice of substantive law in maritime cases. See, e.g., D. ROBERTSON, supra note 
40, at 242-46. But the case just does not fit. It stands alone. 
324. The problem of maritime choice-of-law is clearly and correctly analyzed by 
Judge Wright in Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973 ), where a 
group of pleasure boat owners sought recovery for physical damage and loss of use 
of their vessels resulting from the Santa Barbara oil spill. Plaintiffs argued tha:t Cali-
fornia law gave them the right to recover for loss of use of their vessels; thus the 
jurisdictional and choice-of-law inquiry was crucial. The court saw the inquiry as 
bifurcated: (1) Was the case one of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction?- The con-
clusion was yes. See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 
(1972). (2) Was California law a partial source of substantive principle in this ad-
miralty case? This question was viewed as close and the answer was "perhaps." 
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The possibilities for confusion are illustrated in a recent decision, 
Principe Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Board of Commissioners of the 
Port of New Orleans.325 Arguably, the New Orleans dock board had 
committed a tort; when sued, it claimed sovereign immunity. The 
court disagreed, noting that while there was a wealth of state and 
federal cases establishing the board's immunity from tort liability, this 
case was in admiralty: 
It is well settled that an admiralty court in proper exercise of its ju-
risdiction does not defer to state law in determining whether a cause 
of action cognizable in admiralty can be asserted. . . . To hold oth-
erwise would destroy the uniformity admiralty seeks since admiralty 
law would vary according to the often-conflicting laws of the several 
states .... 
It is likewise settled that where an admiralty court has jurisdic-
tion over the parties and subject matter, sovereign immunity will not 
defeat an otherwise meritorious lawsuit brought against a state agency 
for its alleged torts. . , . 
In almost all the cases on this subject the Court has found, an admir-
alty court has never applied state immunity law to defeat an other-
wise meritorious cause of action against an agency or political subdi-
vision of the state. 
Judge Wright thought that, until recently, there would have been no room for Califor-
nia law in a maritime tort case of this kind. However, he pointed out that the Su-
preme-Court's decision in Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 
325 (1973), discussed in note 319 supra, had "broadened the power of the states to 
apply their own laws to certain maritime torts occurring within their territorial 
waters." 485 F.2d at 253. Ultimately it was not necessary to decide the close ques-
tion of the appropriate scope for application of California law because of the decision 
that neither maritime nor California law would redress the plaintiffs' injuries. 485 
F.2d at 259. 
_ The important dimension of Oppen is the clarity with which the court's analysis 
supports the central point here. Whether a case is admiralty and maritime in nature 
is important for two distinct reasons: ( 1) If it is, it is litigable in the federal court 
without reference to federal question or diversity grounds. (2) And, if it is, it is 
presumptively governed by the substantive federal maritime law (to whatever extent 
modified by the admission of limited state-law competence), whatever the court in 
which the matter is heard. 
See also McCross v. Ratnakar Shipping Co., 265 F. Supp. 827, 830-31 (D. Md. 
1967): 
Three of the seven cases [before the court in this consolidated proceeding] were 
instituted as libels in admiralty. The other four cases are actions on the "law 
side" of this Court. This difference is without legal distinction, insofar as the 
"substantive" issues common to all seven cases are concerned. "For it is now 
clear that the maritime law controls all 'substantive' issues in the disposition of 
maritime claims _ regardless of the form or forum of suit. . . . This is so 
whether ... [the] suit ... be treated as a libel in admiralty ... [or] as an 
action on the 'law side' of the federal court . . . or if the suit . . . had been 
brought in a state court under the saving clause. Larios v. Victory Carriers, 
Inc., 316 F.2d 63, 65 (2d Cir. 1963)." 
325. 333 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1971). 
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[T]his Court can find no valid reasons supporting the doctrine 
of immunity sufficient to offset the strong reasons . . . for not recog-
nizing the state immunity doctrines in a court of admiralty . . . . 326 
There are two possible interpretations of the court's remarks: (1) 
In a proceeding based on the commission of a maritime tort, brought 
against the dock board in a United States district court on the ground 
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, there is no sovereign immuni-
ity; (2) In any proceeding in any court against the dock board based 
on the commission of a maritime tort, there is no sovereign immunity. 
The second statement is correct, but there is no way to discern 
whether the judge intended it. As the passage stands "admiralty 
court" might refer either to a United States. district court exer-
cising its admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, or to any court exer-
cising jurisdiction over a maritime matter. 
The importance of this recurrent and troublesome imprecision is 
considerable, for some courts apparently remain unaware of the 
reverse-Erie principle. A fairly typical misinterpretation is contained 
in a recent Eighth Circuit decision327 involving deaths on navigable 
waters within Arkansas. At the time of the decision the law pertain-
ing to deaths in state waters was a blend of admiralty and state 
principles. 328 On the issue of whether the trial court applied the 
correct principles as to beneficiary status, the court stated: 
Had the federal district court been sitting as a diversity court faced 
with the problem of choosing which of several competing state laws 
should apply, the relevant contacts with . . . Arkansas may have 
been sufficient to support a choice of the law of that state. But, a 
federal court which sits in admiralty does not sit as a diversity court 
and thus in fashioning the full details of this . . . federal cause of 
action, it would seem that more consideration must be given to the 
problem of which law is to serve as the proper analogue than to a 
mere finding of a quota of contacts with a particular state.329 
The assertion that a federal court, sitting in diversity, would be bound 
by some fairly demanding choice-of-law (state/state) principles, 
whereas the same court, sitting in admiralty, was free to concoct a 
sensible blend of the available bodies of substantive law, is inconsistent 
with both the reverse-Erie thesis and the spirit of the 1966 unifica-
tion.330 
326. 333 F. Supp. at 356-57 & n.10 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
327. Spiller v. Lowe & Associates, Inc., 466 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1972). 
328. Very recent cases may have made the matter fully maritime. See Sea-Land 
Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 
398 U.S. 375 (1970). 
329. 466 F.2d at 908 n.6 (citations omitted). 
330. Other recent decisions have also displayed significant deviations. In Capoz-
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None of the recent articulations of the idea that choice of forum 
determines choice of law were particularly costly. In two in-
stances, 881 the mistakes were made by district courts and corrected on 
appeal. In other cases, courts arrived at the right answer for the 
wrong reasons. 332 However, it is purely fortuitous that no ultimate 
injustice was done to the parties by the adoption of this mistaken 
view. At worst it can cause injustice; at best it forces costly appeals, 
sows confusion, and frustrates legitimate expectations. 833 The sur-
vival of a separatist notion concerning the nature of an admiralty 
court is at least partially at fault here. If "the admiralty" were 
ziello v. Brasileiro, 443 F.2d 1155 (2d Cir. 1971), the trial court concluded that be-
cause the matter was in federal court on the basis of diversity, state law controlled 
the interpretation of an indemnity contract between shipowner and stevedore. The 
Second Circuit corrected the misconception, pointing out that it was of no importance 
in the instant case, where the applicable principles of state and maritime law were 
equivalent. 443 F.2d at 1157. In King v. Alaska S.S. Co., 431 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 
1970), the trial court held that because plaintiff predicated federal jurisdiction upon 
diversity of citizenship in a personal injury action by longshoreman against vessel 
owner, the state statute of limitations controlled. However, plaintiff could have leave 
to amend and invoke jurisdiction in admiralty, whereupon the doctrine of Inches 
would apply. The Ninth Circuit, like the Second Circuit in Capozz.iello, made ap-
propriate corrections. 431 F.2d at 996. 
331. See note 330 supra. 
332. See, e.g., Spiller v. Lowe & Associates, Inc., 466 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1972), 
discussed in text at notes 327-30 supra, where the substantive conclusion reached was 
correct. The case involved the elements of the federal right for death on territorial 
waters created by the Supreme Court in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 
375 (1970). The court was free to choose among the features of competing state 
law as to elements of the new remedy not specified by the Supreme Court, not be-
cause it was sitting in "admiralty," but because it was hearing a suit on a maritime 
cause of action. A court whose jurisdiction was invoked on grounds of diversity 
would have been equally free. 
333. All the above decisions, supra notes 330, 332, err in the direction of assum-
ing that plaintiff must be in an admiralty court before he has access to maritime prin-
ciples. The reverse was argued in an interesting way in McNeil v. A/S Havbor, 339 
F. Supp. 1264 (B.D. Pa. 1972). Plaintiff in McNeil contended that a recent Supreme 
Court decision, Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971), making clear 
that his case was not within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, meant only that 
he was foreclosed from invoking that ground of federal jurisdiction, not that he was 
debarred from access to the beneficent principles of the federal maritime law. His 
argument was ingenious: 
[P]laintiff • • . argues that Law dealt with maritime jurisdiction and did not 
limit the application of maritime law. Since this is a diversity case, plaintiff 
contends, this court has jurisdiction • • . and must, under Erie • • • apply Penn-
sylvania law. Plaintiff further argues that the Pennsylvania courts have applied 
maritime law in cases involving longshoremen and seamen. In this factual situ-
·ation, the Pennsylvania courts, it is argued, would apply the general principles 
of maritime law • . • • 
339 F. Supp. at 1266 (citations omitted). The court disagreed and found it obvious 
that the decision in Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971), completely 
removed cases like plaintiff's from the ambit of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. 
339 F. Supp. at 1266. The court might have added that Victory Carriers binds the 
Pennsylvania courts equally with the federal courts, so that, even giving plaintiff his 
Erie route to Pennsylvania law, the federal court would be bound to find against him 
when he got there. The Pennsylvania courts, like admiralty courts and diversity 
courts, are now foreclosed from treating these cases as maritime cases. 
August 1976] Admiralty Procedure and Jurisdiction 1687 
abolished as a separate heading of federal jurisdiction and merged 
into the federal question category, 884 there would be much less oc-
casion for the confusing language typified by Principe. 885 
3. Pre-Judgment Interest in Jones Act Cases 
It is well settled that the award of pre-judgment interest under 
general maritime law lies within the discretion of the trial judge.886 
Under the prevailing view that the availability of pre-judgment inter-
est is a matter of substantive law, 837 the saving clause plaintiff who 
would have obtained pre-judgment interest had he brought his case 
in admiralty is entitled to the same interest in the nonadmiralty 
tribunal. 838 
A special problem is presented in cases brought under the Jones 
Act, 389 which incorporates for seamen the bundle of rights given 
railway workers under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 840 be-
cause of a line of cases holding that in PELA litigation there can be 
no award of pre-judgment interest. 341 Since the Jones Act incorporates 
PELA, one sensible resolution is to hold that the PELA cases dis-
allowing pre-judgment interest override the normal maritime rule and 
make such interest unavailable in Jones Act cases as well. This view-
point prevails in the Sixth Circuit. 342 Another equally tenable ap-
334. See notes 379-405 infra and accompanying text. 
335. 333 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1971), discussed in text at notes 325-26 supra. 
For related confusion in the choice-of-law area, see Hobart v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 
445 F.2d 435 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1971); Leach v. Mon River 
Towing, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Bensen v. Jackson, 238 F. Supp. 
309 (E.D. Pa. 1965). 
336. See, e.g., Iberia Tankers Co. v. Gates Constr. Corp., 1974 A.M.C. 2186 (2d 
Cir. 1974); Dennis v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp., 453 F.2d 137, 141 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972); Complaint of Farrell Lines, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 194, 
205 (S.D. Ga. 1975). 
337. See, e.g., Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Amirault, 202 F.2d 893, 898 (1st 
Cir. 1953); Barton v. Zapata Offshore Co., 397 F. Supp. 778, 780 (E.D. La. 1975). 
338. See, e.g., Doucet v. Wheless Drilling Co., 467 F.2d 336. 341 (5th Cir. 
1972); Canova v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 301 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. La. 1967), 
affd. sub nom. Canova v. Travelers Ins. Co., 406 F.2d 410 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
396 U.S. 832 (1969). 
339. 46 u.s.c. § 688 (1970). 
340. 45 u.s.c. §§ 51-60 (1970). 
341. See, e.g., Louisiana & Arkansas Ry. v. Pratt, 142 F.2d 847, 848-49 (5th Cir. 
1944); Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R. v. Busby, 41 F.2d 617, 619 (9th Cir. 1930). 
The reason for this limitation was not deeply rooted in policy but rather stemmed 
from a recognition that since at the time the Federal Employers Liability Act was 
enacted interest was not allowable on personal injury claims until damages had been 
judicially ascertained, the silence of the Act on the subject of interest was indicative 
of a purpose that no interest should be allowed. See Louisiana & Arkansas Ry. v. 
Pratt, 142 F.2d 847, 848-49 (5th Cir. 1944 ). 
342. See Petition of United States Steel Corp., 436 F.2d 1256, 1279 (6th Cir. 
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 987 (1971); Cleveland Tankers, Inc. v. Tierney, 169 
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proach to pre-judgment interest in Jones Act cases is to conclude 
that the FELA rule is not deeply rooted in policy,343 and that the 
normal maritime rule making pre-judgment interest available should 
prevail. This viewpoint obtains in the First Circuit. 344 
The Fifth Circuit, however, which hears by far the greatest num-
ber of such cases, has developed a hybrid resolution that is highly 
offensive to the general policy that choice of forum should not have 
substantive law consequences.345 In the Fifth Circuit, as else-
where, the normal maritime rule providing for pre-judgment in-
terest at the discretion of the trier of fact usually prevails in what-
ever court the case is heard. 346 The rule applies to suits under direct 
action statutes against the liability insurer of a Jones Act employer. 347 
The same pre-judgment interest rule obtains in Jones Act cases brought 
in admiralty. 348 But in Jones Act cases brought on the "law side," 
pre-judgment interest cannot be awarded. 349 This peculiar and little-
noted posture, which is one of the more indefensible, albeit acciden-
tal, effects of separatist thinking, excites controversy, 3uo makes courts 
F.2d 622, u26 (6th Cir. 1948); Bednar v. United States Lines, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 
1313, 1318 (N.D. Ohio 1973). Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 1104, 1112-15 (1964), states 
as the general view that there is no pre-judgment interest in any Jones Act case. In 
fact, this appears to be the settled view of the Sixth Circuit only. But see Mpiliris 
v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 323 F. Supp. 865, 895 (S.D. Tex. 1969): "While the court 
recognizes that there is some authority indicating that the court may, in the proper 
exercise of its discretion, award pre-judgment interest on wrongful death actions 
brought under the Jones Act ... this authority represents only a minority position. 
The court has concluded that, at least in the present case, such pre-judgment interest 
should not be allowed." 
343. See note 341 supra. 
344. See Robinson v. Pocahontas, Inc., 477 F.2d 1048 (1st Cir. 1973). 
345. See notes 316-35 supra and accompanying text. 
346. See, e.g., Dennis v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp., 453 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972). 
341. See note 336 supra and accompanying text. 
348. See, e.g., Brown v. Aggie & Millie, Inc., 485 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1973). 
349. See, _e.g., Doucet v. Wheless Drilling Co., 467 F.2d 336, 341 (5th Cir. 
1972); Sanford Bros. Boats, Inc. v. Vidrine, 412 F.2d 958, 973 (5th Cir. 1969). 
350. In Barrios v. Louisiana Constr. Materials Co., 465 F.2d 1157, 1167 (5th Cir. 
1972), the court referred to the plaintiffs' extensive brief on the issue of pre-judg-
ment interest. That brief made a cogent argument for the availability of pre-judg-
ment interest to any Jones Act plaintiff, and especially for the sort of workers who 
may have been doubtful as to the likelihood of their achieving seaman status via liti-
gation. A frequent plaintiff, particularly in the Fifth Circuit, is an amphibious em-
ployee who may ultimately be deemed to be covered by the Jones Act and other sea-
men's remedies, or by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 
or by the state workmen's compensation statute. According to the brief: 
When the man is hurt, the employer makes an initial determination as to what 
benefits it will voluntarily pay. Here defendant decided to pay state compensa-
tion benefits (the lowest of the three possible rates) rather than either of the 
other two rates. When a Jones Act suit is filed sometime later, the employer 
generally stops paying all disability benefits under any of them. The employer's 
reasoning is to the effect that "until the man's status is determined we won't 
pay anything", or "since the man claims he is a seaman and we deny it, we can't 
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uncomfortable, 351 and yet is allowed to exist without plausible expla-
nation. 352 
4. Appellate Jurisdiction of Interlocutory Decisions 
Section 1292(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code lists four 
categories of interlocutory decisions that are appealable as of right. 353 
Two of those categories are of special relevance in maritime cases. 
Section 1292(a) (3) provides for the appealability of "[i]nterlocutory 
decrees . . . determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to 
admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed."354 
The purpose of that section is well understood: 355 Admiralty 
courts traditionally determined liability first and afterwards referred 
the parties to a commissioner for the determination of damages. The 
major purpose of section 1292(a)(3) is to permit an appeal from the 
finding of liability.356 As was intended, this admiralty peculiarity 
survived the 1966 unification.857 It presents no special problems, 
pay maintenance or it would be an admission, and we won't pay state or federal 
compensation in the meantime because the man isn't asking for it." 
Brief for Plaintiff at 17, Barrios v. Louisiana Constr. Materials Co., 465 F.2d 1157 
(5th Cir. 1972). In such cases, it would seem that pre-judgment delay amounts to 
a real and compensable injury. 
351. See, e.g., Thibodeaux v. Rowan Drilling Co., 314 F. Supp. 543; 546 (W.D. 
La. 1969), affd. per curiam, 429 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1970). 
352. In Barton v. Zapata Offshore Co., 397 F. Supp. 778, 780 (E.D. La. 1975), 
Judge Rubin wrote that the reason for denying pre-judgment interest in jury-tried 
Jones Act cases might be "that the jury considers the delay in making the award." 
That reason, of course, would be equally applicable to maritime cases tried to juries 
under the saving clause, in which pre-judgment interest is available. See text at note 
338 supra. In Sanford Bros. Boats, Inc. v. Vidrine, 412 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1969), the 
court wrote that "[t]he reasons for this limitation have ranged from the view that 
'unliquidated' claims cannot bear interest to the position that 28 U.S.C.A. § 1961 pro-
hibits prejudgment interest in personal injury claims based upon federal law." 412 
F.2d at 972-73 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted). Of course, many other un-
liquidated maritime claims tried before juries merit pre-judgment interest. See text 
at note 338 supra. Further, a Jones Act personal injury clainl tried to a judge alone 
is just as unliquidated as the same claim tried to a jury. When pre-judgment interest 
in Jones Act cases in admiralty is awarded, it is under the theory that the delay is 
a real loss and that the judgment should take it into account in order to afford full 
compensation for the entire loss. For a convincing argument that the statute cited 
in Sanford Bros. does not in fact speak to the question of pre-judgment interest, see 
Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Amirault, 202 F.2d 893, 895 (1st Cir. 1953). 
353. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1970). 
354. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a){3) (1970). 
355. See 9 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ,r 110.19(3), at 209 (2d ed. 1973). 
356. Section 1292(a) (3) validates appeals in admiralty cases other than those 
where the district court determined liability separately from quantum, whenever the 
order goes to the merits. See generally 9 J. MOORE, supra note 355, ,r 110.19(3), at 
209. 
357. The last sentence of rule 9(h) states: "The reference in Title 28, U.S.C. 
1292(a)(3), to admiralty cases shall be construed to mean admiralty and maritime 
claims within the meaning of this subdivision (h)." FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h). As origi-
nally promulgated, rule 9(h) referred specifically to rule 73(h) in order to preserve 
the right of interlocutory appeal in admiralty. When the Federal Rules of Appellate 
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except for occasionally requiring an appellate court to conduct an 
otherwise unnecessary inquiry into whether an action in federal court 
had an admiralty, as opposed to a "law side," basis for jurisdiction.3M 
Considerably more difficulty has been generated by section 
1292(a)(l), which provides for the appealability of "interlocutory 
orders . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving 
injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions .... "8119 
This provision presents one of those situations where, despite the 
1938 merger of law and equity, the federal courts must sometimes 
make a law/ equity distinction.360 The necessity arises when a party 
seeks appellate review of a district court's ruling on a motion to stay 
proceedings in that court. The statute has been interpreted to allow 
an appeal of such a ruling only if the action in which the stay was 
sought would, prior to 1938, have been an action at law, and if the 
stay was sought to permit the prior determination of some matter that 
would, prior to 1938, have been heard in equity.861 The theory is 
that prior to 1938 an order staying a proceeding at law in favor of an 
equity proceeding would necessarily have been issued by a chancellor; 
therefore, the order is thought to be an "injunction," appealable 
under the terms of section 1292(a)(l). In contrast, an order stay-
ing other matters in favor of a prior determination at law would never 
have amounted to an "injunction."862 
Courts that heard admiralty cases escaped much of the confusion 
generated by 1292(a)(l) by establishing that if the action stayed (or 
for which a stay is denied) is in admiralty, the order is not appeala-
ble, regardless of whether the action and the matter for which a stay is 
Procedure were adopted in 1968, rule 73(h) was abrogated, and the reference to it 
was deleted from rule 9(h). To replace that reference, the above-quoted sentence 
was added "to make it clear that the right of interlocutory appeal in admiralty con-
tinues to exist. Thus, the 1968 changes were entirely formal in nature." 5 C. 
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 292, § 1315, at 456 (1969). 
358. See Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 
1968), where the trial court determined that ~e Federal Tort Claims Act, rather than 
the Public Vessels Act, was the proper basis of an action by a drydock owner against 
the United States based on the negligence of a Coast Guard seaman while the vessel 
was in drydock. That determination, while erroneous, would not ordinarily have re-
quired scrutiny by the appellate court, since, by whatever route, the trial judge had 
ultimately arrived at the correct substantive principles. See 398 F.2d at 168. How-
ever, because of the restriction of section 1292(a) (3) to admiralty cases, whether 
the trial judge's determination of liability was appealable necessitated inquiry into the 
correct basis for jurisdiction below. 398 F.2d at 169. 
359. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(l) (1970). 
360. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 292, at § 1045. 
361. See Jackson Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 303 F.2d 844, 845 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 371 U.S. 891 (1962); C. WRIGHT, supra note 110, at§ 102. 
362. The rule is confusing and troublesome and most of the literature has thus 
been critical. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note 110, § 102, at 461. 
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sought are "legal" or "equitable" in nature.863 Nevertheless, partly 
due to the above-described ru1e, with its underlying concept of a 
law/ equity dichotomy, admiralty courts have encountered difficu1ties 
even after the 1966 unification. The most obvious anomaly is 
created by the very notion of separatism that characterizes admi-
ralty: The appealability of interloctuory stays or refusals to 
stay in maritime cases depends upon whether the plaintiff designated 
this action as an admiralty and maritime claim under federal ru1e 
9(h). If a rule 9(h) designation is made, the stay (usually sought so 
that arbitration may proceed) will not be appealable; if the designa-
tion is not made, appeal may be taken. 
Penoro v. Rederi A/B Disa364 is the leading case pertaining to 
section 1292(a)(l) appeals in maritime matters. An injured long-
shoreman had filed suit against a shipowner, and the shipowner had 
impleaded the stevedoring contractor. The stevedore, contending 
that it had the dual status of stevedore and charterer and that a 
charter party provided for arbitration of the dispute, moved for a stay 
of the third-party action pending arbitration. The trial court granted 
the stay, and the appellate court held the order nonappealable because 
"[o]rders by courts in admiralty granting or denying stays of pro-
ceedings before them have been spared the confusion . . . . Such 
orders have consistently been held not to be injunctions within the 
meaning of § 1292(a)(l) even if based on equitable defenses or 
counterclaims."365 The third-party plaintiff contended that the 1966 
merger of the admiralty and civil rules forced admiralty courts to 
confront the "fictitious injunction" confusion of the civil jurispru-
dence, further theorizing that post-unification admiralty actions are 
to be treated as actions at law and that an order staying an action 
at law, pending arbitration, is appealable. The appellate court re-
jected this argument. Noting that the matter of interlocutory ap-
peals under section 1292(a) (1) is not explicitly considered in rule 
9(h), the court concluded that the 1966 draftsmen had demonstrated 
no intention to alter 1292(a)(l) in any way. Indeed, said the court, 
the continued existence of the "fictitious injunction" question in the 
post-1938 jurisprudence shows that "separate 'sides'" of the district 
court may survive unification for purposes of 1292(a)(l). "Since a 
court in admiralty had the power to stay its own proceedings without 
363. See Penoro v. Rederi A/B Disa, 376 F.2d 125 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 
U.S. 852 (1967). See also C. WRIGHT, supra note 110, § 102, at 461 n.29. 
364. 376 F.2d 125 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 852 (1967) (Black and Doug-
las, JJ., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). 
365. 376 F.2d at 129. 
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the aid of equity prior to unification, there is no reason to believe that 
it somehow lost that power as a result of unification."366 · 
Although the Second Circuit in Penoro evidently approved the 
difference between interlocutory appeal rules for admiralty and civil 
actions, the Fourth Circuit has deplored the distinction, while still 
feeling compelled to maintain it. In J.M. Huber & Co. v. M/V 
Plym, 867 a shipper sued a carrier in admiralty for cargo damage, and 
the carrier moved to stay proceedings pending arbitration. The trial 
court's denial of the motion was held not appealable, in line with the 
court's interpretation that "if the underlying action is in equity or 
admiralty the fictional 'injunction' is lacking .... "868 However, 
the court of appeals expressed its impatience with the restriction, 
stating: "Were the decisional slate clean we would have no hesitancy 
in discarding this fictional distinction and upholding appealability . 
"369 
The consistent application of the rule that stay orders of admiralty 
proceedings are not appealable should not be taken to indicate that 
1292(a)(l) problems cannot continue to arise in maritime litigation. 
In La Capria v. Compagnie Maritime Belge,370 the defendant argued 
that a district judge's order, permitting a longshoreman-plaintiff to add 
a rule 9(h) designation to his personal injury suit commenced on the 
basis of diversity, had, in effect, allowed a "transfer" to admiralty and 
therefore was appealable under 1292(a)(l) as an order enjoining 
further proceedings on the law side of court. Writing for the Second 
Circuit, Judge Friendly deemed this argument nonsense: "[l]t is 
the plaintiff who no longer wishes to proceed at law; to envision the 
chancellor contemplating an injunction to require a plaintiff to keep 
on proceeding at law despite the plaintiff's desire to shift to admiralty 
in order to avoid jurisdictional doubts would carry the 'element of 
366. 376 F.2d at 130-31. As well it might, the Penoro decision has served as 
ammunition in arguments that the merger could hardly be expected to work a full 
unification of the federal district courts. Writing in 1967, one commentator pre-
dicted: "I believe traditional admiralty procedure will continue to wait, in the wings, 
like an old actor awaiting his cue. Some indication of admiralty's persistence may 
be gathered from . . . Penoro . . • . Perhaps it is appropriate to postulate the po-
tential survivability of the 'separate sides.'" Cohn, supra note 13, at 231. 
When the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Penoro, Justices Black and Douglas 
expressed dismay: "An order should be appealable within the meaning of this statute 
[§ 1292(a)(l)] if in substantial effect it is equivalent to an injunction • . . . I 
think the time has come to abandon this outmoded fiction about 'sides' of the court • 
. . . Since the stay entered in this case was an injunction in every practical sense 
I would hold that it was an injunction in the statutory sense and allow the present 
appeal." 389 U.S. at 853-54. 
367. 468 F.2d 166 (4th Cir. 1972). 
368. 468 F.2d at 167. 
369. 468 F.2d at 167. 
370. 373 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1967). 
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fiction' . . beyond permissible bounds."371 Judge Friendly added 
a muted plea for reason in treatment of the admiralty/ civil 
dichotomy: "Prior criticism of the conceptualism of insistence on 
the two-sidedness of a single court . . . gains added force from the 
recent amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to include 
admiralty cases. "372 
IV. A COUNTER-SEPARATIST PROPOSAL 
We no longer need separate admiralty courts. The sole responsi-
ble protest to the 1966. unification arose from the fear that the end of 
procedural separation would inevitably lead to the destruction of the 
conception of maritime law as a distinct body of substantive princi-
ples. 373 But that argument rests on the dubious premise that a 
federal district judge becomes sensitive to the niceties of maritime law 
and the exigencies of marine commerce only through the magic of 
symbolism. Many members of the federal judiciary are expert in 
maritime matters, partly as a result of the concentration of maritime 
cases in nineteen United States district courts. 374 However, as many 
of the cases discussed above show, the expertise is spotty. In most 
instances, procedural separateness seems to obfuscate rather than to 
promote understanding of uniquely admiralty considerations.375 The 
371. 373 F.2d at 581. 
372. 373 F.2d at 581. 
373. Our mythical separate court of admiralty, which did not [prior to the 
1966 merger] admit the joinder of non-maritime causes of action and did not pur-
port to offer equitable remedies, was well situated to apply the law of the sea. 
It looked to its own clearly· marked precedents to identify and to develop that 
law. It looked also to foreign law for information and authority on occasion. 
The successor to the court of admiralty, the United States District Court having 
jurisdiction impartially of actions in admiralty, in equity, and at law, and bound 
to accept complaints joining maritime and non-maritime claims, may find it in-
creasingly difficult to administer one rule of contract law applying to a charter-
party and another rule applying to a car rental agreement, or one rule of tort 
law applying to a ship collision and another rule applying to a collision between 
two automobiles, or one rule applying to a hull insurance policy and another 
rule applying to a standard fire policy. 
Crutcher, supra note 13, at 376-77. See also Wiswall, supra note 12, at 46-47. 
374. "Out of the 6020 admiralty cases commenced or pending as of June 30, 
1960, 5655 were in these 19 districts." 1960 Dm. ADMIN. OFFICE, U.S. COURTS 
ANN. REP., Table C-3a, at 240-47. 1960 was the last year separate admiralty sta-
tistics were kept. See Comment, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 594, supra note 108, at 605 n.57. 
See also Fiddler, supra note 13, at 16-17. 
375. In the words of the Advisory Committee, proposing the 1966 merger: 
To the extent that admiralty procedure differs from civil procedure, it is a mys-
tery to most trial and appellate judges, and to the nonspecialist lawyer who finds 
himself-sometimes to his surprise-involved in a case cognizable only on the 
admiralty "side" of the court. "Admiralty practice," said Mr. Justice Jackson, 
"is a unique system of substantive law and procedure with which members of 
this Court are singularly deficient in experience." Black Diamond S.S. Corp. 
v. Stewart & Sons, 336 U.S. 386, 403, 69 S. Ct. {;22, 93 L. Ed. 754 (1949) (dis-
senting opinion). The comment applies generally to all levels of the judiciary, 
The distinctiveness of substantive maritime law is a matter beyond the com-
1694 Michigan Law Review [Vol, 74: 1627 
mystery engendered by separatism makes the nonspecialist judge and 
attorney even more likely to err. 376 Since the unification, the silver 
oar has come to be not so much an awesome symbol of a genuinely 
specialist tribunal as an unfortunate and anachronistic signal of the 
"usual tendency of a particularistic, restrictive approach to procedure 
to drive out the more liberal view-the Gresham's law of procedure 
whereby the technical gloss supersedes the . . . liberalizing princi-
ple."377 
The 1966 merger of the admiralty and civil rules was accom-
plished with the belief that "simplification through unification has 
been the path of procedural progress since the codes of the mid-
nineteenth century."378 The task begun with that merger should be 
completed. A useful starting point would be legislation modelled 
after the proposed Federal Court Jurisdiction Act.379 The admiralty 
provisions in the proposal should be deleted as separate sections and 
rewritten into the federal question jurisdiction proposals as follows: 380 
§ 1311 Federal, question jurisdiction; original jurisdiction; 
exclusive jurisdiction 
(a) Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the dis-
trict courts shall have original jurisdiction, without regard to amount 
in controversy,381 of all civil actions, including those for declaratory 
or equitable382 relief, in which the initial pleading sets forth a sub-
stantial claim: 
petence of this Committee, even if we were disposed to concern ourselves with 
it; indeed, it is probably too much to hope that we can ever be spared the nec-
essity of more or less recondite bodies of substantive law, whether they relate 
to maritime affairs, or patents, or copyrights, or combinations in restraint of 
trade. It is multiplying the burden of the bench and bar, however, to require 
mastery of unnecessarily distinctive systems of practice and procedure. 
ADVISORY COMMI1TEE ON ADMIRALTY RULES, AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVJL 
PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS PROPOSED BY THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON ADMIRALTY RULES, 34 F.R.D. 331, 333-34 (1964) (emphasis added), 
376. See Romero v. Bethlehem Steel Corp,, 515 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1975), dis-
cussed in text at notes 8-11 supra. 
377. Cohn, supra note 13, at 232, quoting Clark, State Law in Federal Courts, 
55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946). 
378. Currie, supra note 13, at 14. 
379. See notes 33-43 supra and accompanying text. In the following discussion, 
the proposed Federal Court Jurisdiction Act of 1973 is taken as the beginning model. 
See S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973 ). 
380. The following is evidently quite similar to a suggestion made by Leaven• 
worth Colby, Admiralty Advisor to the American Law Institute, during the Institute's 
deliberations on the 1969 jurisdictional recommendations. See note 45 supra. 
381. The Federal Court Jurisdiction Act followed the recommendation of the 
American Law Institute in removing the amount in controversy requirement for all 
federal questions cases. While the proposal should be adopted, it is obviously not 
essential to integrating admiralty cases into the general federal question jurisdiction, 
since no monetary jurisdictional requirement has ever existed in admiralty. 
382. Adding the words "or equitable" to the proposal is probably unnecessary, but 
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(1 ) arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 
United States; 
(2) arising out of any admiralty or maritime matter, transaction, 
or occurrence. 383 
(b) The jurisdiction of the district courts shall be exclusive of the 
courts of the States in actions and proceedings under Title 11 except 
it seems desirable to provide explicitly against any continuation of the doubt about 
the equitable arsenal of a court exercising maritime jurisdiction. See notes 104-07 
supra and accompanying text. 
383. New subsection (2) simply lifts the proposal's section 1311 into the basic 
federal question grant. See S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 1311, 1316 (1973 ). 
The proposal suggested here does not include the fairly extensive language that ap-
peared in the Federal Court Jurisdiction Act attempting to clarify some of the con-
tours of the body of cases that involve "admiralty or maritime matter[s], transac-
tion[s], or occurrence[s]." S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 1316 (1973). If that kind 
of clarification is still deemed desirable, all of the language of the proposed section 
1316 in the Senate bill could be written into section 1311. While the decision whether 
to include all of that language is not central to the thesis here, it seems useful to point 
out reasons for believing it unnecessary. The SUpreme Court has been quite active in 
the maritime sphere since the ALi's recommendations were formulated. Each of the 
decisions rendered during the intervening period has clarified an aspect of the maritime 
law, and most of them operate toward clarification of the boundaries of the admiralty 
jurisdiction. Significantly, with the exception of Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 
Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), each important step taken since 1969 has been restrictive. 
We have been taught since 1969 that (1) Fixed offshore drilling platforms are is-
lands, not watercraft, and are to be treated almost as though they were real land, 
Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & SUr. Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969). See also Chevron Oil Co. 
v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971); (2) The pre-1972 Longshoremen's and Harbor Work-
ers' Compensation Act meant what it said when it limited its coverage to "navigable 
waters," and injuries on a pier are outside that coverage, Nacirema Operating Co. 
v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212 (1969). This outcome has been changed by the 1972 
amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, Act of 
October 27, 1972, P.L. 92-576, § 19, 86 Stat. 1263, amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 
(1970), approved October 27, 1972, effective November 27, 1972; (3) Longshoremen 
(and probably seamen) do not recover on the basis of breach of the warranty of 
seaworthiness when their injury stems from an instantaneous act of negligence; unsea-
worthiness depends on the existence of a condition over some period of time, Usner 
v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494 (1971); (4) A longshoreman hurt on 
a pier by pier-based equipment is a terrestrial tort victim, unable to enter the portals 
of the admiralty jurisdiction and the maritime law, Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 
U.S. 202 (1971). This outcome has perhaps been changed by the 1972 amendments 
to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, supra; (5) The fact 
that an injury or accident occurred on navigable water by itself is not enough to 
invoke the admiralty jurisdiction, when aircraft are involved, and probably more gen-
erally. See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972). 
It seems fairly obvious that a jurisprudential trend toward clarification and restric-
tion of the admiralty jurisdiction is under way; that is the sense in which the lower 
courts have been applying the SUpreme Court decisions. In the Executive I et case, 
the Court said admiralty cognizance of aircraft crashes depended upon some "sig-
nificant relationship to traditional maritime activity." 409 U.S. at 271. The tenor 
of the opinion suggested that the "significant maritime relationship" requirement 
probably should obtain respecting all questions of admiralty tort jurisdiction, and that 
is the way the lower courts have been reading Executive let. See St. Hilaire Moye 
v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 973 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 884 (1974); In re 
Motor Ship Pac. Carrier, 489- F.2d 152 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 931 
(1974); Onley v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 488 F.2d 758 (4th Cir. 1973); 
Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973); Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 
520 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974); Crosson v. Vance, 484 F.2d 
840 (4th Cir. 1973), . 
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as otherwise there provided; in actions under the patent or copyright 
law of the United States; in actions under the antitrust laws author-
ized by section 15 or 26 of title 15; in ·actions on bonds of contractors 
for public buildings or works authorized by section 270b of title 40; 
and in actions brought under section 185 of title 46 for limitation of 
liability, admiralty and maritime actions brought against the United 
States and its agencies, and in all admiralty and maritime actions 
that proceed in rem or by maritime attacbment.384 In all other 
actions within subsection (a) of this section, jurisdicition of the 
district courts shall be concurrent with the courts of the States. 
This suggestion accomplishes my basic aim, integration of the 
admiralty into the federal question jurisdiction. Other admiralty 
proposals in the federal court jurisdiction acts dealt with re-
moval, 385 process and venue, 386 and jury trial. 387 The removal recom-
mendation mirrored the prevailing view of existing law in one respect, 
by disallowing removal of in personam actions unless there is a 
federal jurisdictional basis other than admiralty,388 and deviated from 
it in another, by providing for removal of exclusively admiralty actions 
mistakenly brought in state court. Under my proposed integration of 
the admiralty jurisdictional grant into the federal question section, no 
separate provision for admiralty removal would be necessary. The 
proposed change, removal of exclusively admiralty cases, would fol-
low from the general federal question removal section;389 moreover, 
once admiralty is made a subcategory of federal question jurisdiction, 
· there will no longer be a plausible argument for prohibiting removal 
of concurrent jurisdiction admiralty cases. With respect to venue and 
process, the peculiarly admiralty proposals presented in section 1318 
of the federal court jurisdiction acts could, in a purely mechanical 
fashion, be added as separate subsections to the provisions of the 
general federal question venue and process section.300 
The effect of the proposed blending of the admiralty into the 
federal question jurisdiction upon the availability of jyry trial in 
maritime cases should not be left to judicial inference. An appropri-
ate resolution of the jury trial matter was contained in the proposed 
Federal Court Jurisdiction Act, which provided that in any case of 
384. What is proposed here is that the Senate bill's provisions on admiralty 
jurisdiction, S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 1316(b) (1973), be added, verbatim, 
to the exclusive jurisdiction portion of the federal question proposal, id.§ 1311. 
385. S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1317 (1973 ). 
386. Id. § 1318. 
387. Id. § 1319. 
388. See ALI STuov, supra note 23, at 239-45. But see Monarch Indus. Corp. 
v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 276 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
389. See S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 1312 (1973). 
390. See id. §§ 1314, 1318. 
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admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, "except for actions for limitation 
of liability under section 185 of title 46, United States Code, and 
actions against the United States and its agencies, any claim in 
personam limited to money damages for personal injuries or death 
shall be tried by a jury if any party demands it."391 The question 
may arise of how best to integrate this proposal into the Judicial 
Code. A convenient place for such an insertion may be found in 28 
U.S.C. § 1873,392 which presently provides a limited right to jury trial 
for maritime claims relating to matters occurring on the Great Lakes. 
Although usually viewed as an anachronism reminiscent of a peculiar 
period in the nineteenth-century development of American admiralty 
jurisdiction, 393 the statute could easily accommodate a new subsection 
that would incorporate the present jury trial recommendation. 394 
This proposal to integrate the admiralty with the federal question 
jurisdiction would necessitate modest amendment of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Admiralty cases under the proposed sec-
tion 1311 (a) ( 2) 395 would continue to be "admiralty and maritime 
claims"396 within the meaning of rule 9(h). A plaintiff with admi-
ralty as his only federal jurisdictional basis would continue to be a 
maritime plaintiff under that rule; a plaintiff with an additional basis 
for federal jurisdiction would still be permitted the choice of proceed-
ing on the basis of maritime jurisdiction. In either case, the proce-
391. Id. § 1319. 
392. The statute presently reads: 
In any case of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction relating to any matter of 
contract or tort arising upon or concerning any vessel of twenty tons or upward, 
enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade, and employed in the business of 
commerce and navigation between places in different states upon the lakes and 
navigable waters connecting said lakes, the trial of all issues of fact shall be by 
jury if either party demands it. 
28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1970). I am indebted to Leavenworth Colby, Admiralty Adviser 
to the American Law Institute, for the idea of using this statute as a vehicle for the 
new jury trial provision. See note 45 supra. 
393. See N. HEALY & B. CURRIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMIRALTY 27-30 
(1965). 
394. The statute would then read: 
(a) In any case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, except for actions for 
limitation of liability under section 185 of title 46, United States Code, and ac-
tions against the United States and its agencies, any claim in personam limited 
to money damages for personal injuries or death shall be tried by a jury if any 
party demands it. (b) In any case of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction relat-
ing to any matter of contract or tort arising upon or concerning any vessel of 
twenty tons or upward, enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade, and em-
ployed in the business of commerce and navigation between places in different 
states upon the lakes and navigable waters connecting said lakes, the trial of all 
issues of fact shall be by jury if either party demands it. 
It may be that the Great Lakes jury provision ought to be changed or abolished, but 
this is not the place to argue that matter. 
395. See text at note 383 supra. 
396. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(h). 
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dural consequences specified in rule 9(h) would survive. However, if 
all the present recommendations were adopted, the second sentence of 
rule 82 and the reference thereto in rule 9(h) would be deleted. 807 
Further, while not essential, the following revision of rule 38(e)808 
would clarify matters: 
( e) Admiralty and Maritime Claims 
An admiralty or maritime claim within the meaning of Rule 9 (h) 
shall be governed by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 1873. In 
respects not covered by that statute, these rules shall not be con-
strued to create a right to trial by jury of the issues in an admiralty 
or maritime claim within the meaning of Rule 9 (h). 
After these changes in the rules, several special procedures for ad-
miralty and maritime claims under rule 9 (h) will still exist: third-
party practice under rule 14(c) ;399 interlocutory appeals under 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3);400 trial by judge alone, except as provided in 
the amended28 U.S.C. § 1873.401 
The proposed integration of the admiralty and the federal ques-
tion jurisdictions would not affect the source of substantive law in 
maritime cases. As stressed above, 402 that law is presumptively 
federal. The task of determining when and to what extent state 
principles should apply is a preeminently judicial one, and is "among 
the most difficult and subtle that . . . courts are called upon to 
make."403 These necessary choice-of-law determinations under my 
proposal would be neither easier nor more difficult than at present, 
although I believe some of the mistakes discussed earlier in this 
article404 would be somewhat more difficult to commit. The inclu-
sion of the words "or maritime" in the suggested incorporation of 
397. That sentence reads: "An admiralty or maritime claim within the meaning 
of Rule 9(h) shall not be treated as a civil action for the purposes of Title 28, U.S.C. 
§§ 1391-93." FED. R. CIV. P. 82. Under the recommendation to write the proposals 
of the federal court jurisdiction acts on admiralty venue and process into the gen-
eral federal question venue and process sections, the caveat would no longer be neces• 
sary. See text at note 390 supra. 
398. Rule 38(e) now states: "These rules shall not be construed to create a right 
to trial by jury of the issues in an admiralty or maritime claim within the meaning 
of Rule 9(h)." FED. R. Crv. P. 38(e). Since the present recommendation would 
entail amending 28 U.S.C. § 1873 to make specific provision for jury trial on some 
admiralty and maritime cases, see notes 391-94 supra and accompanying text, rule 
38(e)'s disclaimer of any effect of the rules themselves on jury trial could stand. 
See note 261 supra. 
399. See notes 141-46 supra and accompanying text. 
400. See notes 353-58 supra and accompanying text. 
401. See notes 390-94, 398 supra and accompanying text. 
402. See notes 316-35 supra and accompanying text. 
403. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 375 (1959), 
404. See notes 316-35 supra and accompanying text. 
August 1976] Admiralty Procedure and Jurisdiction 1699 
admiralty into the federal question jurisdiction405 is intended to make 
clear that this delicate choice-of-law balance would be unaffected. 
The proposal to make admiralty and maritime cases a subcategory 
of federal question cases closely approaches the result rejected by the 
Supreme Court in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.406 
In that case, the Supreme Court was asked to conclude that the terms 
of the present federal question statute407 were broad enough to ac-
commodate cases arising under the general maritime law.408 A five-
member majority refused to do so, reasoning that the words of the 
present federal question grant trace to the Judiciary Act of 1875, 
which directly tracks the language of Article ID, section 2, clause 1, 
of the Constitution; similarly, the co-equal admiralty grant traces 
back to the language of Article ID. There was thus every indication 
that Congress, like the Framers, meant to distinguish cases of admi-
ralty and maritime jurisdiction from those arising under federal laws. 
Nothing in the Romero opinion even remotely suggests that it is 
beyond the power of Congress to integrate the federal question and 
admiralty jurisdictions. Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion does 
stress that Article ID of the Constitution plainly erects federal ques--
tion cases as one category of judicial power, and admiralty and 
maritime cases as another. He was impressed with the fact that "in 
dealing with a subject as technical as the jurisdiction of the courts, the 
Framers, predominately lawyers, used precise, differentiating, and not 
redundant language."409 But this distinction in the Constitution 
militates only against interpreting a statutory scheme based on the· 
words of the Constitution as somehow blurring the distinction; it does 
not erect a constitutional bar to an alternative statutory rendering. 
Justice Frankfurter explicitly addressed this issue: "It is a statute, 
405. See note 383 supra and accompanying text. 
406. 358 U.S. 354 (1959). 
407. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970): "The district courts shall have original juris-
diction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value 
of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, 
or treaties of the United States." 
408. The Supreme Court was being urged to hold that cases arising under the gen-
eral maritime law also arise under federal law in the sense necessary to sustain fed-
eral question jurisdiction. This proposition was put forth as an answer to the problem 
of trying the typical three-pronged seaman's personal injury action. The Jones Act 
gives such a plaintiff access to the "law side" of the federal court and to a jury; nat-
urally, there was pressure also to take the maintenance and cure and unseaworthiness 
claims that typically accompany a Jones Act claim to the jury. Plaintiffs in Romero 
urged that the maintenance and cure and unseaworthiness claims arose under federal 
law, so that all three claims could be tried to the jury. The Court rejected that argu-
ment, but did hold that the two general maritime law claims could be heard in the 
federal district court, law side, as pendent to the Jones Act claim. See notes 115, 
231-39 supra and accompanying text. 
409. 358 U.S. at 364. 
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not a Constitution, we are expounding. Of course the many limita-
tions which have been placed on jurisdiction under section 1331 are 
not limitations on the constitutional power of Congress to confer 
jurisdiction in the federal courts."410 
Nor does Romero offer any argument against the wisdom of inte-
grating the jurisdictional grants in the wake of the 1966 merger. 
Indeed, Justice Frankfurter indicated that the Court could have read 
the present federal question grant to include maritime cases if sound 
reasons for policy had dictated such a reading: "Of course if com-
pelling reasons can be found for redefining the statute, if an ancient 
error cries out for rectification, we should not be deterred from 
applying new illuminations to the interpretation of past enact-
ments."411 The failure of the Romero majority in 1959 to find 
reasons sufficient to support what it considered a strained interpreta-
tion of section 1331 hardly constitutes an argument against present 
legislative action to complete the unification project begun ten years 
, ago.412 
The motivation for this article is a self-described generalist bias 
against unnecessary separatism, esoterism, and specialization. It 
seems obvious that few of the effects of civil/ admiralty concep-
tualism detailed in section ill of this paper should have survived the 
1966 merger of the admiralty with the civil rules. Yet as Professor 
Brainerd Currie pointed out in his analysis of the Romero case, there 
is something "seductive [about the] influence of thinking in dichoto-
mous terms of the admiralty and civil jurisdictions. "418 Six years 
later, writing about the imminent merger of the civil and admiralty 
rules, Currie was forgivably exultant: "One may understand and 
respect the preference of the admiralty bar for a separate set of rules; 
yet I must say that, given the demonstration of the extent to which 
uniformity is feasible, unification seems compelled by the logic of 
history."414 The exultation was premature. As I sought to demon-
410. 358 U.S. at 379 & n.51. 
411. 358 U.S. at 380. 
412. The commentary inspired by Romero was generally favorable to the resolu-
tion reached by the majority. See CUrrie, supra note 235; Kurland, supra note 235. 
But nothing therein is pertinent as an argument against the proposal to combine the 
admiralty and the federal question jurisdictions by amendment to the Judicial Code. 
Indeed, the best-known commentary, CUrrie, supra note 235, is at bottom a diatribe 
against precisely the kind of separatism being decried here. In Professor CUrrie's 
view, the problem that gave rise to the issue in Romero was itself a product of arti-
ficial separatist thinking about the nature of the admiralty jurisdiction. 
413. CUrrie, supra note 235, at 14. 
414. CUrrie, supra note 13, at 13. Professor CUrrie's firm convictions against 
separatism have been well known and sometimes deplored. One commentator stated: 
[I1he protective feature of the General Rules-the forced awareness that Ad-
miralty was "different"-was ignored by many who propounded unification, and 
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strate in this article,· civil/ admiralty separatism is still very much with 
us. It is time to take aim once again at the goal of unification, so that 
it may yet be possible accurately to state: "We now have one form 
of civil action. Libels, . libelants, respondents, exceptions, petitions 
and monitions have met the fate of the Dodo bird, and maybe even 
proctors are going the way of the duck billed platypus."415 
the cloaking of the substance of Admiralty law in quaint antique terminologies 
was scoffed at by many others as a pseudo-mystery by which the proctors, as 
the only initiates, snobbishly contrived to set themselv~s above and apart from 
the Bench and their brothers at the Bar. It cannot tarnish the valuable contribu-
tions to the literature of Admiralty by the late Professor Brainerd Currie • . • 
to cite his single-minded zeal for reform and his widely-held view that while Ad-
miralty had become a relatively unimportant area of the law, and the unification 
about to take place ·was not an event comparable with the 1938 merger of Law 
and Equity, it was still a necessary duty to ring out the old, ring in the new, 
and welcome Admiralty to the dynamic twentieth century Law and Equity Club 
on an equal footing .. 
Wiswall, supra note 12, at 47. · 
415. Bradley, supra note 13, at 260. Genuine specialists in maritime law will 
not fear the unfrocking. As pointed out shortly after unification: "We do not think 
that specialization in admiralty practice will be affected by the unification of the 
rules. . . . [S]pecialization is not primarily a matter of procedure, but a matter of 
substantive law and know-how in the field of specialization." Tweedt, supra note 
13, at 237. 
ANNOUNCEMENT OF AWARDS AND PRIZES 
JASON L. HONIGMAN AWARD FOR 1975-1976 
This award has been given to Charlotte Crane, Elizabeth Goddard Gentry and 
Andrew H. Marks in recognition of their outstanding contribution as editors of the 
Michigan Law Review. 
HOWARD B. COBLEN1Z PRIZE FOR 1975-1976 
This priz.e has been awarded to Yvonne S. Quinn and Lyman Franklin Spitzer 
in recognition of their contribution as Associate Editors of the Michigan Law Review. 
ABRAM N. SEMPLINER MEMORIAL AWARD FOR 1976-1977 
This award has been given to Robert H. Gorlin, Editor-in-Chief of Volume 75 
of the Michigan Law Review, in recognition of his superior scholastic record, ef-
fective leadership, and outstanding contribution to the Review. 
BODMAN-LONGLEY AWARD FOR 1976-1977 
This award has been given to William L Cathey, Robert H. Jerry II, and Steven 
P. McDonald in recognition of their superior scholastic records and their contribution 
to the Michigan Law Review in their junior year. 
RAYMOND K. DYKEMA AWARD FOR 1976-1977 
This award has been given to Bruce A. Featherstone and Daniel K. Tarullo for 
significant contribution to the Michigan Law Review during their junior year and in 
recognition of qualifications that indicate the likelihood of future contributions to the 
legal profession. 
